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Franchise and Legitimacy.
An analysis with reference to England's history of electoral law.
In  the present paper I aim to analyse how the franchise can be distributed legitimately, i.e. 
according to the principles of freedom, equality and reasonable acceptability. For this purpose 
I use the example of the English history of electoral law in order to gain insights into actual 
franchise  patterns.  By  systematizing  the  underlying  justifications  of  the  so-found 
qualifications I develop an analytical framework that can be used to assess the legitimacy, not 
only  of  the  English  suffrage  but  of  any  potential  distribution  of  voting  rights.  The  key 
conclusions are that a certain combination of citizenship/residence qualifications is legitimate, 
as are minimum age and mental sanity requirements. However, the exclusion of prisoners, 
conscientious objectors, or disenfranchisement based on property and sex can not be justified.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Democratic institutions have intrinsic moral value.”1
In recent political theory the discourse has often focused on the special value and significance 
of the democratic political process. In fact, democracy is mostly discussed in the context of 
justice and legitimacy, with authors often concentrating on the demonstration of democracy's 
intrinsic  value.  Its  foundations,  however,  i.e.  those  conditions  that  render  the  democratic 
political  process  possible  in  the  first  place,  are  hardly  ever  questioned.  Instead  they  are 
presumed to be “legitimate”, “just” or simply “pre-given” as such. In the first part of my 
paper I aim to reject this assumption by pointing out a precondition of democracy that, if  
constituted illegitimately, renders a democracy as such illegitimate: the demos.
Starting off from Lincoln's description of democracy as  “government of the people, by the  
people and for the people” I will first explicate the conception of democracy that I endorse in 
the present paper. I argue it is a form of constitutional government that comes into being 
through regular free and fair elections in which all members of  “the people” have a right to 
an equal say. It is a political concept, which is why the issue of coercive enforceability is  
crucial. There are several other participatory rights commonly associated with democracy, but 
it  is  primarily the “democratic say” that distinguishes  democracy from all  other  forms of 
political organisation. No matter what particular conception of democracy we adopt, those in 
charge of political decisions always recruit from, belong to and are, in the end, the same as 
1 Christiano,  Tom: The Constitution of  Equality.  Democratic  Authority and its  Limits.,  Oxford  University 
Press, 2009, p. 2
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those who are governed by them. Thus, what makes democracy special is the congruence of 
the people ruling and those ruled.  The problem is  that it  is  not at  all  obvious who those 
“people” are, let alone who “all” of them are. This ambiguity will be the main focus of my 
paper,  because  through my clarification of  the concept  of  “legitimacy”  I  will  show  that 
democracy is  quite often charged with normative aspirations that we should be careful to 
accept. For example, the concept of “democratic legitimacy” states that democracy uniquely 
realizes the normative requirements of legitimacy – namely freedom, equality and reasonable 
acceptability – and therefore claims that democracy itself is a requirement. However, I aim to 
show that democracy's legitimacy fundamentally depends on the premise that the demos is 
constituted according to principles that are themselves legitimate. Hence democracy can only 
be legitimate if both its demos and the political process live up to those standards. Theorists  
have spent a lot of time and energy defending the latter. But what renders a demos legitimate?
In the third part of this paper I will try to answer this question by constructing a systematic 
framework of principles that can be used to distribute the franchise legitimately. In order to 
define what kind of in- and exclusions are justified, I will use the second part of this paper to  
give an overview of English electoral law, because it is an example for how democracy may 
develop in regards to its people. I will analyse which qualifications are currently used for 
dis-/enfranchisement and on what basis  they have evolved.  The main questions are:  Who 
enjoys suffrage? On what grounds has suffrage been granted? And: How have the answers to 
those  questions  changed  over  time?  It  is  crucial  to  acknowledge  that  the  aim  of  this 
assessment is not actually historic, but theoretical, as is the purpose of this paper. That is to 
say I do not mean to provide an exhaustive study of the history of England's electoral system, 
but  rather  give  an account  of  its  franchise patterns  in  a  way that  allows me to arrive at 
theoretical principles that can be used to develop a general system of franchise distribution. 
To this system I can then apply the concepts of legitimacy so to conclude, not only whether 
English franchise regulations are legitimate, but also whether their underlying justifications 
are. I thus mean to use this example to answer the general question of how to legitimately 
constitute a demos. Note that I will integrate political and historical as well as theoretical 
literature, in order to allow for a more comprehensive insight into potential franchise patterns 
and their justifications.
In sum, the question this paper seeks to answer is: Who should get the right to vote? Or, put 
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differently, how should franchise be regulated in a legitimate democracy? This means I will 
only deal with the legal aspects of franchise distribution, not with de-facto aspects such as 
indirect barriers to voting. I will not make any assumptions about whether the democratic 
political  process  is  actually  as  “intrinsically  legitimate”  as  some authors  like  to  suggest, 
because  for  the  present  purpose  it  suffices  to  argue  that  (legal)  franchise  is  a  central 
precondition for democracy and that therefore it is necessary to analyse its legitimacy.
3

II. THEORETICAL CLARIFICATIONS
1. Democracy
1.1 Introduction
When searching for a definition of democracy2 that is accurate, but at the same time allows to 
capture its spirit and the normative ideals associated with it, it is almost impossible not to 
stumble across an aphorism attributed to the American president Abraham Lincoln. To him, 
democracy was “government of the people, by the people and for the people”3. I have decided 
to pick up on this quote, not only because it is a very popular slogan, but also because it is a 
good starting point for clarifying the slightly different conception of democracy that I will be 
working upon in the present paper. Note that I do not presume that any of those clarifications 
are what Lincoln himself had in mind, but that I view it as a formulation which can be used in 
order to provide structure to my own argument.
I will proceed by firstly analysing three central aspects of Lincoln's definition: First, he states 
that  democracy is  “government”4. This is crucial because it renders democracy a political 
2 Note that my work will be concerned with modern democracy only. It is not possible within the limited scope  
of this paper to consider both ancient as well as modern versions of democracy. See e.g. Sartori, Giovanni:  
Demokratietheorie., Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006, pp. 274-288 for exhausting comparison.
3 Note that he is claimed to have used this formulation in the famous “Gettysburg Address”, a public speech  
held  in  Gettysburg,  Pennsylvania  on  19  November  1863.  For  reference  see  e.g. 
http://showcase.netins.net/web/creative/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm (last visited on 12 April 2010, 11:11) 
or Sartori, Giovanni: Demokratietheorie., Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006, p. 44 [Note that I refer 
to the German version of this book where it literally says “Regierung des Volkes, durch das Volk, für das 
Volk.”.  However,  I  have  used  several  websites  to  confirm  my  English  translation  ,  e.g.  
http://www.democracy.ru/english/quotes.php (last  visited  on  18  April  2010,  12:28)  or 
http://thinkexist.com/quotation/democracy_is_the_government_of_the_people-by_the/6959.html (last visited 
on 17 April 2010, 18:37)].
4 Note  that  some  theorists  might  contest  the  idea  that  democracy primarily  is  a  concept  of  government.  
However, I agree with Pennock in his observation that the “primary meaning” of democracy “relates to a  
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concept and that brings with it a specific set of implications which must not be overlooked. 
Second, to Lincoln democracy is government “of”, “by” and “for” the people. I will concede 
to the former two interpretations while deliberately cautioning against the latter. Last, I will 
turn to the aspect of  the “people” and I will suggest that while this term is obviously most  
prominent within the quote, it has strangely often been overlooked by democratic theorists. I 
aim to deviate from this tradition in that the “people” and its role and significance within the 
concept of democracy will be the main focus of my paper. Actually, I will go even further and 
argue that it is central to democracy's legitimacy too. Hence I will have used Lincoln's quote 
to lay down the groundwork of my own argument.
1.2 Democracy as a strictly political concept
Lincoln  referred  to  democracy  as  a  form of  government5.  This  is  important,  because  it 
clarifies that democracy is first and foremost a political concept and is thus not to be confused 
with  just  any kind  of  majoritarian  decision-making.  Instead  the “political”,  or  “narrow”, 
reading of the term implies that democracy is primarily concerned with making collectively 
binding decisions6.  Its main function is to create laws, i.e.  rules that every member of its 
community is bound to abide by. What is more, those rules are enforceable and hence a matter 
of coercion.  On the other hand, a  “general”,  or “wide”,  conception of democracy would 
suggest that it is not limited to the political realm, but that it refers to any sort of collective 
decision-making procedure which satisfies certain procedural requirements. I will argue that 
despite procedural similarities, it is nonetheless crucial that I commit to a political conception 
in the present paper. 
In order to illustrate the difference, let us consider the following example: It is Saturday night 
and a group of friends decides to go to the cinema together7. There are several movies on, but 
none of them appeal to everyone and there is disagreement about what to watch, therefore 
they decide to hold a vote. Everyone has an equal say, and whichever movie has the most 
form of government” (see Pennock, Roland: Democratic Political Theory., Princeton University Press, 1979, 
p. 3)
5 Note  that  some  might  feel  confused  by  my defining  democracy  as  “government”  instead  of  a  sort  of 
government-producing  procedure.  However,  by defining democracy as  a  particular  sort  of  government  I 
actually invite the explication that it is special due to the specific set of procedures (e.g. free elections) that  
bring that government into being.
6 See e.g. Dahl, Robert: Democracy and its critics., Yale University Press, 1915, pp. 106-107.
7 Note that David Estlund has inspired the following example when he offered a very similar one at a peer  
discussion at Warwick University in January 2009. 
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supporters is the one that they will watch together. This seems rather “democratic” compared 
to other options. For example, they could simply get annoyed by their disagreement and thus 
cancel movie-night altogether. While this would certainly prevent favouring any one person's 
movie preference,  it  would also be defeating the original purpose of movie nigh thought. 
Another option would be to simply split up, each of them going to see the movie of their 
choice. This way each of them would be able to see their most preferred film. Yet at the same 
time they would be quitting on going out together. They might therefore draw the conclusion 
to simply flip a coin and take their chances, still holding on to the idea of going in as a group. 
All of them would then assert an equal chance of having their movie preference realized, but 
in the end most of them would end up not seeing their preferred movie.
What makes the first option seem so much more “democratic”8 than the other scenarios, is 
that it involves the familiar act of “voting” and of having a majority decide, elements which 
we know well  from the  political  democratic  process.  What  is  more,  it  actually  depicts  a 
collective decision-making  procedure:  A group  is  making  a  decision  together  as a  group 
(instead of individually and each for their own), and they are actually making a decision on 
the issue at hand (not simply quitting in the face of disagreement). Furthermore, they do so by 
using a specific procedure (voting and aggregating preferences). All of this indeed resembles 
“democracy”.  However,  there  is  one  important  characteristic  that  this  situation  lacks:  the 
matter of bindingness or enforceability. Even if the majority of my friends decides that we are 
going to see movie A, I may still drop out and not do it. Perhaps they will be angry, but it is  
not likely that they will quit our friendship over it, and – no matter their disappointment – 
they are not in any way entitled to drag me in to see the movie with them. This is because how 
I choose to spend my evening is not their decision to make, not even if we are friends, not  
even if I behave unreasonably – it just is not a collective matter, so to speak.
In contrast,  consider another example: Imagine a democratic referendum on whether or not a 
certain tax law should be implemented. Again, every member of the community, e.g. each 
citizen, has an equal vote and an opportunity to use it. However, the point is that no matter my 
initial preference, if the collective decision is in favour of the new tax law, I will still end up 
having to abide by this rule. Trying  not to will most likely result in the state taking the money 
8 See Christiano, Tom: Democracy., In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (first published online on 27 July 
2006 - http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democracy/, last visited on 11 April 2010, 23:13) for a definition of 
democracy that would allow for this situation to actually be called democratic.
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away from me anyway,  or in me having to leave the country.  This is because state taxes  
actually are a matter of collective interest and being a member of society brings with it the 
responsibility to abide by rules that protect what is in the collective interest. Thus, in this case, 
even if I dislike the result of the collective decision, even if it is to my own disadvantage, I am 
not able to drop out (not usually, at least).  This shows that in the case of political democratic 
decisions, when they have the form of laws that is, the matter of enforceability is pressing, 
because (within a constitutional state at least) those rules always have binding force.
What those two examples are supposed to show is that despite their procedural similarities 
there  still  is  a  crucial  difference  between  “general”  and  “political”  democracy.  We  may 
consider both cases of collective decision-making procedures, but the degree of collectivity is 
different and this results in a different degree of bindingness and enforceability – collective 
decisions do not generally have binding force over others9, but laws do.
In the present paper I will therefore work with a political conception of democracy. As we 
have seen, this definition is narrow in the sense that it excludes “private” situations. However 
the limitation does not refer to the content of decisions (e.g. in the sense that politics would be 
limited to questions of conquest and power10), but to the specific background of collectivity 
which leads to coercive enforceability. Regarding collectivity, I suggest that politics is about 
matters that  fundamentally affect all people within a certain group and that it affects them 
collectively, because it shapes the “basic structures” - that is, its “main political, social, and  
economic  institutions,  and how they  fit  together”11.  Regarding enforceability,  I  argue  that 
democracy  should  be  understood  as  “a  way  of  making  coercively  enforceable  collective  
decisions”12 and that therefore one of the key questions is about “legitimate coercion”13. The 
very concept of (political) democracy is hence intimately linked with questions of what may 
9 Note that this is not to say that there never is any coercion (or never any legitimate coercion) within the 
private realm. I do claim, however, that it is of a different nature.
10 See  Sartori,  Giovanni:  Demokratietheorie.,  Wissenschaftliche  Buchgesellschaft,  2006,  ch.  3  for  further 
remarks on that issue.
11 Note  that  I  have  borrowed  this  formulation  from  John  Rawls  (see  Rawls,  John:  Political  Liberalism.,  
Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 11), but slightly simplified it in order to make it fit my own conception.  
For Rawls, the basic structure of society has much graver implications, because he presupposes that it refers 
to a “closed” (ibid, p. 12)., “democratic” (ibid. p. 11) society that members enter only by birth and leave only 
by death (ibid. p. 12).
12 Coleman,  Jules:  Rationality  and  justification  of  democracy.,  In:  Christiano,  Tom (Ed.):  Philosophy and 
Democracy., Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 216
13 Coleman,  Jules:  Rationality  and  justification  of  democracy.,  In:  Christiano,  Tom (Ed.):  Philosophy and 
Democracy., Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 218
8
be enforceable, how we should decide upon that, and, obviously, who should be in charge of 
this decision.
1.3 Democracy – Government “of”, “by” and “for” the people?
As we have seen, American president Abraham Lincoln described democracy as government 
“of the people, by the people and for the people”. In the present section I will now turn to 
analyse  each  of  those  ascriptions.  I  suggest  that  they  all  refer  to  important  strands  of 
democratic thought, and that it is actually quite common for them to be referred to in the same 
breath. Yet, I claim that they are nonetheless distinct and should actually be treated that way.
1.3.1 Democracy – Government of the people
Lincoln's first ascription is that democracy is  “government of the people”. Obviously there 
are two possible ways to construe this14. First, it can be understood to mean that democracy is 
a form of politics where “the people” have governmental authority. On the other hand, the 
formulation  could  also  be  seen  to  declare  the  exact  opposite,  namely  that  democracy  is 
politics in the sense that it  governs the people. On the one interpretation the people are (at 
least  part  of)  the  government,  on the other  they are merely subjected to  it.  In  fact,  both 
perspectives hold some truth and need to be combined in order to understand the nature of 
democratic politics.
The  former  interpretation  simply  states  that  the  people  are  the  subjects  of  democratic 
government. This may be seen as a confirmation of my argument in the previous section, 
where I claimed that democracy has to be understood first and foremost as a political concept. 
It means that democracy's main function is to create binding rules, i.e. these rules bind the 
people as  their  subjects.   This  is  indeed a  key feature of  democracy in  that  it  renders  it 
political, yet it is in no way unique to it. Any form of effective government has this function.  
It  is  therefore  not  a  strictly  democratic  characteristic  at  all,  but  rather  a  consequence  of 
politics' nature more generally. However, the opposite is true if we combine it with the latter  
interpretation, which states that in democracy the people actually form,  are, or make up, the 
government.  It  claims that the people are the ones having political  authority and thus the 
14 See Sartori, Giovanni: Demokratietheorie., Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006, p. 44 for a very similar 
version of the following analysis.
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power  to  create  binding laws15.  If  we combine  this  with  the  fact  that  the  people  are  the 
subjects of the democratic government, it means that “the people” are both ruling and ruled at 
the same time. Government and those subjected to it are therefore one and the same16. This 
indeed is a fairly unique characteristic, because it is by no means common to all forms of 
government. This feature is therefore distinctly democratic in that it distinguishes democracy 
from other forms of political organisation17.  
In sum, I thus conclude that democracy is indeed “government of the people”, in the sense 
that those ruling actually belong to and recruit from the people who are ruled18, and this is 
what marks out democracy as such.
1.3.2 Democracy – Government by the people
I  will  now  analyse  Lincoln's  definition  of  democracy  as  “government  by  the  people”. 
According to Giovanni Sartori this part of the quote is most difficult to flesh out and he claims 
that it does not actually add relevant insights about democracy's nature. Instead he claims that 
it shows how Lincoln's statement is mostly rhetoric and that the only reason we read so much  
into  it  is  simply  because  we  associate  Lincoln  himself  with  so  many  “democratic” 
achievements19. I disagree, arguing that Lincoln's aphorism is in fact a good starting point for 
clarifying some of the most important aspects of democracy. Consequently, I do think that the 
formulation  of  democracy  as  “government  by  the  people” does  hold  some  significant 
15 Note that it is not possible within the limited scope of this paper to justify my definition of political authority  
(having the power to create laws that bind others). For detailed discussion of various concepts please see one  
of the following: Christiano, Tom: Authority., In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (first published online 
on 2 July 2004 - http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/authority/, last visited on 15 April 2010, 12:13); Christiano, 
Tom: The constitution of equality. Democratic authority and its limits., Oxford University Press, 2008, ch. 6.;  
Dagger, Richard: Political Obligation., In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (published online on  17 
April  2007 - http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-obligation/, last visited on 15 April 2010, 12:13); Raz, 
Joseph (Ed.): Authority., New York University Press, 1990.
16 Note that this hints at  another important characteristic of democracy: constitutionalism. Since the people 
making the rules are the same that are ruled by them, no one is exempt from the rules and democracy thus fits  
an important aspect of the rule-of-law principle.
17 See Christiano, Tom: The constitution of equality. Democratic authority and its limits., Oxford University 
Press, 2008, espec. ch. 3 for arguments how democracy is unique.
18 Note that this is true for both direct as well as representative forms of democracy: Even if only a few elected  
representatives are actually involved in formulating, passing and implementing laws, all members of “the  
people”  can  actually  run  for  office  and  can  thereby  become  one  of  those  few.  In  this  sense,  even  if  
government is not literally made up by the whole set of “the people” (as it might be in very pure forms of 
direct democracy), it is still made up by a part of exactly those. In this sense they are still the same. Or, as  
Pennock puts it:  “power resides in the people as a whole” (see  Pennock, Roland: Democratic Political 
Theory., Princeton University Press, 1979, p. 3).
19 See Sartori, Giovanni: Demokratietheorie., Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006, pp. 44-45
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insights20.
So far, we were able to define democracy as a concept of politics in which a certain set people 
is both, ruled but also ruling at the same time. It has thus become obvious that democracy is 
indeed  “government  of  the  people”.  However,  it  has  not  yet  been  clarified  what  actual 
procedure brings this sort of government into being . I suggest that it is this very aspect, the 
one of democratic political procedure, that the present formulation hints at. This is because by 
stating that democracy  is  “government by the people” one could also be saying that it  is 
elected by (and therefore ultimately legitimised by) them21.  
What is special about that? In fact, there are two important features to democratic elections. 
First, in modern democracies it is not usually the whole set of people ruling22, at least not 
directly in the sense that they all have a seat in government. Instead it is far more common for 
them to elect  representatives (from their  mids),  and to  allow them to make the laws, i.e. 
decisions that bind not only themselves, but rather the people collectively.  The process of 
election is important, then, because even those who are not literally part of the government are 
nevertheless actively involved in the creation of the institution that makes their collectively 
binding decisions – they get to elect those in office23. Moreover, it is crucial to the concept of 
democracy that they get to do so on a fairly regular basis24.
Note  that  this  aspect  has  become  even  more  important  since  modern  democracies  most 
commonly take the form of parliamentary party systems and this allows for the formation of a 
parliamentary opposition.  With this  institution in  place,  all25 chosen representatives are  in 
office some way or another, and they all play a vital role in the shaping of collectively binding 
decisions26. This is because of the following reason: If it was only the actual rulers that were 
20 Note that  I  am not  claiming that  Lincoln himself  meant to  subsume this definition. Yet I  ague that  his  
formulation can very aptly be used to clarify what I deem an important clarification.
21 I recognize that we have not talked about legitimacy yet, so this formulation has anticipatory status at the 
present point. 
22 See Bogdanar, Vernon: The people and the party system. The referendum and electoral reform in British  
politics., Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 2
23 See Sartori, Giovanni: Demokratietheorie., Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006, ch. 2.3 for an analysis 
of how the delegation of power can be dangerous nevertheless and even in democracy.
24 See e.g. Dahl, Robert: Democracy and its critics., Yale University Press, 1915, p. 233
25 Note that it may not be “all” in the strict sense of the word, but it is at least more than the ruling majority.
26 See e.g. the work of Kurt Kluxen for details on the role and significance of the parliamentary opposition in  
democracy (e.g. “Das Problem der polititschen Oppostion.”, Verlag Karl Alber, 1956, espec. ch. 7 and 8;  
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elected,  the  people  would  still  be  the  ones  appointing  them.  However,  since  election 
procedures  tend  to  include  some  sort  of  majoritarian  mechanism  in  order  to  aggregate 
individual choices, not everyone would be able to secure his/her preferred representative a 
place in government. Government would still be representing the people as a collective, but 
perhaps not all of them to the same degree (if this was measured by individual choice). In 
contrast, a parliamentary system that allows for a government and opposition at the same time 
ensures that all individual preferences are represented in the formation of collectively binding 
decisions, even the “minority”27.
A second important characteristic of democratic elections is that they are based on an equal 
“right to a democratic say”28. As we have seen, in democracy the people are the rulers. Either 
they actually make the political decisions or they at least get to decide who will represent  
them in doing so. In democracy this is not a matter of chance, but a matter of right. Thus, the  
people have a right to participate in the political process and it is this participation of the 
people that actually constitutes the nature of democracy's political process29. This is because 
the right to a democratic say is not a collective right, but an individual one. It is held by the  
persons that belong to the people, not to “the people” as one indivisible unit.
Now that the concept of rights is in play, we therefore finally come to see one of the most  
important aspects of democratic decision-making. So far, we have mostly been talking about 
the people as if they were one singular unit. What now comes into sight is that the people are 
actually individual human beings, though they are connected through the fact that they share 
certain  political  rights,  hence  enjoy  political  equality30.  This  is  because  the  right  to  a 
democratic say is held individually but nonetheless equally by the people. The exact meaning 
“Geschichte  und  Problematik  des  Parlamentarismus”,  Suhrkamp,  1983,  espec.  ch.  3).  Also  see  Sartori,  
Giovanni: Demokratietheorie., Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006, p. 42.
27 See  Sartori, Giovanni: Demokratietheorie., Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006, ch. 2.4 for an analysis 
of the relation between “majority” and “minority” in democracy.
28 Note that this term was inspired by Richard Arneson. See e.g. His essay “Democracy is not intrinsically just.” 
in “Dowding, Keith / Goodin, Robert E. / Pateman, Carole (Eds.): Justice and Democracy. Essays for Brian  
Barry., Cambridge University Press, 2004.
29 See e.g. Adrian, Wolfgang: Demokratie als Partizipation. Versuch einer Wert- und Entstehungsanalyse., In: 
Politik & Wähler, Vol. 18, 1977, p. 53 and Dahl, Robert: Democracy and its critics., Yale University Press,  
1915, p. 233.
30 Note  that  this  is  a  very crude interpretation of  political  equality.  See  Beitz,  Charles:  Political  Equality., 
Princeton University Press, 1989 for a comprehensive theory on political equality. Also see Peter, Fabienne:  
Democratic  Legitimacy.,  Routledge,  2009,  ch.  5  and  Wall,  Steven:  Democracy  and  Equality.,  In: 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 228, 2007 for further analysis.
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of  this  equality  depends  on  the  particular  conception  of  democracy  we  adopt,  but  the 
underlying principle is mostly the same: Every one member's say counts as much as any other 
member's one. On an  aggregative interpretation this is captured by the slogan “one person, 
one vote”31 -  every one person gets one vote and every vote counts as exactly one.  On a 
deliberative interpretation,  political  equality  “also  demands  access  to  the  institutions  of  
public deliberation”32. In sum, however, political equality of the people does not depend on 
any of those procedural specifications – neither regarding the point of the decision-making 
process at which the people may use their say33, nor regarding the form that their say should 
take34 – because  it is at the core of any conception of democracy. Of course there are other 
rights  commonly  associated  with  democracy,  e.g.  political  freedoms  like  the  freedom of 
expression35, but I suggest that those rights are not as constitutive for democracy as the right 
to an equal democratic say is, because they do not need to be unique to democracy. Instead 
they are conceptually compatible with non-democratic forms of government too.
I thus conclude that democracy is indeed “government by the people” in the sense that it is 
chosen (and ultimately legitimised) by them in regular fair and free elections. At its core we 
find the “equal right to a democratic say”, which is an individual right that all members of the 
people hold, and which they all hold equally.
1.3.3 Democracy – Government for the people 
Lincoln ascribes three attributes to democratic government – its being a government “of” and 
“by” and “for” the people. By putting those claims together like this, parallel and within in 
the  same  breath,  one  is  tempted  to  assume  that  they  all  have  equal  status  in  clarifying 
democracy's nature. However, I aim to caution against this reading because I have found that 
it is prone to misunderstanding. What does it even mean for democracy to be “government for 
the people”?
31 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p.75.
32 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p.75
33 Note  that  this  refers  to  the  different  concepts  of  direct  and representative democracy.  For  detailed 
descriptions  and  further  differentiation  see  e.g.  Sartori,  Giovanni:  Demokratietheorie.,  Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 2006, espec. ch. 5.
34 Note  that  this   refers  to  the  different  concepts  of  aggregative and deliberative  democracy.  For  detailed 
descriptions see e.g. Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, ch. 2 and 3.
35 See Arneson, Richard: Democratic rights at the national level., In: Christiano, Tom (Ed.): Philosophy and 
Democracy., Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 95-96 for an overview of rights commonly associated with 
democracy. Note that he makes an interesting distinction between “democratic” and “other fundamental” 
rights.
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Sartori convincingly shows that it depicts democracy as a government acting in the interest 
and  for  the  sake  of  the  people36.  There  are  two  ways  to  construe  this.  First  it  could  be 
interpreted along the lines of some “rational actor” or “social choice” framework37. On these 
views, “the people” are made up from rationally acting individuals who, in their acts and 
choices, seek to realize their own preferences. This works on a collective level too: “just like  
individual preferences are interpreted as what is expressed by individual choices, [...] social  
preferences are expressed by democratic choices the collective makes.”38 Thus, democracy 
can be seen a form of government that is made up by the people and therefore acts according 
to their preferences, thus “for” them. In contrast, the second reading suggests that democracy's 
being “for” the people lies not merely in motivational mechanisms or outcome perceptions, 
but rather in an effective, measurable output. On this view, democracy is seen to – more or 
less inherently – lead to outcomes that are “for”, or in the interest of, the people. This is 
dangerous,  because  it  might  get  confused with  the  assumption  that  these outputs  are  the 
objectively “best” ones (in regards to justice, legitimacy or effectiveness, for example) and 
this  may  lead  to  oversimplified  arguments.  For  example,  if  the  output  of  democratic 
government is in the interest of the people, this seems to suggest that democracy itself is. And 
if it is, shouldn't we spread it? The danger lies in the fact that democracy may no longer be  
treated as a form of politics, but rather be charged with an immediate presumption of its 
superior value39. One can see how powerful this idea has become (especially after the end of 
the Cold War and the alleged victory of liberal democracy over all other forms of political 
organisation40) by simply looking at the vast amount of literature on democracy's “intrinsic” 
value, justice or legitimacy. Most arguments centre around democracy's procedural value, yet 
some authors claim that this procedural superiority uniquely justifies its outputs too41. In the 
present paper I will actually use some of those authors' work, which is exactly why I think the 
present clarification was important.
36 See Sartori, Giovanni: Demokratietheorie., Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006, pp. 44-45.
37 See e.g. the work of Kenneth Arrow (e.g. “Social Choice and individual values.”, Yale University Press,  
1963).
38 See Peter,  Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy.,  Routledge, 2009, p. 9 and note that  she refers to Kenneth 
Arrow's concept of social choice there.
39 Note  that  Joshua  Cohen  has  focused  on  yet  a  different  problem:  “The  concern  is  that  if  we  offer  an  
interpretation of democracy that treats all good things as ingredient in the idea of democracy (...) then we  
may appear to integrate procedural and substantive values at the cost of practical guidance. What are we to  
do when the many elements of (...) democracy come into conflict?” (“Procedure and substance in deliberative 
democracy.”, In: Christiano, Tom (Ed.): Philosophy and Democracy. An anthology., Oxford University Press,  
2003).
40 See e.g. Fukuyama, Francis: The end of history and the last man., The Free Press, 1992.
41 See e.g. the work of Fabienne Peter or Tom Christiano.
14
In sum, I suggest that the normative aspirations captured by the formula “government for the  
people” are  vital  elements of democratic  theory,  but  that  it  is  therefore just  all  the more 
important not to automatically read them as an objective description of facts42.
1.3.4 Conclusion 
In the previous sections I have analysed whether it makes sense to describe democracy as 
government “of”, “by” and “for” the people. I conclude that this formula actually enables us 
to  deduce some very important aspects of democratic politics.  First,  democracy is  indeed 
government  “of” the people in the sense that they are its rulers and those ruled through it. 
Second, democracy can also be viewed as government  “by” the people because democratic 
government is elected and legitimised by them. Third, normative aspirations are central to 
democratic theory, but they have to be acknowledged as such and must not be read as an 
objective description of fact.
1.4 Democracy and “the people”
Lincoln  states  that  “democracy  is  government  of  the  people,  by  the  people  and  for  the  
people”. The triple repetition of “the people” suggests that this is the central notion within his 
definition of democracy. But what does Lincoln actually tell us about them? In short: Not 
much. Yet the  way he refers to them suggests that he does in fact make a few assumptions 
about them and in the present section I will concentrate on revealing them. I will demonstrate 
that  this  is  necessary,  because  the  ambiguity  of  Lincoln's  formulation  is  actually  quite 
symptomatic for academic democratic theory too.  In doing so I will point out how and why 
this  poses  a  severe  problem  not  only  for  conceptual  clarity,  but  also  for  our  ability  to 
systematically deal with actual political developments.
From the way Lincoln's formulation refers to the people, the first impression we get is that it 
should be plain obvious who he is talking about. From my review of the available literature, 
most democratic theorists tend to do the same thing – they make serious efforts to define 
42 See Christiano, Tom: Democracy., In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (first published online on 27 July 
2006  -  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democracy/, last  visited  on  11  April  2010,  23:13)  for  a  similar 
argument that the definition of democracy should not be seen to carry “any normative weight”.
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democracy according to its procedural characteristics, and to show how this makes democracy 
somehow “special”, but at the same time they refer to the “demos” as though it is obvious 
whom it includes and why so. For example, most of them use “citizens” and “the people” 
interchangeably,  but without ever systematically justifying this view43. Those who actually 
address  the  issue  mostly  do  so  in  the  context  of  current  political  affairs,  e.g.  boundary 
problems and questions about migration44 or global justice45. If they do, they usually draw the 
same conclusions I have, i.e. that there is surprising ambiguity regarding the demos, because 
it  is  simply  taken  as  pre-given46.  As  Robert  Goodin  observes:  “Virtually  all  democratic  
theorists find they have surprisingly little to say on the topic.”47  Or in the words of Robert 
Dahl:
“In expressing the idea of democracy as ´rule by the people` or asserting ´the right of the  
people to self government` democrats have sometimes assumed that what properly constitutes  
a ´people` for purposes of self-government is not highly problematical.”48
Most  theorists  actually  treat  “the  people”  as  a  non-issue.  This  is  problematic,  because 
“Historical experience [...] shows that what and how ´a people` is constituted can be controversial to  
the point of violence and bloodshed.”49 History thus suggests that the idea of who the democratic 
people are has actually changed and evolved so often that there is hardly any agreement on 
what is presumed to be self-evident.
Besides the historical evidence, conceptual analysis brings us to the same conclusion: It is not  
obvious who the democratic people are, at least not from within democratic theory. In fact, 
there is no specifically democratic definition of “the people”, because the procedural features 
that mark out democracy as such cannot be used to determine who its people are. As Dahl 
43 See e.g.   Pennock,  Roland:  Democratic  Political  Theory.,  Princeton University Press,  1979, p.  7,  where 
Pennock claims that  democracy is rule by the people where  “the people” includes all adult citizens not  
excluded by some generally agreed upon and reasonable disqualification (...)” and continues to name some 
of  those  “reasonable  disqualifications”  without  justifying  them.  Also  see  Wall,  Steven:  Democracy and 
Equality., In: Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 228, 2007, e.g. p. 49 for similar presumptions.
44 See e.g. Hurley, Susan: Rationalty, democracy, and leaky boundaries: vertical vs. horizontal modularity., In: 
Shapiro, Ian / Hacker-Cordón, Casiano (Eds.): Democracy's Edges., Cambridge University Press, 1999.
45 See e.g. Goodin, Robert: Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives., In: Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2007.
46 See e.g. Canovan, Margaret: Nationhood and political theory., Edward Elgar Publishing, 1996, pp. 13-16.
47 Goodin, Robert: Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives., In: Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
Vol. 35, No. 1, 2007, p.41
48 Dahl, Robert: Democracy, Liberty and Equality., Norwegian University Press, 1986, p. 19
49 Dahl, Robert: Democracy, Liberty and Equality., Norwegian University Press, 1986, p. 19 (Also see p. 122 
for elaborations.)
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puts it: “The fact is that one cannot decide from within democratic theory what constitutes a  
proper unit for the democratic process. (...) the democratic process  presupposes a unit.”50 
Goodin agues that this is because  “Logically, constituting the demos (...) cannot itself be a  
product of ordinary democratic decision making.”51 For example, if the “ordinary” way to 
make democratic decisions is to hold a majority vote, we need to decide who gets a vote prior 
to actually conducting the voting process. This decision, however, will lead to a  regressus 
infinitum,  if  we  aim  to  make  it  democratically,  because  we  cannot  make  this  decision 
democratically without first having a demos that can actually make the decision. Even saying 
that just “anyone” may participate does not answer the question if we cannot specify who 
“just anyone” is. Is it only humans, only humans of a certain age, only humans of a certain 
age  and  with  certain  intellectual  abilities,  only  humans  of  a  certain  age  and   who  are 
somewhat affected by the decision, or is it some different criterion altogether? In any case the 
same procedural features seem to attach to a democracy that includes all sane adult citizens of  
a particular state and to a democracy that allows only women who are taller than 5 feet 10  
inches  to  participate  in  the  political  process.  From  what  we  have  clarified  so  far,  both 
procedures could be democratic as long as they include those who actually are included in a 
certain way. This would seem to imply that who the democratic people are and according to 
what principles they are assembled is irrelevant, as long as other democratic features such as 
the equal democratic say and the congruence of rulers and ruled are preserved. Yet I will 
claim that the opposite is true and I will give three arguments for that.
First, the demos is vitally important to democracy because it is “the first step in constructing  
a democracy”52. This is true temporally (in real world politics)53 as well as logically (from an 
analytical perspective)54 – without anyone voting, there can be no vote, without the vote there 
is no democratic process and hence no politics at all55. We need the people and we need to 
determine who they are in order to be able to theorise about, or conduct, democracy. Second, 
Lincoln  uses  the  definite  article  (“the”)  when  referring  to  the  people  -  he  does  not  say 
50 Dahl, Robert: Democracy, Liberty and Equality., Norwegian University Press, 1986, p. 122
51 Goodin, Robert: Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives., In: Philosophy and Public Affairs,  
Vol. 35, No. 1, 2007, p.43. Also see Whelan, Frederik: Democratic theory and the boundary problem., In:  
Pennock, J. Roland/Chapman, John (Eds.): Liberal Democracy., New York University Press, 1983.
52 Goodin, Robert: Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives., In: Philosophy and Public Affairs,  
Vol. 35, No. 1, 2007, p. 43
53 See Nasström, Sofia: The legitimacy of the people., In: Political Theory, Vol. 35, No. 5, 2007, p. 628.
54 See Nasström, Sofia: The legitimacy of the people., In: Political Theory, Vol. 35, No. 5, 2007, p. 629.
55 See Goodin,  Robert:  Enfranchising all  affected interests,  and its  alternatives.,  In:  Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2007, p. 43
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“democracy  is  government  of  people”,  but  that  it  is  government  of  “the” people.  This 
suggests  that  democracy does not apply to  just  any random plural  of persons,  but  that  it  
actually applies to a certain set of persons. It seems reasonable, then, that there have to be 
conditions that are responsible for uniting them and rendering them a “certain set”. Third, the 
definite article can be construed in another way too: From the way democracy refers to “the 
people” it becomes obvious that they are treated as one collective whole – it does not say 
“some of the people” or “many of the people”, after all – and that implies that wherever it 
says  “the people” it  actually means to  say “all  of  the people” or  “all  who belong to the 
people”.  This  makes  sense  if  we  look  at  the  previous  clarifications  about  the  nature  of 
democratic politics. For example, democracy is special not because there is some congruence 
of rulers and ruled, but because all ruled are rulers in some way or another56.
I  thus  conclude  that  the  people  are  in  fact  of  special  significance  for  the  concept  of 
democracy. Only if we suppose that there is a certain set of people that it refers to, and only if  
it includes all of them in a certain way, democracy can actually be called democratic. Yet, 
none of those specifications have indicated that it matters according to which principle we 
assemble the demos. It seems like the only thing that matters is that there is a people, any 
people, but not who they are or why certain persons belong to it while others may not57. From 
a merely democratic viewpoint this may not be a problem, because as long as there is a(ny) 
demos, there can be democracy and it can be democratic. However,  who the people are and 
how, or according to which principles, they are determined does matter if we look at it from 
the perspective of legitimacy, and this is what I will show in the following chapter.
1.5 Conclusion
In  the  previous  sections  I  have  shown  how  Lincoln's  description  of  democracy  as 
“government of the people, by the people and for the people” can be used to clarify some of 
democracy's  most  important  characteristics:  First,  that  it  is  a  political  concept  and  that 
therefore the matter of the bindingness or coercive enforceability of democratic decisions is 
crucial. Second, it has been analysed what sort of government democracy refers to. It is a 
form  of  constitutional  government  that  comes  into  being  through  regular  free  and  fair 
elections in which all members of  “the people” have a right to an equal say. There are several 
56 See e.g.  Dahl,  Robert:  Democracy,  Liberty and  Equality.,  Norwegian  University Press,  1986,  p.  201 or  
Czermak, Emmerich: Demokratie und Wahlrecht., Europa-Verlag, 1948, p. 17.
57 Note that there is not yet any justification why there should be any exclusions at all.
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other rights, especially participatory rights, commonly associated with democracy, but it is 
primarily the “democratic say” that distinguishes democracy from all other forms of political 
organisation. No matter what particular conception of democracy we adopt, aggregative or 
deliberative,  direct  or  representative,  those in  charge  of  political  decisions  always  recruit 
from, belong to and are, in the end, the same as those who are governed by them. Thus what 
makes democracy special is the congruence of the people ruling and those ruled, i.e. all rulers 
are ruled and all ruled are rulers too. 
The problem is that it is not at all obvious who those “people” are, let alone who “all” of them 
are. This ambiguity will be the main focus of my paper. First, however, I will now turn to 
make some clarifications regarding the concept of legitimacy. This will be important, because, 
as we have seen, democracy is quite often charged with normative aspirations that we should 
be careful to accept. 
19
2. Legitimacy
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I aim to explicate the notion of legitimacy that I will be working upon in the 
present  paper.  I  will  first  clarify  the  most  important  aspects  of  the  concept  of  political  
legitimacy, then  compare it to the notion of  democratic  legitimacy. I will discuss several 
versions of this view, one that concentrates on freedom, one that centres around the value of 
public equality, and last the approach of reasonable acceptability. On this basis, I will then be 
able to show that democratic legitimacy is an insightful concept, but that it nonetheless has a 
significant blind spot; i.e. the role of the people. I will point this out by showing that even if 
the democratic process is legitimate, this legitimacy is hollow if it is not combined with a 
legitimate constitution of the demos.
2.2 Normative - Political - Legitimacy 
In this section I aim to specify the notion of political legitimacy. For this purpose, I will first  
introduce two distinctions: First the distinction between justice and legitimacy and second a 
distinction between normative and descriptive legitimacy. On this basis I clarify that I will 
treat  legitimacy as a strictly political concept and what this means for the context of this  
paper. 
2.2.1 Legitimacy as a concept distinct from justice
Ever  since  John  Rawls'  “A theory  of  justice”58,  there  has  been  a  revival  of  normative 
democratic  theory59.  However,  while  most  of  it  originally  centred  around the  concept  of 
“(distributive)  justice”,  “this  seems  to  be  changing”60 and  “the  concept  of  legitimacy  is  
attracting increasing attention”61. In fact both values have been used to provide a normative 
standard for political authority, yet Fabienne Peter has pointed out that there are at least two 
important differences: First, theorists of justice are usually concerned with the substance of 
policies, e.g. questions of how certain goods should be distributed within a society or “what  62   
58 See Rawls, John: A theory of justice., Harvard university Press, 2001 (first printed 1971).
59 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 57 for a brief overview of how Rawls'  
writing influenced the development of political philosophy.
60 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 56
61 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 56
62 Note that this emphasis was added by myself, not the author.
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is  owed  to  people”63.  In  most  cases,  they are  thus  concerned with  distributive  issues.  In 
contrast,  the  concept  of  legitimacy  is  usually  applied  to  political  procedure,  e.g.  “how64 
decisions  about  distributive  policies  ought  to  be  made”65.   Moreover,  legitimacy is  often 
viewed as  “related to but weaker than justice”66. It is treated as a  “normative minimum”67, 
less demanding than justice and therefore achievable even under imperfect circumstances. In 
the face of the  “procedure versus substance dilemma”68, which describes the fact that just 
outcomes may not always result from legitimate procedures and legitimate procedures may 
not always lead to just outcomes, some theorists have argued that the latter of those options is 
actually more desirable69. This is justified by the assumption that disagreement on substantial 
issues  of  justice  (e.g.  how  resources  should  be  distributed)  is  more  pervasive  than  the 
disagreement on how to legitimately make this decision.
I thus define legitimacy as a concept distinct from justice, accepting the assumption that it 
specifies  only  a  “normative  minimum”,  not  a  full-blown  set  of  normative  requirements. 
However,  not  all  theorists  actually  embrace  that  differentiation,  which  is  why I  deem it 
permissible  to  look  at  the  content  of  their  arguments  rather  than  attaching  too  much 
significance to whether they use the term “justice” or “legitimacy”.
2.2.2 Legitimacy as a normative concept
In  the  previous  section  I  have  pointed  out  that  political  legitimacy  can  be  understood 
normatively,  i.e. as a concept defining moral standards for evaluating political procedures. 
This approach is distinct from the descriptive notion of legitimacy in that it is not concerned 
with the question of whether people actually support certain political institutions or decisions, 
but whether they ought to70. On the one view, political decisions have binding force simply 
because they have the form of laws and are effectively backed by coercive measures, on the 
other,  their  binding  force  is  defined  by  them  imposing  the  (moral)  duty  to  obey71. 
Furthermore,  descriptive  legitimacy  is  measured  empirically,  e.g.  by  conducting  surveys 
63 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 1
64 Note that this emphasis was added by myself, not the author.
65 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 1 (also see pp. 56-57)
66 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 58
67 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 56
68 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, pp. 53-54 for a detailed description.
69 See the work of John  Rawls or Fabienne Peter.
70 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 56.
71 See Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 57.
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asking whether and to what extent people support political institutions or particular policies. 
Normative legitimacy, on the other hand, is specified through theoretical principles that can be 
applied to any political process, even an hypothetical one.
For the purpose of the present paper I will focus on the normative notion of legitimacy. This is 
reasonable if we look at the problem at hand: I argue that the concept of democracy does not 
tell us anything about who its “people” are and that this need not be a problem as long as there 
actually  is  a  demos.  Yet  in  the  following  sections  I  will  show  that  how  the  demos  is  
constituted, i.e. whom it in- and excludes on the basis of which principles does a make a 
difference in regards to legitimacy if we define it normatively.
2.2.3 Legitimacy as a political concept
In a previous chapter I have demonstrated why it is important to understand democracy as a 
strictly political concept. I now urge that the same is true for the concept of legitimacy. This is 
because adopting a normative concept of legitimacy means to adopt certain conditions that a 
decision-making process has to live up to in order to count as “legitimate”. Vice versa, calling 
a  political  procedure  legitimate  is  asserting  that  it  actually  satisfies  those  conditions.  By 
stressing that legitimacy is a political concept, I thus mean to emphasise that the conditions 
specified in the following sections are those that political decision-making ought to live up to, 
i.e. they only apply to a particular sort of decision-making, not just any sort. This is justified if 
we remember that political decisions are special in that they are collective and coercively 
enforceable in a certain way.
2.3 Democratic legitimacy
So far, I have given a brief overview of the most important aspects of political legitimacy. In 
the present chapter I now aim to clarify the concept of democratic legitimacy.
2.3.1 Democratic legitimacy - Not actually a normative concept? 
In the previous sections I have specified the notion of political legitimacy so that it applies to 
political procedures  only.  Along  those  lines  it  would  stand  to  reason  that  democratic 
legitimacy  –  since  democracy is  defined as  a  particular  form of  politics  –  is  a  concept 
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applying  only  to  democratic  political  procedures.  Furthermore,  if  political  legitimacy  is 
understood normatively, as specifying conditions that political procedures ought to live up to, 
democratic legitimacy could be assumed to set moral standards for the democratic process. 
However, one implication may strike us as odd: If democracy is nothing but a particular form 
of politics – why should we need a specialised concept of legitimacy at all? It would mean 
either that conceptions of political legitimacy are too crude or too general than to apply to 
democracy, or that democracy is so distinct from other forms of political procedures that a 
conception of political legitimacy needs to at least be supplemented, i.e. supplemented to such 
an extent that it makes sense to call it a conception of its own.
In  contemporary  conceptions  of  democratic  legitimacy  we  actually  find  another,  rather 
different  approach:  Instead  of  viewing  democratic  legitimacy as  a  specialised  version  of 
political legitimacy (in the sense that it specifies normative conditions for a particular form of 
politics - democracy), some theorists have actually argued that it is not just one version of, but 
essentially  itself  a  requirement  of  political  legitimacy.  Only  if  a  political  procedure  is 
democratic  and  lives  up  to  the  normative  ideals  associated  with  that,  it  can  be  called 
legitimate  at  all.   For  example,  Fabienne  Peter  rejects  what  she  calls  “Democratic 
Instrumentalism” for that it “wrongly denies how democratic procedures are constitutive for  
legitimacy”72.  She  actually  argues  that  “democratic  procedures  are  (...)  necessary  for  
legitimacy”73. This means that there is virtually no legitimacy outside of democracy. Political 
legitimacy essentially is democratic legitimacy, and democracy thereby becomes part of the 
measure instead of being a procedure yet to be evaluated.
In  my view,  this  approach  is  questionable,  because  it  somehow confuses  normative  and 
descriptive aspects of the notion of legitimacy. On the one hand, democratic legitimacy is still 
normative in that  only a certain kind of democracy actually qualifies as a “measure”. This 
means that there still are some conditions that democracy has to live up to in addition to what 
makes it democratic. However, what is problematic is that those conditions are not viewed as 
external to democracy, but as constituting its very nature. This boils down to the assumption 
that democracy needs to satisfy certain conditions in order to be legitimate, but only if it is 
legitimate  it  even  counts  as  democratic  –  there  is  no  truly  democratic  illegitimate 
72 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 64
73 Peter, Fabienne: Democratic Legitimacy., Routledge, 2009, p. 65
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democracy74. To put it differently: From a normative perspective, democratic legitimacy is 
supposed to be a concept that specifies standards which democracy ought to live up to, but 
which it does not necessarily do live up to. If it does it is a legitimate, if it does not it may not 
be legitimate, but it is nevertheless democratic. In contrast, incorporating democracy within 
the notion of political legitimacy itself means that there is no standard to actually evaluate 
democracy's legitimacy, because political legitimacy requires it. If it is democratic it is thus 
legitimate.  Hence,  it  is  legitimate because  it  is  democratic,  not  because  it  lives  up to  an 
external normative standard.
While I find this approach rather unsatisfactory from an analytical perspective, I do believe 
that  it  captures  some  important  insights  about  the  nature  of  democratic  politics.  This  is 
because adopting democracy as a measure of legitimacy is  often justified by arguing that 
“true”  democracy,  by itself,  is  a  realization  of  what  is  required  by legitimacy –  namely,  
freedom and public equality, as well as reasonable acceptability. The first argument states that 
coercive measures are problematic, because they conflict with our human right to live our 
lives free from domination. However, laws and politics do not necessarily need to count as 
domination if their interference is  necessary for living in a society. Granting an equal say and 
ensuring the rule of law, democracy can live up to this requirement. Second, another argument 
states  that  people's  equal  status,  either  morally qua being human or  politically qua being 
bound by the  collective  decision,  requires  that  they have  an  equal  say in  those  political 
decisions.  Again,  democratic  procedure  effectively  realizes  this  requirement.  Third,  some 
theorists  claim  that  in  the  face  of  “reasonable  pluralism”75 the  legitimate  way  to  make 
collectively binding decisions is through a procedure that is acceptable to all those who are 
willing to propose and accept fair terms of cooperation76. Democracy is seen to satisfy this 
condition by granting all people an equal say in those decisions.
In the following sections I will elaborate on some of those arguments by using the work of 
Philip Pettit, Tom Christiano, John Rawls and David Estlund as examples. On this basis I will 
be  able  to  show  what  their  common  premise  is.  At  the  same  time  it  will  allow  me  to 
74 Note that Pennock, too, has observed that “much of the criticism of democracy heard today is in the name of  
the ideal. It  claims only that democratic institutions are not working democratically.”  (Pennock, Roland: 
Democratic Political Theory., Princeton University Press, 1979, p. 122).
75 Note that this term goes back to Rawls. See e.g. Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University  
Press, 2005, pp. 3-4
76 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 54.
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demonstrate that democratic legitimacy thus understood is not enough to render democracy 
legitimate, because it has a significant blind spot: The principles that underlie the process of 
constituting  the  demos  also  have  to  live  up  to  the  requirements  of  legitimacy,  otherwise 
democracy cannot count as legitimate, no matter how legitimate its core procedure is.
2.3.2 Democratic legitimacy as based on freedom
In previous sections I have argued that one of the key features of political decision-making is 
that it creates laws which are coercively enforceable. This may be seen to stand in contrast 
with the common assumption that human beings are “free”, i.e. they are not to be dominated 
by others. However, most theorists accept that there actually is a need for society, or at the 
very least a need for collective decisions on some matters77. This is why even from a rather 
liberal perspective institutionalised interference can be justified under certain circumstances. 
On the  account  of  Philip  Pettit,  interference  can  be  legitimate  if  it  „tracks“  the  relevant 
interests and ideas of a person78. In contrast, interference counts as illegitimate domination if 
it constitutes „interference on an arbitrary basis”79. Politics therefore have to satisfy certain 
constitutional requirements in order to avert arbitrary domination, for example grounding an 
extensive rule of law80. Democracy is seen to realize these conditions, because it is a form of 
decision-making process that persons can identify with and because it involves stating their 
interests81.  It  hence  permits  government  interference  to  track  the  relevant  interests  of  the 
people. Moreover, it provides a safeguard against arbitrary domination due to what Pettit calls 
„contestability“: „It is only if I can effectively contest any such interference – it is only if I  
can  force  it  to  account  to  my relevant  interests  and ideas  –  that  the  interference  is  not  
arbitrary and the interferer not dominating.“82 By granting a democratic say, people's interests 
are hence tracked in a twofold way: Not only can they actually state their interests, but they 
can also contest interference if they deem it fails to do so. 
In sum, Pettit's argument states that a political decision-making procedure should be able to 
justify government interference and it should entail safeguards against illegitimate or unjust 
interference (“arbitrary domination”). Democracy satisfies the first condition, because through 
77 See e.g. Dahl, Robert: Democracy, liberty and equality., Norwegian University Press, 1989, p. 192.
78 Pettit, Philip: Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government., Claredon Press, 1997, p. 55
79 Pettit, Philip: Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government., Claredon Press, 1997, p. 52
80 Pettit, Philip: Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government., Claredon Press, 1997, pp. 171-183
81 Pettit, Philip: Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government., Claredon Press, 1997, p. 184
82 Pettit, Philip: Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government., Claredon Press, 1997, p. 185
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the democratic say people's interests can be tracked, and it satisfies the second condition, 
because it allows contestation of interference. 
2.3.3 Democratic legitimacy as based on equality 
While Pettit  concentrates on the value of freedom, some other theorists  have stressed the 
importance of equality. In their view, the equal moral status of all human beings needs to 
result in an equal say in political decisions. For example, Tom Christiano's argument is based 
on the assertion that both justice and legitimacy require public equality. Since all persons have 
equal moral status, their interests have to be advanced equally and in a way that allows them 
to actually see that  they are being treated as equals83.  Moreover,  since there is  pervasive 
disagreement on how to ensure equal distribution of interest advancement, and since there is 
no public measure of well-being which would allow for a fair comparison84, the legitimate 
thing to do is to distribute „says“ instead of resources, and to distribute them equally85. The 
democratic  say thus  allows  for  the  satisfaction  of  four  fundamental  human  interests:  the 
interest in „correcting for other's cognitive bias“86, the interest in „learning the truth about  
matters of social importance“87 the interest in  „having one's equal moral standing among 
one's fellow citizens recognized and affirmed“88 and the interest in  „feeling at home in the  
world“89. By having an equal say in the political decision-making procedure, individuals can 
see that their judgement is taken seriously, they have a chance to influence how the „common 
world“90 is shaped, and the communication with others is encouraged so that all can develop a 
more profound picture regarding their common human interest. All this makes collectively 
binding decisions legitimate. In contrast, it would be illegitimate if some members of society 
were denied a say in the political process, because it would mean that they are publicly treated 
83 See Christiano, Tom: The Constitution of Equality. Democratic Authority and its Limits., Oxford University 
Press, 2009, ch. 1.
84 See Christiano, Tom: The Constitution of Equality. Democratic Authority and its Limits., Oxford University 
Press, 2009, p. 59.
85 See Christiano, Tom: The Constitution of Equality. Democratic Authority and its Limits., Oxford University 
Press, 2009, p. 60.
86 Christiano,  Tom: The Constitution of  Equality.  Democratic  Authority and its  Limits.,  Oxford University 
Press, 2009, p. 42.
87 Christiano,  Tom: The Constitution of  Equality.  Democratic  Authority and its  Limits.,  Oxford University 
Press, 2009, p. 65.
88 Christiano,  Tom: The Constitution of  Equality.  Democratic  Authority and its  Limits.,  Oxford University 
Press, 2009, p. 65.
89 Christiano,  Tom: The Constitution of  Equality.  Democratic  Authority and its  Limits.,  Oxford University 
Press, 2009, p. 43.
90 See Christiano, Tom: The Constitution of Equality. Democratic Authority and its Limits., Oxford University 
Press, 2009, p. 57 for a definition.
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as inferiors91 and their well-being would have less chance of being advanced equally92: “If the  
standpoint is not egalitarian, then it is not inclusive, which means that it is responsive to some  
and not to others.”93  Since democracy cannot be charged with either of those faults, it must 
count as a legitimate procedure.
From people's equal moral status Christiano thus deduces that legitimacy requires the right to 
a democratic say:  “The argument implies that there ought to be an institutionalized way in  
which the particular judgements of a person are accorded the respect that is embodied in the  
right to an equal say in the process of collective decision-making.”94
2.3.4 Democratic legitimacy as based on reasonable acceptability
The  third  argument  for  democratic  legitimacy  is  based  on  the  notion  of  reasonable 
acceptability.  It essentially goes back to John Rawls who argued that the exercise of political 
power  is  legitimate  only  if  it  can  be  justified  based  on  reasons  that  all  those  who  are 
reasonable in the sense that they are willing to propose and accept fair terms of cooperation 
would accept95. Note that in this context, “acceptable” does not mean “likely to be accepted 
(empirically)” but rather “meriting acceptance”96 - it is what people would accept were they 
reasonable, thus it is what they ought to accept if they aim to propose and abide by fair terms 
of cooperation.
On the one hand, this notion of “reasonable acceptability” can be used to ground democratic 
legitimacy in that it applies to the procedure itself: By according someone a say in political 
decisions one realizes both their freedom and equality and it is thus unlikely that anybody will 
object to that. If they are reasonable, it has to be acceptable to them that everybody else's 
freedom and equality is realized the same way. Thus, the democratic procedure is reasonably 
91 See Christiano, Tom: The Constitution of Equality. Democratic Authority and its Limits., Oxford University 
Press, 2009, p. 66.
92 See Christiano, Tom: The Constitution of Equality. Democratic Authority and its Limits., Oxford University 
Press, 2009, p. 63.
93 Christiano,  Tom: The Constitution of  Equality.  Democratic  Authority and its  Limits.,  Oxford  University 
Press, 2009, p. 86
94 Christiano,  Tom: The Constitution of  Equality.  Democratic  Authority and its  Limits.,  Oxford  University 
Press, 2009, p. 67
95 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, pp. 136ff
96 See Weale,  Albert:  Contractarianism, deliberation and general  agreement.,  In:  Dowding,  Keith /  Goodin, 
Robert / Pateman, Carle (Eds.): Justice and Democracy. Essays for Brian Barry. Cambridge University Press,  
2004, pp. 91-92
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acceptable to all who view themselves as free and equal: “Democracy seems (...) reasonable  
(...) since it is a conception of government that accords equal respect to the moral claims of  
each citizen, and is therefore morally justifiable from the perspective of each citizen.”97 On 
the other hand, David Estlund has also developed an argument for how democracy renders its 
outcomes reasonably acceptable: democracy's “epistemic value”. Its key key premise is that 
there is no publicly recognized, or objectively true, standard for „maximum rights fulfillment“ 
and no person can reasonably be accepted to settle how everybody's rights are best fulfilled98. 
Yet if I myself had an equal say in that decision and was thus accorded equal weight, the 
decision itself becomes acceptable to me (from a perspective of reasonableness).
In sum there are thus two ways how a concept of reasonable acceptability can be seen to 
justify democratic  legitimacy.  First,  democracy itself  is  a  “reasonably acceptable” way of 
making collectively binding decisions. Second, democracy thereby also renders its outcomes 
reasonably acceptable.
2.3.5 The common structure of arguments for democratic legitimacy
In the previous sections I have presented three arguments for democratic legitimacy. They all 
share a common structure that I now aim to briefly summarize: In a first step, they develop 
requirements  of  legitimacy.  For  this  purpose  they  usually  focus  on  one  key  value,  e.g. 
freedom,  equality  or  reasonable  acceptability.  Second,  they  then  aim  to  show  how  the 
democratic political  procedure satisfies those requirements. Last they conclude that this is 
proof for “democratic legitimacy”, i.e. that democratic procedure itself is a requirement of 
legitimacy. The premise of this claim is that the democratic process does not only live up to 
those standards, but that it is unique in doing so and that it is thus the only political procedure 
that satisfies the conditions of legitimacy. Their arguments work out that way, because they 
centre around the democratic say. As we have seen, this say is what actually distinguishes 
democracy  from other  forms  of  political  organisation.  Thus,  if  freedom,  equality  and/or 
reasonably acceptability are necessary for legitimacy, and if the only way to realize them is 
the democratic say, then democracy is not only legitimate, but uniquely so. This allows the 
conclusion that democracy itself is a requirement for justice, because the democratic say is.
97 Gutmann, Amy / Thompson, Dennis: Democracy and Disagreement., Harvard University Press, 1996, p. 26
98 See Estlund, David: Demoratic Authority. A philosophical framework., Princeton University Press, 2008, ch. 
2.
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It  is  not  my  aim  within  the  present  paper  to  challenge  the  assumption  of  democratic 
uniqueness in regards to legitimacy, because that is not necessary for the present argument. 
Instead the key aim was to elaborate three concepts of legitimacy and the arguments for how 
democracy lives up to them. On this basis I am now able to point out a blind spot of the 
concept of “democratic legitimacy”: It may be true that a democratic political process satisfies 
the  requirements  of  legitimacy.  However,  “democracy”  as  a  whole  can  only  count  as 
legitimate if its foundations, i.e. the principles underlying the constitution of the demos, also 
live up to those requirements. Demonstrating this will be the aim of the following sections.
2.4 Democracy's legitimacy
2.4.1 Democracy's legitimacy – A two stage concept 
In the previous section I have claimed that in order for democracy to count as legitimate, not 
only the democratic political procedure itself must be legitimate, but also the foundation that 
renders this process possible in the first place. By “foundation” I refer to the constitution of 
the democratic  people,  because without  anyone making a democratic decision there is  no 
decision at all. From a democratic viewpoint it may not matter who the people are; as long as 
there actually is a demos, and as long as those people can participate in the political process in 
a certain way, democracy can persist to be democratic. Yet, the picture changes if democracy 
is supposed to not only be democratic but also count as legitimate. In this case, it does matter  
who the people are, because it does matter how, i.e. according to which underlying principles, 
the demos is constituted. I actually provide a twofold argument for this claim: In a first step I 
have demonstrated why the constitution of the demos is essential to democracy. This allows 
for the conclusion that if it is essential to democracy, it is essential for judging its legitimacy 
too.  However,  since constituting the demos requires a procedure other than the “ordinary 
democratic” one it is reasonable to assume that it needs its own check of legitimacy. Thus, 
democracy's  legitimacy  actually  requires  the  legitimacy  of  both,  its  foundation  (the 
constitution of the demos) and the core democratic process. Both  need to be legitimate in 
order for democracy, as a whole, to count as legitimate. The second part of this argument is 
still missing; I have to show that the arguments used to support democratic legitimacy work 
out only if the same measures have been applied to the constitution of the demos too. For this  
purpose  I will use the three concepts of legitimacy discussed in the foregoing sections   – 
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freedom, equality and reasonable acceptability. The basic argument will be that all of those 
concepts refer to “someone” and that it is not irrelevant who this someone is, respectively 
who it is not.
Once  I  have  demonstrated  that  the  legitimacy  of  the  democratic  people  is  an  essential 
precondition for democracy's legitimacy, I can turn to the key question of this paper: How can 
a legitimate demos be constituted?
2.4.2 Why democratic legitimacy based on freedom requires a legitimate  
demos
I have used Philip Pettit's approach to sketch a concept of democratic legitimacy that is based 
on the value of freedom. Now I will  show how this approach relies on the premise of a 
legitimate demos and why it has to do so.
Pettit suggests that if someone interferes with my life this is legitimate only if my relevant 
interests are „tracked“ thereby. It is illegitimate, then, for anyone to interfere with my life 
without taking account of my interests, because this would constitute arbitrary domination. 
Democracy,  or  an  equal  democratic  say,  is  legitimate,  because  it  can  do  both;  help 
governments make their interference track people's interests, and provide adequate protection 
against  illegitimate  interference.  This  suggests  that  anyone  whose  life  a  democratic 
government interferes with should have a democratic say, because this is how his/her interests 
can be tracked and how they can protect themselves against arbitrary domination. In contrast, 
it is illegitimate for someone to have a say if he/she is not actually interfered with by the 
democratic government. Put this way, it is obvious that it does matter who is included in the 
democratic political procedure and who is not – freedom and non-domination are realized by 
democracy only if  certain people are included (and excluded, respectively).  They are not 
realized if the inclusion of people is arbitrary and fails to follow principles that capture the 
spirit of freedom and non-domination99.
99 Note that Pettit's argument can be used not only to show that a legitimate demos is a necessary precondition 
of democratic legitimacy, but that it can also be used to specify its requirements. In fact it would suggest a  
concept along the lines of the “all affected principle”. This is not relevant here, but I will come back to this in  
later chapters of this paper.
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2.4.3 Why democratic legitimacy based on equality requires a legitimate  
demos
Tom Christiano defends a concept of democratic legitimacy that centres around a notion of 
public  equality.  On  this  view,  the  democratic  political  process  is  legitimate,  because  it 
includes  the  democratic  say which  indeed  realizes  this  value.  Is  a  legitimate  demos  still 
necessary?
Some might argue that it is not, and they might justify this claim by pointing at the democratic 
say as an „equal“ say. They would maintain that democracy actually excludes the possibility 
of  an  illegitimate  demos,  simply  in  virtue  of  its  being  democratic.  This  is  because  the 
democratic say requires that “all” have an “equal” say. However, this objection is invalid in 
the present context: The right to a democratic say is held by all members of a certain group, 
and it is held by them equally. At best, it thus specifies how the say should be distributed 
within a certain group (that is, equally), but thereby it just all the more presupposes that there 
actually is a certain group. It requires that this group is constituted according to a principle 
that makes equality the right moral value to refer to. For example, if equal moral status is 
what justifies an equal democratic say, it would be illegitimate to include beings of unequal 
moral status within the demos. Obviously, if democratic legitimacy requires that equals are 
treated as such, it must require that unequals are not. Therefore it is crucial that the principle 
of equal treatment is applied only when the group in question has been assembled according 
to principles that actually justify equal treatment100. Thus democratic legitimacy presupposes a 
legitimate demos, because it does matter who is included (respectively excluded) and why, 
and it  does matter  that  those decisions are  made legitimately.  Equality is  always equality 
among “someones” and it makes sense only if we make sure that those “someones” actually 
satisfy the conditions required by equality.
2.4.4  Why  democratic  legitimacy  based  on  reasonable  acceptability  
requires a legitimate demos
According to Rawls and Estlund, a political procedure is legitimate only if it is reasonably 
acceptable  and  if,  due  to  its  procedural  features,  it  also  renders  its  outcomes  reasonably 
acceptable. As a consequence, this approach does not allow for an arbitrary constitution of the 
demos. This is because the very qualification of “reasonableness” could work as the principle 
100 Note that, again, we could use Christiano's argument to specify conditions that render a demos legitimate.
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of in- and exclusion: Political procedure has to be acceptable to the people, but only to those 
who  are  reasonable.  Thus,  the  principle  of  democratic  legitimacy  presupposes  that  the 
democratic  people is  of  a certain sort,  i.e.  that  it  consists  of reasonable persons who are 
willing  to  offer  and abide  by fair  terms  of  cooperation.  This  means  that  it  is  not  at  all  
irrelevant who the democratic people are and how, or according to which principle, they were 
assembled. On the contrary, this concept of democratic legitimacy works on the premise that 
there  is  a  demos and that  it  satisfies  certain  conditions  of  legitimacy.  Again,  as  with the 
concepts of freedom and public equality, I do not aim to discuss whether this principle of 
enfranchisement is actually the most sensible one101,  I  merely conclude that the foregoing 
analysis has confirmed my claim that democratic legitimacy is fundamentally dependent on 
the legitimacy of the demos. Thus the legitimacy of democracy depends on the legitimacy of 
the demos,  i.e.  the legitimacy of the principles and procedures  on the basis  of which the 
demos is constituted.
2.5 Conclusion
In the previous sections I have clarified the notion of “legitimacy” that I will be working upon 
in the present paper. It is a concept that sets normative standards for political procedures. Also 
it is linked to the concept of “democratic legitimacy” which states that democracy uniquely 
realizes the normative requirements of legitimacy – namely freedom, equality and reasonable 
acceptability – and therefore  claims that  democracy itself  is  a  requirement  of  legitimacy. 
However, I have shown that democratic legitimacy fundamentally depends on the premise 
that the demos too is constituted according to principles or procedures that are legitimate. 
Thus, democracy can only be legitimate if  both its demos and the political  procedure are 
legitimate, but the former is actually more fundamental. As Dahl puts it: “The criteria of the  
democratic process presuppose the rightfulness of the unit itself.”102.  In the present paper I 
will therefore try to determine what renders a democratic people legitimate, i.e. how a demos 
can be constituted legitimately. For this purpose I will use England's history of electoral law 
as an example for how democracy may develop in regards to its people, and I will examine 
whether and why those developments could count as legitimate. This assessment will function 
as a basis for developing systematic framework that can be used to determine the legitimacy 
of a democratic people.
101 Note that I will, however, come back to this in later chapters.
102  Dahl, Robert: Democracy and its critics., Yale University Press, 1915, p. 207
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III. THE EXAMPLE OF THE ENGLISH 
FRANCHISE
1. Introduction
In the present paper I have set out to develop a systematic framework of principles that can be 
used to determine the legitimacy of a democratic people.  While the previous chapter was 
meant to provide the necessary theoretical clarifications and concepts, the present chapter now 
turns  to  an empirical  example  – England's  history of  electoral  law.  I  will  analyse  which 
qualifications are currently used for dis-/enfranchisement in England, on what basis they have 
evolved and how they can be justified. It is crucial to acknowledge, however, that the aim is  
not so much to provide an exhaustive study of England's political system, or even its electoral 
law, but rather to give an account of its franchise development103 in a way that allows us to 
arrive  at  theoretical  principles  which  can  be  used  to  develop  a  general  but  systematic 
framework of franchise qualifications.
Thus,  the  main  questions  are  the  following:  Who enjoys  suffrage?  On what  grounds has 
suffrage been granted? And: How has the answer to those questions changed over time? In 
this context I will not be overlooking the fact that one can only include someone if there are 
103 Note that because of the limited scope of this paper I will consider legal principles of (dis)enfranchisement 
only. This is to say that I will not deal with general “barriers” to voting, i.e. background circumstances that to 
not legally prohibit a person from voting but nevertheless may render him/her effectively unable to exercise 
their vote. (See e.g.  Dahl, Robert: Democracy and its critics., Yale University Press, 1915 or Parry, Geraint / 
Moyser, George /  Day, Neil: Political Participation and Democracy in Britain., Cambridge University Press,  
1992, p. 19 for the distinction between legal and actual disenfranchisement.)
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limits, or boundaries, to the group in question. For example, one can only include someone 
who previously was not, i.e. someone who had not enjoyed franchise before. Hence, the focus 
will also be on the change of circumstances which lead to the extension of suffrage. On the 
other  hand,  inclusion  also  suggests  that  there  remain  to  be  “outsiders”,  i.e.  people  who 
continue  to  be  excluded.  In  this  case,  the  question  goes  to  both  the  permissiveness  and 
necessity of exclusion in general and of the particular groups or persons who are excluded. 
My aim is to give an account of who has been included in the franchise, and reversely who 
has not, why, when and under which conditions. The main interest is theoretical, because the 
English example is but a “case study”, meant to serve as a starting point for systematizing 
relevant principles.
I  will  proceed  as  follows:  First,  I  will  provide  a  general  introduction  into  the  English 
governmental  and  electoral  system.  This  will  serve  to  define  the  specific  time  span  and 
electoral level that will concern me throughout the further course of this chapter. Second, I 
will then turn to outline the current franchise conditions in England. Note that my aim is to 
give an account of prevailing principles of enfranchisement as well as of disenfranchisement. 
I will explain the relevant qualifications and give a review of their historic evolution. At the 
same  time,  I  will  also  provide  an  account  of  possible  justifications  supporting  those 
conditions:  Why  should  this  particular  qualification  serve  as  a  condition  of 
(dis)enfranchisement  and  what  are  the  underlying  assumptions  of  this  argument?  This  is 
crucial  since  the  purpose  will  be  to  analyse  whether  and why certain  principles  actually 
convey  legitimacy  to  the  English  democratic  people.  After  having  provided  a  detailed 
description of the prevailing principles of (dis)enfranchisement, I will thirdly turn to those 
historic qualifications that no longer prevail in English electoral law. Again, the question of 
potential  justification  will  be  the  main  focus  of  attention,  especially  in  regards  to  the 
justification of their abolishment or replacement due to the course of time.
At the end of this chapter I will have given a detailed account of the English franchise and its 
evolution, as well as of its underlying justifications for in- and exclusion. On this basis, I will 
be able to develop a systematic framework of legitimate enfranchisement in the following 
chapters.
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2. Government and electoral system in England
2.1 Introduction
In the following sections I aim to give a brief introduction into the main features and history 
of the governmental and electoral system in England. First I will acknowledge the fact that the 
idea  of  an  “English”  government  might  seem unclear,  because  it  is  officially that  of  the 
“United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland”. Second I will describe the general 
structure of government in England by pointing out how parliament,  government  and the 
monarch are interconnected. This is relevant, because it will justify why the focus of this 
paper will only be on general election franchise, which is distinct from three other electoral 
levels, as I will show in section three. Fourth I will outline the voting system that is employed  
for general elections, before last summarizing some other relevant procedures. In the end I 
will have limited the scope of the following analysis, both in regards to the relevant time span 
and scope of the subject.
2.2 Government in England
2.2.1 Remarks on the subject of an “English” government 
In this paper I set out to analyse the legitimacy of the English franchise. Some readers may 
find  themselves  confused  by this  notion,  because  strictly  speaking  there  has  not  been  a 
Government  of  England since 1707 when the Acts  of  Union were passed and joined the 
Kingdom of England and that of Scotland into one single United Kingdom of Great Britain. 
Today,  the  United  Kingdom still  shares  a  common  head  of  state  as  well  as  a  common 
parliament,  and  it  has  grown to  include  not  only England,  Wales  and Scotland,  but  also 
Northern Ireland. In addition to that, the  “British overseas territories”, formerly known as 
Crown colonies, also share the political bodies of the United Kingdom. The main reason why 
I have decided to focus on the English history of suffrage anyway, is that it would actually go 
beyond the scope of this paper to trace back the roots and differences regarding the electoral 
franchise  in  all  constituent  countries  of  the  United  Kingdom.  Furthermore  comparative 
literature  is  frustratingly  ambiguous,  with  many  authors  using  “England”  and  “Britain” 
interchangeably104. While this may partly be justified due to the fact that England has always 
104 See  Canovan,  Margaret:  Nationhood  and  political  theory.,  Edward  Elgar  Publishing,  1996,  p.  77  for 
confirmation of my observation.
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been the most powerful constituent country within the United Kingdom – not least because it 
is the largest, both in regards to population and area – it does make stringent research difficult 
and  time-consuming.  Since  the  historic  aspect  of  this  paper  is  supposed  to  have  only 
exemplary  status,  I  therefore  deem  it  sufficient  to  focus  on  England,  whose  history  of 
electoral  law is  comparatively well  documented and for  which  there  is  a  vast  amount  of 
research available. 
Hence, my decision is not so much to neglect the fact that England is part  of the United 
Kingdom, but instead to incorporate its relevance indirectly, i.e. by analysing the significance 
of residence, nationality or citizenship for the right to vote. In this context I will indeed pay 
special attention to the relationship between England and the other constituent countries of the 
United Kingdom, as well as the special status of Commonwealth countries. Yet, I will ignore 
historic differences in franchise regulations, focussing only on those laws that were relevant 
for England. This is why I will refer to “England” rather than the United Kingdom in most of 
the cases.
2.2.2 The general structure of government in England
Politics in England comprise of constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary party system. 
The hereditary monarch functions as the head of state, but no longer has the sovereign power 
to make, amend or abolish laws on his/her own. Instead, legal sovereignty now lies with the 
bicameral parliament which consists of the House of Commons and the House of Lords. In 
order for a parliamentary bill to effectively become law, however, royal assent still has to be 
granted and the monarch thus retains some of his legislative capacity, even though today it is 
mostly a formal right105. 
The connection of Crown and Parliament goes back to the very beginnings of parliamentary 
history, even though the balance of power has of course changed drastically throughout the 
centuries: The first official mention of the Parliament, which can be found on a Plea Roll  
dated 1236106, refers to a royal assembly of estates, i.e. an assembly summoned by the king in 
order  to  provide  council  and  to  witness  the  creation  of  new  laws  to  be  implemented 
105 See e.g. Keir, D. L.: The constitutional history of modern Britain 1485-1937., R&R Clark, 1938, p. 375 on 
the role and powers of the monarch today.
106 See Kluxen, Kurt: Geschichte und Problematik des Parlamentarismus., Suhrkamp, 1983, p. 19
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throughout the kingdom107. Back then it was thus a royal prerogative to make law, with the 
parliament not yet having any independent legislative power. However, this began to change 
in the 14th century when it became accepted that there are some issues that monarch should 
not decide by himself but in parliament; one of the most fundamental issues being taxation108. 
Due to the 1688 Bill of Rights Crown and parliament were later granted equal rights in the 
legislative process109. What is more, it  was established that both parliamentary houses had 
equal rights to participate110. This signifies the increasing importance of the Commons: In the 
beginning, the Parliament had comprised only of the King's council,  mostly aristocrats of 
some sort. By 1322 the passive attendance of the “Commons” also came to be required111. 
From 1327 on they were finally granted the privilege to function as petitioners, meaning they 
had  the  right  and  duty  to  propose  new  legislative  acts,  thus  to  initiate  the  process  of 
legislation. In contrast, the “Peers” were assigned the role of judges, assessing the proposals 
brought up by the Commons. Hence it was only after the introduction of the Bill of Rights  
that the making of laws required consent of the King and both chambers of the Parliament112. 
Since the beginning of the 18th century, effective power over the legislative has shifted once 
again, with the Crown's influence decreasing in favour of the parliament. One of the main 
reasons for this change is that the monarch has effectively lost executive sovereignty and a 
new de facto sovereign power has emerged, enjoying a close connection to the Parliament: the 
Prime Minister113. Until today he formally remains the senior minister of the Cabinet of Her 
Majesty's government, but he actually functions as the head of government. His connection to 
the Parliament is twofold. First, the same general elections effectively appoint the personnel 
of the House of Commons and, albeit indirectly, that of the governmental Cabinet. This is 
because even though the Prime Minister is appointed by the Crown, this appointment follows 
the convention that he/she should be the member of the House of Commons. Usually the 
monarch  chooses  the  leader  of  the  political  party  which  has  the  support  of  an  absolute 
107 See e.g. Kluxen, Kurt: Geschichte und Problematik des Parlamentarismus., Suhrkamp, 1983, p. 19 and p. 35 
or  Emden,  Cecil:  The  people  and  the  constitution.  Being  a  history  of  the  development  of  the  people's 
influence in British government., Clarendon Press, 1956, p. 12 for the role of the early medieval parliament 
in England.
108 See Kluxen, Kurt: Geschichte und Problematik des Parlamentarismus., Suhrkamp, 1983, p. 39.
109 See Kluxen, Kurt: Geschichte und Problematik des Parlamentarismus., Suhrkamp, 1983, p. 45.
110 See Kluxen, Kurt: Geschichte und Problematik des Parlamentarismus., Suhrkamp, 1983, p. 45.
111 See Kluxen, Kurt: Geschichte und Problematik des Parlamentarismus., Suhrkamp, 1983, p. 34.
112 Kluxen, Kurt: Geschichte Englands., Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1968, p. 371
113 See  Kluxen,  Kurt:  Die  Umformung  des  parlamentarischen  Regierungssystems  n  Großbritannien  beim 
Übergang zur Massendemokratie., In: Kluxen, Kurt (Ed.): Parlamentarismus., Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1967, 
p. 130 or Kluxen, Kurt: Geschichte und Problematik des Parlamentarismus., Suhrkamp, 1983, p. 115 on the 
increasing importance of the prime minister and how his power depends on and refers to his being elected.
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majority  of  seats  in  the  House  of  Commons,  because  the  executive  is  answerable  to 
parliament and a successful “vote of no confidence” would therefore force the government to 
resign. Not only the prime minister is recruited from within the parliament, however, but (by 
convention) all ministers are. This means that all members of the government are supposed to 
be Members of Parliament (MPs) with a seat either in the House of Commons or the House of 
Lords114.  Thus there is  a close connection between executive and legislative in regards to 
personnel. It is tightened by the fact that part of the MPs of the House of Lords are actually  
chosen by the Prime Minister. This is because the so-called “Lords Temporal” are mostly life 
peers appointed by the king or queen on the prime minister's specific recommendation. To be 
sure, none of the MPs in the House of Lords are elected by the people. Those not appointed 
on the prime minister's recommendation are either hereditary peers (such as dukes, earls or 
barons by birthright)115 or “Lords Spiritual” who hold their office by virtue of an ecclesiastical 
role within the established church, which means that they usually are senior bishops of the 
Church of England. 
Summing  up,  government  in  England,  or  the  United  Kingdom,  is  tightly  linked  to  the 
parliament, because its personnel recruits from there and its leader, the Prime Minister, is also 
legitimised through parliamentary election by the people. Yet it has to be pointed out that only 
one chamber of the Parliament is actually elected and the role of the hereditary monarch, who 
holds this  position in  virtue of  birthright  rather  than (democratic)  election,  should not be 
underestimated116. Note, too, that there is a special position of the Church of England, with 
permanent seats within the supreme legislative body.
2.3 Electoral system in England
2.3.1 The four levels of the English electoral system 
As we have seen, government is indirectly appointed through parliamentary elections. Since 
the present paper will be concerned with electoral franchise, I aim to briefly distinguish four 
basic levels of election in England in order to make clear which of them will be relevant for  
the further course of my argument.
114 Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 2
115 Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 2
116 See e.g. Keir, D. L.: The constitutional history of modern Britain 1485-1937., R&R Clark, 1938, p. 375 and  
p. 461 on the role and powers of the monarch, and how it has (not) changed over time.
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First, there are local elections generally used to appoint councils whose functions and powers 
may  vary  depending  on  local  arrangements.  Historically,  the  main  function  of  local 
government is to promote the area's well-being, but there is no legislative power independent 
from the parliament. In the present paper I will therefore not deal with the franchise of local  
elections, but focus on “general elections” instead, i.e. the election to the House of Commons. 
On the one hand, this is because the concerns for democratic legitimacy most pressingly arise 
due  to  the  bindingness  and  enforceability  of  laws.  Since  those  are  created  by  Acts  of 
Parliament and royal assent, not within local councils, the former are much more relevant. On 
the other hand, there are but minor differences117 in the franchise of general and local elections 
and I therefore do not deem it necessary to further analyse the latter.
Apart from local and general election level, the third kind of election is the so-called “by-
election” which takes place between regular elections if a political office has become vacant, 
for example following the death or resignation of the former office-holder. Since those by-
elections do not involve a distinct franchise, they will not be of any special relevance for the 
purpose of this paper. This is also true for the fourth kind of election which is that of the 
Members of the European Parliament. Note that although the European Union obviously is a 
transnational institution, electoral procedures may vary according to the national customs of 
the member states. I will mostly neglect those elections, however, on the one hand because 
they are a relatively new development and I  therefore do not deem them a good example to 
analyse the history of franchise. On the other hand, the suffrage for European elections in 
England is very similar to that of general elections, with the major exception being that all 
resident  European Union citizens  have  a  vote  in  European Parliament  but  not  in  general 
elections.
For  the  present  paper  I  will  thus  concentrate  on  the  English  electoral  system and voting 
procedures regarding only general, i.e. parliamentary, elections, because in my view those are 
the most relevant and representative for the purpose of analysing democratic legitimacy118.
117 Note that  the main difference lies in the fact  that  European Union citizens are allowed to vote in local  
elections, but not in general elections.
118 Note that I have not mentioned referendums in this overview, because they are not so much elections as they 
are examples for direct voting.
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2.3.2 Voting system employed for general elections in England
In their  introduction to English politics,  Reeve and Ware state that“the two most obvious  
features  of  the  electoral  system used for  the British Parliament  today are that  it  utilizes  
plurality voting and that it is based entirely on territorially-defined constituencies”119.
General elections function on the basis of plurality voting, more specifically a “first-past-the-
post” system. That is is to say that:  “Under the established system for electing MPs, each  
elector has only one vote, each constituency returns only one MP, and the winner takes all, as  
the candidate who is first-past-the-post with the most votes becomes the MP whether or not  
he  or  she  has  an  overall  majority  of  the  votes  cast  in  the  constituency”120.  Thus,  each 
constituency gets to appoint one MP for the House of Commons with the candidate most 
voted for getting the seat, regardless of whether he/she has an overall majority or not. Two 
things are important about this. First, voters are required not only to cast their vote within a 
certain  electoral  constituency,  but  they  vote  specifically  for this  constituency  –  they 
specifically elect their constituency's MP. In turn, the MPs hold their office in the capacity of  
representing  this  particular  constituency121.  As  Mackintosh  has  pointed  out,  this  single-
member seat122 “gives an illusion of voting for a person rather than a party”123, because there 
usually is only one candidate per party within a constituency, not a range of party nominees 
the voters can rank or choose from, and thus the effective choice is for a particular candidate. 
On a wider perspective, of course, the appointment of the MP does not only determine who 
gets  this  one  seat  in  parliament,  but  also  contributes  to  settle  which  Party will  form the 
government124, because the leader of the winning Party will be prime minister125, nevertheless 
the most obvious effect of a person's vote is to determine which candidate should represent 
the territorially defined constituency within the parliament.
119 Reeve, Andrew / Ware, Alan: Electoral  Systems. A comparative and theoretical  introduction., Routledge, 
1992, p. 44
120 Dearlove, John / Saunders, Peter: Introduction to British Politics. Analyzing a Capitalist Democracy. (2 nd 
edition), Polity Press, 1989, p. 178
121 See Judge, David: Representation. Theory and practice in Britain., Routledge, 1999, pp. 38-39. 
122 See Mackintosh, John (Ed.) People and Parliament., Saxon House, 1978, pp. 49-52.
123 Mackintosh, John (Ed.) People and Parliament., Saxon House, 1978, p. 52
124 Reeve, Andrew / Ware, Alan: Electoral  Systems. A comparative and theoretical  introduction., Routledge, 
1992, p. 5 (referencing p. 9 of Michael Dummet's “Voting Procedures” published by the Oxford Clarendon 
Press in 1984)
125 Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 2
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This is actually one of the reasons why there are continuous debates about the legitimacy of 
this voting system: Some theorists argue that depending on a person's constituency and the 
anchoring of a particular party there, votes may not always have equal de facto weight or 
“influence”, and thus proportional representation should be implemented instead. Historically 
an even more urgent problem was the fact that there were various anomalies regarding the 
size and population of the constituencies, but the Redistribution Acts have set provisions to 
ensure that the electoral constituencies are roughly equal in size and population today126. This 
does not change the fact, that territory still is an important aspect of representation in the 
parliament127.
2.3.3  Other relevant procedures in the English general election process
So far, I have discussed the structure of government in England, distinguished between four 
levels of election and summarized the functioning of the voting procedure deployed in general 
elections. In the present section, I now aim to outline some formal procedures which voters 
have to follow in the general election process. 
The most important procedure any potential voter has to undergo in order to be able to cast 
his/her vote is registration. It refers to an act whereby a person enters the electoral register of 
a certain constituency, usually the one he/she is resident in or can otherwise establish to have 
a  relevant  “local  connection”  to.  Registration  is  crucial  because  regardless  of  whether  a 
person satisfies the legal qualifications to vote, i.e. regardless of whether he/she is included in 
the franchise, he/she cannot actually vote unless formally registered: “Only individuals whose 
names appear on the electoral register are entitled to vote.”128 Thus, only those eligible to 
vote may enter the electoral register, but only those registered can actually vote. Blackburn 
adds: “Voting is a voluntary activity, but electoral registration is compulsory. A responsibility  
lies with the individual citizen to respond promptly to the forms for completion sent from the  
electoral  registration  offices  (...)”129 Electoral  Registration  Officers  are  in  charge  for 
126 See Blewett, Neal: The Peers, the Parties and the People. The General Elections of 1919., Macmillan Press,  
1972, pp. 364-365.
127 See Judge, David: Representation. Theory and practice in Britain., Routledge, 1999, p. 149. Also see Reeve, 
Andrew / Ware, Alan: Electoral Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction., Routledge, 1992, p. 49 
for an overview of legitimacy problems arising from this fact.
128 Electoral Commission: Who can vote?, 2006 (to be found online: http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__ 
data/assets/electoral_commission_pdf_file/0017/13274/0906whocanvote_23253-6144__E__N__S__W _.pdf, 
last visited on 15 June 2010, 13:55)
129 Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 85
41
comprising the register130, but it is the potential voter's responsibility to facilitate that process.
The second set of procedures relevant to the general election process is the choice of voting 
method.  In fact, voting is most commonly conducted in person at a local polling station, but 
one can also apply for extraordinary methods of voting. This is to say that one may also vote  
by post or proxy, but these methods require formal application and may be subject to certain  
conditions, such as timely application or the inability to vote in person 131.
In sum we can conclude that apart from meeting the legal qualifications relevant for being 
included in the franchise there also are formal qualifications which may also be necessary for 
the actual ability to vote.
2.4 Conclusion
In the foregoing sections I have provided a brief overview of the governmental and electoral  
system   in  England.  I  have  emphasised  the  link  between  governmental  cabinet  and  the 
parliament in order to show that the electoral level most relevant for analysing democracy's 
legitimacy with regards to its people is that of general election. Moreover I have shown that 
general elections are conducted on a territorial basis and employ a system of plural voting as 
well as several formal procedures the most important of which is registration. On the basis of 
this outline we may conclude that there are several possible starting-points for questioning the 
legitimacy of democracy in England, for example the remains of monarchy and aristocracy, 
the status of the established church, discriminations arising from the strict plurality voting 
system, and the division of constituencies. Some might even go as far as to question whether, 
for all those alleged problems, England can even be called a democracy at all. Nonetheless, 
for the purpose of the present paper I will go with Parry and Moyser who pointedly argued 
that “Britain, for all its problems (...) remains one of the models for liberal democracy.”132 
What this is meant to say is that the present paper will not provide a comprehensive analysis 
of the quality of English democracy, but my focus is only on the legitimacy of its franchise. 
130 Note that the Electoral Registration Officers use poll tax registers as main source of information in order to 
determine  whom to  send  registration  forms.  (See  Blackburn,  Robert:  The  Electoral  System in  Britain.,  
Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 85 for further information.)
131 For more information please see  http://www.aboutmyvote.co.uk/faq.aspx (last  visited on 30 June 2010, 
12:38).
132 Parry, Geraint / Moyser, George /  Day, Neil: Political Participation and Democracy in Britain., Cambridge  
University Press, 1992, p. 3
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The thus  presented  background knowledge allows  us  to  limit  the  scope of  the  following 
analysis in two ways. First, I have justified my decision to focus only on general elections, 
which  means  that  the  scope  of  my  review  will  not  cover  local  or  European  Parliament 
elections. Second, since the “Common” MPs are my focus of attention it is reasonable to limit 
the time span to after 1322, when they first became an  integral part of parliament.
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3. England's democratic franchise
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I summarized some of the most important background features of the 
English governmental and electoral system. Now I will turn to the main focus of this paper, 
the issue of electoral franchise, i.e. who has a vote and, vice versa, who does not. I will use 
the example of the English franchise, both current and historic, provides an insight into the 
actual design of franchise patterns and I aim to use it to develop a systematic framework of 
principles that can to be followed to create a “legitimate” democratic people. The purpose of 
the present chapter is to provide a detailed account of franchise patterns in England as well as 
of their evolution. The questions I seek to answer are the following: Which qualifications does 
a person have to live up to in order to enjoy suffrage for general (parliamentary) elections in 
England? What attributes or circumstances can lead to legal disenfranchisement? When and 
how have those principles come to be accepted and what are their historic roots? What is the 
general structure of (dis-)enfranchisement in England in 2010? 
In order  to  answer those questions,  I  will  draw on two kinds of  sources.  First,  there are 
“official” legal and advisory documents. Most of them can be found on the website of the 
Electoral Commission whose aim is to make suffrage information available to all potential 
voters. For example, I will make extensive use of their fact-sheet “Who can vote?”133, because 
I find it does not only provide a concise outline of all relevant legal regulations, but it also 
gives an interesting insight into current political debate and justification. This is because there 
is  “special  mention”  of  certain  groups  and  classes  of  persons,  emphasising  that  they 
“especially” or “newly” are included in or excluded from the franchise. The official political 
justification  of  those  rules  is  outlined  too.  Second,  I  have  focused on  sources  providing 
historic analysis of the evolution of electoral law. This is because I aim to trace back the  
particular principles of (dis)enfranchisement – how have they come about, how far do they go 
back, why or based on what justification have they changed over time?
133 See  Electoral  Commission:  Who  can  vote?,  2006  (to  be  found  online:  http://www.Electoral 
commission.org.uk/__data/assets/electoral_commission_pdf_file/0017/13274/0906whocanvote_23253-6144 
__E__N__S__W__.pdf, last visited on 15 June 2010, 13:55). Note that the fact-sheet is dated 2006, but still 
valid as of June 2010. 
44
I  will  first  give  an  overview of  the  evolution  of  English  franchise  in  general.  The basic 
argument will be that there are four phases of development, all marked by specific statutes or 
Acts. I will suggest that continuity is the most prominent feature of this development. This 
interpretation  is  important,  because  it  shapes  the  way  I  will  portray  and  interpret  those 
developments.  Second  I  will  then  turn  to  analyse  the  principles  of  (dis-)enfranchisement 
currently prevailing in England, focussing on their historic evolution as well as their potential 
justification. Third, I will turn to those franchise qualifications that no longer prevail today, 
but which did shape historic franchise at some point. Again, I will outline their aim as well as 
their potential justification, but focus especially on the reasons for their abolishment. I will 
conclude by summarizing all so-found principles of enfranchisement.
3.2 Overview of the evolution of the English franchise
Before detailing the evolution and potential justification of particular franchise qualifications, 
I  want  to  briefly  sketch  the  general  nature  and  course  of  the  development  of  suffrage 
distribution in England.
In regards to the course of development, I suggest there are four phases, each marked by 
significant legislative acts or statutes. The first election of the Commons were conducted in 
the 14th century,  though the electorate  was actually rather  limited and qualifications  were 
extremely diversified. The first significant change occurred in 1430, when a statute introduced 
uniform franchise regulations for county constituencies134. The franchise in boroughs actually 
remained  diverse,  because  they  retained  the  right  to  decide  the  basis  of  franchise  for 
themselves135. The third important phase of franchise development in England started with the 
Representation of the People Act of 1832136. For the first time, borough franchise was unified 
too, even though it persisted to be distinct from that of counties. Due to the course of the 19th 
century, the Act was amended several times and the franchise was extended further, until in 
1918 male universal suffrage had more ore less been achieved. 1918 also marked a turning 
point,  because  women  were  introduced  to  the  franchise.  Further  reform  in  1928  finally 
134 Reeve, Andrew /  Ware, Alan: Electoral  Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction.,  Routledge, 
1992, p. 45 
135 Reeve, Andrew /  Ware, Alan: Electoral  Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction.,  Routledge, 
1992, p. 46
136 Note that the Representation of the People Acts are the core source for legal dis-/enfranchisement. Almost all  
Acts  can  be  found  online  at  http://search.opsi.gov.uk/search?q=representation+of+the+people+act&btnG= 
Search&output=xml_no_dtd&client=opsisearch_semaphore&proxystylesheet=opsisearch_semaphore&site=
opsi_collection, last visited on  20 June 2010, 16:48)
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established “universal suffrage”.  In sum, we may thus conclude that the history of franchise 
was generally that of its extension137.
There were two important conceptual changes: First, there was a shift in the general concept 
of  who should be represented in parliament. While at first the various national  “interests”, 
such  as  trade  interests,  landed  interests,  etc.138,  were  to  be  represented  in  parliament, 
territorially  defined  constituencies,  i.e.  communities  defined by regional  boundaries,  later 
became  the  key  focus  of  attention.  The  general  idea  of  the  parliament  representing  the 
(collective)  interest  of  certain  communities  was  perpetuated  through  the  household 
franchise139, but as Keir has pointed out there was nevertheless a revolution in that it  was 
communities of people rather than interests that were to be represented from the 19 th century 
on140. Yet it was only after the First World War that the individual  person prevailed as the 
effective unit for enfranchisement141. From this point on, it was only a few steps to the idea of 
“one person, one vote” which was effectively implemented in 1948142. The second important 
change concerns the perceived  character of  the right  to vote.  Today,  the burden of proof 
mostly lies with those who argue that a certain person or group should be excluded from the  
franchise,  while  historic  evolution started out  from the idea that  it  was  a  privilege to  be 
granted rather than a right to be demanded143. The latter view was gradually softened when 
franchise qualifications became ever more legalised, i.e. standardized144.
Despite  the  ongoing  change  there  was  nevertheless  a  strong  continuity  in  all  these 
developments. Not only was there a long period of unchanged electoral law from the 15th to 
the 19th century, but many historians have also pointed out that the “Great Reform Act” of 
137 See e.g.  Bogdanar, Vernon: The people and the party system. The referendum and electoral reform in British 
politics., Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 5.
138 See e.g. Kluxen, Kurt: Geschichte und Problematik des Parlamentarismus., Suhrkamp, 1983, p.  124.
139 See  e.g.  Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 68 on how one 
person was seen to vote representatively for all household members.
140 See Keir, D. L.: The constitutional history of modern Britain 1485-1937., R&R Clark, 1938, p. 415 on how 
the Representation of the People Act first introduced this notion.
141  Reeve, Andrew / Ware, Alan: Electoral Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction., Routledge, 
1992, p. 63
142 Note that this is because in 1948 plural voting was finally abolished. (See Reeve, Andrew / Ware, Alan:  
Electoral Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction., Routledge, 1992, p. 63.)
143 See e.g.  Tanner, Duncan: Political change and the Labour Party 1900-1918., Cambridge University Press, 
1990, p. 112 or Pole, J. R.: Political representation in England and the origins of the American Republic.,  
Macmillan Press, 1966, p.399 and p. 469.
144 See e.g.  Tanner, Duncan: Political change and the Labour Party 1900-1918., Cambridge University Press, 
1990, pp. 104-112 on the periodic disenfranchisement of voters.  Also see Blewett,  Neal:  The Peers,  the 
Parties and the People. The General Elections of 1919., Macmillan Press, 1972, p. 360.
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1832 did not introduce fundamental change so much as it integrated the medieval principles 
into a coherent whole145.  The continuous amendments of the 19th century also perpetuated 
most of those justificatory principles, even if they were interpreted differently and therefore 
allowed for the extension of the franchise146. In the following sections I will remain true to 
this “continuity reading” in that I will try to show how today's franchise qualifications have 
their roots in the very beginning of parliamentary history, if not in legislation then at least in 
their underlying principles.
3.3 Current principles and their evolution
3.3.1 Introduction
In the following sections I mean to give an account of the franchise qualifications currently 
prevailing  in  England,  i.e.  the  requirements  regulating  suffrage  in  2010.  Apart  from 
explicating their meaning and role within electoral law, I also aim to trace back their roots by 
giving an overview of their history and evolution. In this context, I will pay special attention 
to the potential justifications for each of those principles.  Note that I will be distinguishing 
between  two  kinds  of  franchise  qualifications,  the  ones  enfranchising  and  the  ones 
disenfranchising. While I admit that any principle of inclusion accounts for certain exclusions 
too, I deem it relevant whether a provision has mostly the purpose of in- or excluding persons 
in  regards  to  franchise.  This  distinction  will  not  be  arbitrary as  it  is  based  on the  legal 
concepts of “conditions of enfranchisement” on the one hand, and the “legal incapacities to  
vote” on the other147.
3.3.2 Prevailing principles of enfranchisement
3.3.2.1 Introduction
The Electoral Commission's fact-sheet  “Who can vote?”  names three basic conditions for 
145 See e.g. Bogdanar, Vernon: The people and the party system. The referendum and electoral reform in British 
politics.,  Cambridge  University  Press,  1981,  pp.  5-7  or  Evans,  Eric:  Parliamentary  reform  1770-1918., 
Longman, 2000, p. 7 or  Keir, D. L.: The constitutional history of modern Britain 1485-1937., R&R Clark, 
1938, pp. 401-402 or Butler, D. E.: The electoral system in Britain 1918-1951., Clarendon Press, 1953, p. 3 
for confirmation of the continuity reading.
146 See e.g. James, Toby: Electoral Modernisation or Elite Statecraft. Electoral Administration in the UK 1997-
2007.,  p.  8 (Not yet  published but forthcoming in “British Politics” (Journal),  kindly provided to me in 
advance by Andrew Reeve (PDF)).
147 See Electoral Commission: Who can vote?, 2006 (to be found online:
    http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/electoral_commission_pdf_file/0017/13274/0906whoca
nvote_23253-6144__E__N__S__W__.pdf, last visited on 15 June 2010, 13:55)
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enfranchisement:
“To vote in UK Parliamentary elections a person must (...):
• be 18 years of age or over on polling day
• be a British citizen, a Commonwealth citizen or a citizen of the Irish Republic
who is resident in the UK (...).”148
In the following I will give an overview of the development and potential justification of each 
of those provisions.
3.3.2.2 The citizenship qualification
Design and working of the citizenship qualification
Citizenship is one of the most fundamental qualifications of enfranchisement in England. It is 
an absolute condition in the sense that it is necessary (though not sufficient) to transfer the 
right to vote. Living up to any or even all other qualifications does not entitle a person to vote, 
if he or she can not produce the “right” citizenship. It therefore functions as a basis for all  
other qualifications. What is interesting, however, is that it is not only the English, or rather 
British, citizenship, which entitles a person to vote in general elections, but that citizens of 
some other countries not part of the United Kingdom – Ireland and Commonwealth countries, 
to be precise – actually share this right.
Yet, while citizenship of either of the listed countries will entitle a person to vote in general 
elections, there still is variation in the depth of this right: British citizens retain their right to  
vote in general elections even if they are not resident in the United Kingdom at the time of the 
election, provided that their last residence does not lie back more 15 years149. However, the 
same does not hold for Commonwealth or Irish citizens, because they do have to be resident  
148 Electoral  Commission:  Who  can  vote?,  2006  (to  be  found  online: 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/electoral_commission_pdf_file/0017/13274/0906whoc
anvote_23253-6144__E__N__S__W__.pdf, last visited on 15 June 2010, 13:55). Note that the emphasis was 
added by me.
149 See Sear, Chris: Electoral franchise. Who can vote? (Publication by Parliament and Constitution Centre of  
the  House  of  Commons  Library,  to  be  found  online  at  http://www.parliament.uk/documents/ 
commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-02208.pdf, last visited on 16 June 2010, 18:52)
48
at the time of the election, otherwise they are not eligible to vote in the United Kingdom's 
general elections. Thus it obviously makes a difference whether one is a “real” British citizen 
or  whether  one  only  belongs  to  the  extended  circle  of  related  subjects. The  “depth”  or 
permanence of the right to vote therefore seems to depend on what particular citizenship a 
person has  (an  alien  one,  a  British-related  one or  the  actual  British  one)  and citizenship 
therefore constitutes the core qualification for voting in England. 
Historic evolution of the citizenship qualification
Citizenship has only recently become important to the distribution of political rights. Up until 
1981,  “British citizenship itself did not devote any specific right”150,  instead the  “right of  
residence conferred political rights rather than citizenship, since rights were granted to any  
resident without the necessary condition of being a citizen.”151 This is not too surprising if we 
consider that the term “citizen” had not been introduced into British law before 1948152, when 
it became relevant especially in regards to immigration law. Before that the dominant concept 
had originally been “subjecthood”, which means that rights were generally not held in virtue 
of being a formal member in the political community, but were originally held in virtue of 
being the sovereign's subject. This means that a personal bond rather than legal membership 
was  required153,  i.e.  until  the  18th century  it  was  because  of  an  owed  allegiance  to  the 
sovereign, because one was subjected to his power and because one lived in his protected 
territory, that people held rights. After the French Revolution this slowly began to change, 
because a new terminology was introduced:  nationality154.   In English law the nation was 
defined in  territorial  terms155,  because  traditionally  whoever  was  born  to  or  living  in  the 
150 Dell'Olio, Fiorella: The Europeanization of Citizenship. Between the Ideology of Nationality, Immigration 
and European Identity., Ashgate, 2005, p. 34
151 Dell'Olio, Fiorella: The Europeanization of Citizenship. Between the Ideology of Nationality, Immigration 
and European Identity., Ashgate, 2005, p. 33
152 See  Dell'Olio,  Fiorella:  The  Europeanization  of  Citizenship.  Between  the  Ideology  of  Nationality, 
Immigration and European Identity., Ashgate, 2005, p. 35. Note that this is of course not meant to say that the 
term  itself  had  not  existed  or  been  in  use  before  that.  See  for  example  Dell'Olio,  Fiorella:  The 
Europeanization of Citizenship. Between the Ideology of Nationality, Immigration and European Identity., 
Ashgate, 2005, p. 23 and p. 52 or Magnette, Paul: Citizenship. The History of an Idea., ECPR Press, 2005, p.  
185 for a brief overview of “citizenship” before that time.
153 See  Jones, Mervyn: British Nationality Law and Pracice., Clarendon Press, 1947, p. 4. Also see Valchars, 
Gerd: Defizitäre Demokratie. Wahlrecht im Einwanderungsland Österreich., Braunmüller Universitätsverlag, 
2006, p. 123 (note that he refers to Otto Kimminich here).
154 See Jones, Mervyn: British Nationality Law and Practice., Clarendon Press, 1947, p. 3.
155 See Canovan, Margaret: Nationhood and political theory., Edward Elgar Publishing, 1996, p. 77 (also see pp. 
51-60 for an overview of how and on what basis “nations” can be defined). Note that some authors have tried  
to point out that English nationality has always been defined through cultural aspects, such as protestant 
religion,  as  .  For  details  see  e.g.  Canovan,  Margaret:  Nationhood  and  political  theory.,  Edward  Elgar  
Publishing, 1996, pp. 75-76 or Spinner, Jeff: The boundaries of citizenship. Race, ethnicity and nationality in 
the Liberal State., John Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp. 55-60 or Rogers, David: Politics, Prayer and 
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sovereign's territory was entitled to his protection and owed allegiance to him156. Subjecthood 
persisted to be an important element,  but the concept was broadened to refer not only to 
individual persons but to a territorially defined people. Subjects (or nationals) were already 
contrasted  with  “aliens”157,  i.e.  outsiders  not  member  of  the  national  community.  Today 
“national” and “citizen” are terms used interchangeably158, but some authors argue that the 
introduction of the latter term nevertheless signifies an important transition. They argue that 
“subjecthood” was a duty-centred notion relying on the individual rights and duties arising 
from the relationship to the sovereign, “nationality” conceptualised the idea of community 
and common state membership, and “citizenship” has continued this tradition but emphasises 
the active and political aspect even more159. 
In sum, the continuity of those developments160 suggests that citizenship has developed as a 
concept of community in which individuals not only share a common sovereign and territory 
but where they have certain obligations and also hold certain rights. In the following I will 
show how all those elements are essential to the justification of the citizenship qualification 
for voting. I will first examine the justifications offered for extending the franchise to non-
British citizens and then develop arguments for defending citizenship as a voting qualification 
in general.
Parliament., Continuum, 2000, pp. 110-111 or Piper,  Nicola:  Racism, nationalism and citizenship. Ethnic 
minorities in Britain and Germany., Ashgate Publishing, 1998, p. 55. Also see Barlow, Richard: Citizenship 
and conscience. A study in the theory and practice of religious toleration in England during the 19 th century., 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962 or Roth, Cecil: A history of the Jews in England, Clarendon Press,  
1964 for an overview of how religion has affected political rights in England.
156 Jones, Mervyn: British Nationality Law and Practice., Clarendon Press, 1947, p. 2
157 See Jones, Mervyn: British Nationality Law and Practice., Clarendon Press, 1947, p. 59. Note that the class  
of “aliens” has always been excluded from the franchise. Official documentation at least dates back until the  
Representation of the People Act 1832 which was the first universal legal act on general franchise. (See 
Tanner, Duncan: Political change and the Labour Party 1900-1918., Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 
100) Also note that in 1918, Parliament discussed the idea of regarding only those nationals as eligible to 
vote who had already been nationals for at least 15 years. Would it have been accepted, this would have  
established a third class of people besides subjects and aliens – those who are subjects, but only to a certain  
extent. (See Trachsler, Wilhelm: Das aktive Wahlrecht in England., K. J. Wyss Erben, 1927, p.  32)
158 See  British  Nationality  Act,  1981  (to  be found  online  at  http://www.opsi.gov.uk/RevisedStatutes/ 
Acts/ukpga/1981/cukpga_19810061_en_1 (last visited on 13 June 2010, 19:47). Note that I will do the same 
throughout the course of this paper (unless stated otherwise).
159 See e.g.  Piper,  Nicola:  Racism, Nationalism and Citizenship.  Ethnic minorities in Britain and Germany., 
Ashgate, 1998, p. 64 or Magnette, Paul: Citizenship. The History of an Idea., ECPR Press, 2005, p. 7 and p. 
189 or Spinner, Jeff: The boundaries of citizenship. Race, ethnicity and nationality in the liberal state., John  
Hopkins University, 1994, pp. 33-34 and p. 54 or Dell'Olio, Fiorella: The Europeanization of Citizenship.  
Between the Ideology of Nationality, Immigration and European Identity., Ashgate, 2005, p. 24.
160 See e.g. Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 80.
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Citizenship as the personal tie between subject and government
In  their  fact-sheet  the  Electoral  Commission  offers  three justifications  for  extending  the 
franchise  to  some non-British citizens.  First  it  mentions  the  “traditionally  close  ties  that  
exist”161 in regards to Ireland. This can be interpreted in two ways: First, it may refer to the 
fact  that  there has  always been a  close relationship between the  countries,  because for a 
period of over 100 years both were part of  the same kingdom162 and there still are various 
forms of cooperation today.  Second, and perhaps even more importantly, the Commission's 
formulation could refer to a relationship between the  people. This is because their second 
justification states that Irish citizens  “are not to be treated as aliens”163. They are to have 
special status in regards to otherwise national rights, because British citizens too are “entitled 
to vote in elections to the Irish Parliament”164. Thus a distinction is drawn between “citizens” 
and “aliens” and it is obviously relevant for the question of franchise. Why is that? Perhaps 
the third justification helps to complete the picture: Commonwealth citizens are enfranchised, 
because they were historically considered British “subjects” and therefore have been seen to 
owe  “allegiance to  the Crown”165.  Note that  the concept  of allegiance applies not  to  the 
country, but to the sovereign, and that it stands for “a personal bond between sovereign (in  
his natural capacity) and subject”166.
All  three  justifications  drawn  together,  we  therefore  get  the  impression  that  citizenship 
matters because it signifies a tie between “subjects” and government. What is more, it refers 
to a relationship so substantially different from the relationship “aliens” have towards the 
government, that it  justifies transferring the right to vote to only this group. Aliens, then, 
would be all persons who are not citizens of one of the listed countries167, even if there are 
161 Electoral Commission: Who can vote?, 2006 (to be found online: http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__ 
data/assets/electoral_commission_pdf_file/0017/13274/0906whocanvote_23253-
6144__E__N__S__W__.pdf, last visited on 15 June 2010, 13:55)
162 Note that from 1800 until 1927, Ireland was part of the United Kingdom, while today Ireland constitutes an  
independent state with only Northern Ireland still belonging to the United Kingdom.
163 Electoral Commission: Who can vote?, 2006 (to be found online: http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__ 
data/assets/electoral_commission_pdf_file/0017/13274/0906whocanvote_23253-
6144__E__N__S__W__.pdf, last visited on 15 June 2010, 13:55)
164 Electoral Commission: Who can vote?, 2006 (to be found online: http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__ 
data/assets/electoral_commission_pdf_file/0017/13274/0906whocanvote_23253-
6144__E__N__S__W__.pdf, last visited on 15 June 2010, 13:55)
165 Electoral Commission: Who can vote?, 2006 (to be found online: http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__ 
data/assets/electoral_commission_pdf_file/0017/13274/0906whocanvote_23253-
6144__E__N__S__W__.pdf, last visited on 15 June 2010, 13:55)
166 Jones, Mervyn: British Nationality Law and Pracice., Clarendon Press, 1947, p. 4
167 Note that  this distinction dates  from the Nationality Act  of  1981. For an explication also see Dell'Olio, 
Fiorella:  The  Europeanization  of  Citizenship.  Between  the  Ideology  of  Nationality,  Immigration  and 
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significant bonds between the countries, for example common membership in the European 
Union168.
Citizenship as a token for permanence
As we have seen, citizenship does not only determine whether a person is generally eligible to 
vote in England, but it also determines the depth of this right, because British citizens have to 
live up to different residence qualifications than non-British citizens. However, citizenship 
itself is subject to certain qualifications, because it is usually granted only due to descent or 
application169. Since it is thus not a random thing to come by it indeed constitutes a rather 
permanent tie. As a consequence, one could suggest that the closer or more permanent the tie 
between a person and a country, the “deeper” or more permanent their right to vote there. 
British citizens are perhaps privileged, because it  is  assumed that their  link to the United 
Kingdom is closer and more permanent than that of others. Their right is as permanent as their 
tie  to  the  country  and  can  therefore  only  be  deferred if  a  person  lives  abroad  for  an 
exceptionally long period of time. In contrast,  “aliens” are obviously assumed not to have 
any relevant link to the country of the United Kingdom at all, while Commonwealth or Irish 
citizens can, following historic bonds between the countries, establish that link, though only 
through residence. Their right to vote is not permanent because it does not follow directly 
from citizenship (which is that of a foreign country), but from a combination of a particular 
citizenship and a personal tie to Britain – a tie for which residence is the demonstration of.
Citizenship as membership in the community of fate
The arguments presented in the previous sections suggest that citizenship is  justified as a 
qualification for voting, because it establishes a permanent tie between a subject and his/her 
government. It thus stands for the legal bond between a person and a political community and 
can be understood as a form of “membership”. On a third account, this membership may be 
seen to matter, because it conjoins persons into a “community of fate”170: Politics are about 
European Identity., Ashgate, 2005, p. 37.
168 Note that while European Union citizens do have a right to vote in local and European Parliament elections, 
they are not enfranchised for the purpose of general elections1, in this context therefore having the same 
status as all other “aliens”.
169 Note that all details and procedures are defined in the British Nationality Act which can be found online at  
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/RevisedStatutes/Acts/ukpga/1981/cukpga_19810061_en_1 (last  visit  on  13  June 
2010, 19:47). For explication and analysis see e.g.  Jones,  Mervyn: British Nationality Law and Pracice., 
Clarendon Press, 1947.
170 Note that this is actually a rather common notion. See e.g.  Van Parijs, Philippe: The Disenfranchisement of 
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creating collectively binding rules and those rules fundamentally affect a person's interests 
and opportunities, not just on random occasion, but permanently. Since an individual's future 
is fundamentally influenced by, or even dependent on, that of his/her political community, 
his/her “fate” is too. Thus, nation-states, the most common form of political  communities 
today, create a community of fate among their legal subjects, i.e. the nationals or citizens of 
their country. In regards to franchise this is important, because the general idea seems to be 
that only those persons who are members in the community of fate should be eligible to vote. 
On a theoretical level, this idea is explicated by the “all affected principle”171 which states that 
only those who are affected by a decision should have a say in it. Thus, only those persons 
who share a permanent link to a certain country should have a right to vote, because they are 
reasonably likely to  be affected by the elected government's  decision.  As Goodin puts it: 
“everyone  who  is  affected  by  the  decisions  of  a  government  should  have  the  right  to  
participate in that government (...) and only those who are affected by a decision should have  
a say in it”172.
This suggests that British citizens' right to vote is most permanent, because they are most 
likely to be affected by the government's decision. For example, even if they decide to live 
abroad, they still count as “British” from other government's viewpoint and  this might affect 
their ability to enter certain countries, get visa, etc. Irish or Commonwealth citizens may also 
share some link to the United Kingdom, because those countries' fates are linked. Aliens, on 
the other hand, are no members in the community of fate at all, because there is no reasonable 
certainty that they are committed to this country or its government. In sum, the degree to 
which citizenship is sufficient to establish a right to vote would seem to depend on the degree 
to which one's interests are likely to be affected.
the Elderly, and Other Attempts to secure Intergenerational Justice., In: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 27,  
No. 4, 1999.
171 See  e.g.  Valchars,  Gerd:  Defizitäre  Demokratie  und  Wahlrecht  im  Einwanderungsland  Österreich., 
Braunmüller Universitätsverlagsbuchhandlung, 2006 for detailed explication and application of this principle. 
Also see  Dahl,  Robert:  Democracy and its critics.,  Yale University Press,  1915, pp. 107-8 and  Goodin,  
Robert: Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives., In: Philosophy & Public Affairs. Vol. 35, No. 
1, 2007. Note that the Latin version of this principle (“Quod omnis tangit ab omnibus debet approbari.”) can 
already  be  found  in  an  English  statute  of  1322.  (See  Kluxen,  Kurt:  Englische  Verfassungsgeschichte.  
Mittelalter., Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1987, p. 96.)
172 See  Goodin,  Robert:  Enfranchising  all  affected  interests,  and  its  alternatives.,  In:  Philosophy  & Public 
Affairs. Vol. 35, No. 1, 2007, p. 51 in reference to Robert Dahl's “After the revolution?”. Also see Christiano,  
Tom: The Constitution of Equality. Democratic Authority and its Limits., Oxford University Press, 2008. p. 
58.
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Conclusion
In sum, citizenship has proven to be the core qualification for voting in England, because only 
British, Irish or Commonwealth citizens can be eligible to vote. All other persons count as 
“aliens” and cannot  qualify,  even if  they were to  satisfy (all)  other  voting  qualifications. 
Historically we have found that the two most significant characteristics of citizenship are that 
it is, first, a legal concept, and second that it is exclusive173. Since it is a legal concept, not a 
natural fact, its structure is contingent on historic interpretation and justification. This will be 
important to keep in mind when we assess the legitimacy of using citizenship as a franchise 
qualification. In addition to that, citizenship is an exclusive concept because by conceding this 
status to certain people and not others  we get away from the notion that “all” people are 
enfranchised in democracy. Indeed democracy does not enfranchise all people in the sense of 
“all human persons” at all, but it rather seems to refer to a people, e.g. defined by common 
nationality. This can be justified in several ways: First, only those should have a vote who are 
actually subject to the elected government. Second, only a permanent, legal tie can make for 
this  sort  of  subjecthood.  Third,  political  communities  are  communities  of  fate,  and  only 
“members” should have a right to vote. Citizenship signifies this sort of membership, because 
it  stands  for  permanent  commitment  and  obligation  towards  a  certain  country  and  its 
government.
3.3.2.3 The residence qualification
Design and working of the residence qualification
In  the  previous  section  I  have  outlined  the  relevance  of  the  citizenship  qualification  for 
England's general election franchise. As we have seen, it is a necessary condition for being 
eligible to vote, but it needs to be combined with residence. To be sure, residence in the realm 
of the United Kingdom does not itself qualify anyone to be enfranchised.  “Alien” residents,  
for example, are not enfranchised, even if they do live in the United Kingdom for an extended 
period  of  time.  Nonetheless,  residence  is  an  important  supplement  to  the  citizenship 
qualification,  because while British citizenship generally confers the right  to vote,  even a 
British citizen's right is deferred if they have not been resident in the United Kingdom for 
more  than  15  years  in  a  row174.  For  Irish  or  Commonwealth  citizens,  the  residence 
173 See Magnette, Paul: Citizenship. The history of an idea., ECPR Press, 2005, p.182 for confirmation of this 
view.
174 Note that there have always been some exceptions to this rule, e.g. government officials such as embassy 
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requirement is even stricter – they are not enfranchised at all, unless they are resident in the 
United Kingdom at the time of the general election.
Historic evolution of the residence qualification
As we have seen, it was only in the end of the 20 th century that citizenship actually became 
the core franchise qualification in England.  Its  underlying justifications,  however,  already 
prevailed in the Middle Ages and I will suggest that citizenship was thus preceded by another 
qualification that effectively fulfilled the same purpose, i.e. ensuring the legal obligation and 
permanent allegiance of the subjects: residence.
While virtually none of the historic literature on the franchise dedicates much attention to 
“nationality” before the 20th century, residence was first mentioned as a franchise qualification 
in 1430175 and thus clearly preceded it. In 1832 it was introduced as a necessary franchise 
qualification176 and from 1918 on it even became the core requirement177, before this place 
was taken by citizenship in 1981. There are various reasons for the early importance of the 
residence  requirement.  First,  pragmatic  reasons:  Who  was  a  Middle  Age  subject  to  the 
sovereign? Effectively it was the persons born to and living in the sovereign's territory. This is 
because one must not forget that the immense personal mobility that individuals experience 
today are characteristic for today's globalization and had no real equivalent before the 20 th 
century178. Therefore neither the franchise status of immigrants nor that of British nationals 
living abroad were much of a political issue, which is for example illustrated by the fact that 
the latter group first obtained their right to vote only in 1985179. Second, “nationality” is by its 
very nature a comparatively universal concept180, because it is held through birth. It was not in 
officials living abroad or persons serving in the armed forces. (See Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System 
in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 79.)
175 See e.g. Pole, J. R.: Political representation in England and the origins of the American Republic., Macmillan 
Press, 1966, pp. 397-398.
176 See e.g. Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 67 or Kluxen, Kurt: 
Geschichte und Problematik des Parlamentarismus., Suhrkamp, 1983, p. 122.
177 See e.g. Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 69.
178 See Nasström, Sofia: The legitimacy of the people., In: Political Theory, Vol. 35, No. 5, 2007, p. 651. Also  
see the UN International Migration Report of 2002 which provides a comprehensive overview of facts and 
figures  relevant  for  transnational  migration  in  its  historical  development  (to  be  found  online  at 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/ittmig2002/2002ITTMIGTEXT22-11.pdf,  last  visited  on  24 
July  2010,  13:37).  For  comments  on  those  figures  also  see  Benhabib,  Seyla:  Borders,  boundaries  and  
citizenship.,  In:  Political  Science  and  Politics,  Vol.  38,  No.  4,  2005  (to  be  found  online  at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/30044348.pdf, last visited on 25 July 2010, 12:27).
179 See Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 79.
180 See Spinner, Jeff: The boundaries of citizenship. Race, ethnicity and nationality in the liberal state., John  
Hopkins University, 1994, p. 37 or Piper, Nicola: Racism, Nationalism and Citizenship. Ethnic minorities in 
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the will of the political leaders of those times to establish any sort of universal franchise yet, 
because voting was seen as a privilege or trust rather than a right181. Residence was more 
easily made subject to stringent regulations than nationality182, therefore it was better suited as 
a  franchise  qualification:  Not  anyone merely “living”  within  the  territories  of  the  United 
Kingdom actually counted as resident183. Before the Reform Act of 1832 only “scot-and-lot-
residents”, i.e. those paying local taxes and obligated to fill local offices, actually counted as 
residents in terms of franchise184. On a similar note prisons, mental hospitals, work or poor 
houses all did not constitute places that would render their inhabitants “residents” in terms of 
voting qualification until the 20th century185. This is because only residents actually living up 
to their own duties as subjects or only those even having such duty counted as members of a 
constituency and had the right to vote, because only they were seen to contribute to society.  
Apart  from  that,  institutions  like  prisons  or  hospitals  were  usually  quite  big,  often 
accommodating people from wider regions and not only one electoral district. Since a person's 
place of residence determines which constituency he/she votes for, the government's fear was 
that  enfranchising  those groups would  mean conceding them decisive  force over  election 
outcomes  within  certain  constituencies186 and  this  was  to  be  avoided.  This  shows  that 
residence was considered important, thirdly, because it was a demonstration of the personal tie 
to the constituency one was voting in and for187.  For example, the prior duration of residence 
within a certain constituency only ceased to be a (dis-)qualification for voting in 1949188. This 
Britain and Germany., Ashgate, 1998, p. 37.
181 See Pole, J. R.: Political representation in England and the origins of the American Republic., Macmillan 
Press, 1966, p. 399 and p. 469.
182 Note that these were mostly property qualifications.
183 See e.g. Trachsler, Wilhelm: Das aktive Wahlrecht in England., K. J. Wyss Erben, 1927, pp. 28-44 or Tanner, 
Duncan: Political change and the Labour Party 1900-1918., Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 101-128 
for an overview of some historical discussions about what should or should not count as “residence” for the  
purpose of enfranchisement.
184 See Pole, J. R.: Political representation in England and the origins of the American Republic., Macmillan 
Press, 1966, p. 400.
185 See Trachsler, Wilhelm: Das aktive Wahlrecht in England., Buchdruckerei K.J. Wyss Erben, 1927, p.39 or 
Thomson, Mathew: The problem of mental deficiency: Eugenics, democracy and social policy in Britain.  
1870-1959.,  p.  51  (to  be  found  online  at:  http://books.google.at/booksid=9rIsDsV_WPkC&printsec= 
frontcover&dq=Thomson+Mathew+eugenics&source=bl&ots=bvY2xAZGjR&sig=poHTb4RAHGsbvMcR6
s0e5oNAnJo&hl=de&ei=gn8aTNqnOJCVOMGAsdYK&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved
=0CCkQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q&f=false , last visited on 17 June 2010, 22:04).
186 See Thomson, Mathew: The problem of mental deficiency: Eugenics, democracy and social policy in Britain. 
1870-1959.,  p.  52  (to  be  found  online  at:  http://books.google.at/booksid=9rIsDsV_WPkC&printsec 
=frontcover&dq=Thomson+Mathew+eugenics&source=bl&ots=bvY2xAZGjR&sig=poHTb4RAHGsbvMcR
6s0e5oNAnJo&hl=de&ei=gn8aTNqnOJCVOMGAsdYK&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ve
d=0CCkQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q&f=false, last visited on 17 June 2010, 22:04).
187 See Trachsler, Wilhelm: Das aktive Wahlrecht in England., Buchdruckerei K.J. Wyss Erben, 1927, p. 38.
188 See e.g. Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 70. Note that it had 
gradually been reduced before that too. (In 1884 it was one year, in 1918 only six months, in 1928 it was  
reduced to three months, until it was finally abolished in 1948, so that today residency on the qualifying date 
is sufficient. See e.g. Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 67 and 
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shows that residence was important, because it made sense of the territorial aspect of English 
politics.
In sum, residence seems to be the historic predecessor of citizenship, because it effectively 
served the same purpose of distinguishing between permanent legal subjects and aliens. In the 
following  I  will  examine  whether  and  how  residence  can  be  justified  as  a  franchise 
qualification today.
Residence ad the  personal “de facto”  aspect of the community of fate
One possible justification for basing franchise on a residence requirement is formulated by 
Rainer Bauböck189. According to him, citizenship constitutes state membership and is, by its 
legal  nature,  permanent.  It  is  crucial  because  it  links  an  individual's  personal  fate  and 
environment  to  a  country,  its  government  and the  people within it  –  not  just  on random 
occasion, but permanently. This gives rise to the idea of a  “community of fate”  where the 
individual  future  is  fundamentally  influenced  by,  or  even  dependent  on,  that  of  his/her 
national country. Bauböck points out that it is possible that some persons may hold a de facto 
link of this sort without it being formalised through citizenship. His claim is that de facto and 
formal link  should be congruent (with  de facto members of the community of fate actually 
holding that community's citizenship190), but that they quite often are not.
Applying this to the issue at hand I would suggest that Bauböck's distinction between “formal 
membership” and “de facto link” is similar to that of citizenship and residence. It might be 
true that states are “communities of fate” and that citizenship signifies membership and thus 
establishes a permanent link between a person and this community. However, a citizen living 
abroad certainly is much less dependent on this country and its government than a person 
being resident there. Of course there always remains at least a formal tie between a citizen and 
his/her  native  country,  be  it  only  that  his/her  right  to  enter  another  country  depends  on 
nationality or because one has to pay certain taxes there. Yet a de facto link in everyday life is 
p. 73.
189 See  Bauböck,  Rainer:  Gleichheit,  Vielfalt  und  Zusammenhalt  –  Grundsätze  für  Integration  von 
Einwanderern.  As references by Czermak, Emmerich: Demokratie und Wahlrecht., Europa-Verlag, 1948, p. 
113.
190 See e.g.  Dahl,  Robert:  Democracy and its  critics.,  Yale University Press,  1915,  p.  124 for a structured  
argument regarding different levels of “membership”.
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most effectively established through residence191, simply because the degree to which a person 
is actually affected by national rules and regulations is much higher. Similarly, it may be true 
that there are historic ties between British and other communities, so that those countries' 
fates are somewhat linked, yet this need not affect a particular individual personally. A person 
choosing to live in the United Kingdom, however, certainly demonstrates a personal bond to 
this country, because he/she will be subjected to all its laws, pay taxes, have their livelihood 
depend on the economic situation there, etc. British nationals retain most of those conditions 
even if they live abroad, yet even their link becomes less tight when they are abroad for an 
extended period of time.
On this view, residence would be an important voting qualification, because it adds substance 
to the idea of community of fate;  it  establishes an actual,  personal  tie  to the government 
elected  in  the  course  of  general  elections,  because  one  is  ruled  by it  directly  and hence 
fundamentally affected by it.
Residence as a token for permanence
Another justification for the residence qualification lies in the issue of permanence: If the 
permanence of a person's bond to the government matters for enfranchisement, one must not 
forget that not only citizenship but residence too shows evidence of reasonable permanence. 
This  is  because  residence  is  actually  distinct  from  mere  “temporary  presence  at  an  
address”192 exactly because it signifies a certain degree of permanence. For example, what 
distinguishes a tourist or guest from a resident is that the former's presence in the country is  
temporary in a way that the latter's is not. It is “de facto permanent”, because to an individual 
choosing one's place to live is usually neither random nor insignificant. Again, we therefore 
find that residence supplements citizenship in an important way.
Residence as “lawful residence”
If we conclude that residence adds depth to the bond established through citizenship, because 
it is both permanent and personal,  why is residence required from foreign citizens and not 
from all persons allowed to vote? I suggest it is because “residence” is not only defined by 
191 See e.g. Trachsler, Wilhelm: Das aktive Wahlrecht in England., K. J. Wyss, 1927, p. 38 for the argument that 
residency actually establishes a “link” or connection to the place where one is living.
192 Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 77
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living in the realm for a reasonably permanent period of time, but by the fact that one is  
legitimately doing so. Today this provision is secured as follows: “People who do not have  
leave  to  enter  or  remain  in  the  UK may  not  be  included  in  the  electoral  register,  and  
consequently are not entitled to vote.”193  Legal frameworks do not allow for the expatriation 
of British citizens anymore, which means that they always “have leave” to live there and 
generally do not need to demonstrate either the legality or the depth of their tie to the United 
Kingdom. Instead their citizenship is usually seen to speak for itself unless they choose to live 
abroad for an extraordinarily extensive period of time, which would demonstrate that there is 
but a formal link to their national country anymore. Non-British citizens, on the other hand, 
might not have leave to remain and be resident in the United Kingdom at all, and if they are  
not, they are not entitled to vote. Through their residence foreign citizens demonstrate both 
the legality of their presence and their personal connection to the United Kingdom, because 
only officially registered residence renders a person eligible to vote and the register therefore 
only includes lawful residents.
Residence and the territorial aspect of politics
Last, the residence requirement could be justified due to the fact that “political communities  
are typically territorial”194 and in modern times they mostly presuppose a nation state195. For 
citizenship,  the  state  matters  mostly  abstractly,  as  a  “community”  whose  members  share 
certain rules, rights and obligations. However, one must not forget that states usually have a 
concrete geographical form as well, with effective boundaries being an important issue, often 
subject to wars and conflict. On a theoretical level, one might therefore assume that politics 
actually need this territorial basis in order to function properly196. More practically speaking, 
the actual workings of English national politics emphasise territory also in another aspect: that 
of voting constituencies. General elections are conducted on a highly territorial basis with the 
“local connection” of a person fundamentally mattering for his/her right to vote, because there 
is at least as much focus on the “where” of a person's voting (i.e. the constituency they are 
eligible to cast their vote for) as on “whether” they are allowed to vote at all197. The residence 
193 See Sear, Chris: Electoral franchise. Who can vote? (Publication by Parliament and Constitution Centre of  
the House of Commons Library, to be found online at  http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/ 
research/briefings/snpc-02208.pdf, last visited on 16 June 2010, 18:52).
194 Canovan, Margaret: Nationhood and political theory., Edward Elgar Publishing, 1996, p. 17
195 See Canovan, Margaret: Nationhood and political theory., Edward Elgar Publishing, 1996, p. 13.
196 See  e.g. Valchars,  Gerd: Defizitäre  Demokratie  und  Wahlrecht  im  Einwanderungsland  Österreich., 
Braunmüller Universitätsverlagsbuchhandlung, 2006, p. 107.
197 Note that this conclusion can be drawn from the fact that quite often the decision  whether to enfranchise 
certain groups depended on whether  they would be able to establish a reasonably tight  connection to  a 
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requirement could hence be justified because it provides a means to connect membership in 
the political community with the territorial requirement of (English) politics.
Conclusion
Residence can be seen as the predecessor of the citizenship qualification, because until the 
20th century it  essentially fulfilled the same purpose citizenship fulfills  today.  In England 
residence still is an important supplement to the latter qualification in that all persons eligible 
to vote actually have to live up to some sort  of residence requirement regardless of their  
nationality. The main justification for this is that while citizenship stands for membership in a 
certain community and thus establishes a “general” bond between a group of people and its 
political  structures,  residence  demonstrates  a  personal as  well  as  permanent  link  of  an 
individual towards a country, its people and its government. Furthermore, it provides a means 
to connect membership in the political community to the territorial requirement of politics.
3.3.2.4 The age qualification
Design and working of the age qualification
In the previous section I have discussed citizenship and residence as qualifications for the 
right to vote in general elections in England. I have pointed out that a particular citizenship is 
a necessary condition in the sense that no one can vote without satisfying this condition, no 
matter what other qualifications he/she might live up to. The second qualification for which 
this is true is the age qualification: Today's English electoral law requires a minimum age of 
18 years of every potential general election voter. This means that no person is allowed to 
vote if he/she is not 18 years old on polling day. Conversely, it also means that once he/she 
has turned 18, no age requirement applies to them anymore, because the age qualification is 
only relevant for the first introduction to the franchise.
Historic evolution of the age qualification
Interestingly enough, though age is one of the oldest conditions for enfranchisement, it didn't 
change substantially over time, but varied only between 18 and 21198. The only exception I 
constituency. For example, this was reflected in the discussion about whether and how soldiers or sailors 
could be enfranchised. (See Trachsler, Wilhelm: Das aktive Wahlrecht in England., K. J. Wyss Erben, 1927, 
p. 12).
198 Note that, interestingly, this observation is not only true historically within Britain, but also internationally, as 
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have found was in  1918 when women were  first  introduced to the  franchise.  They were 
allowed to vote only at the minimum age of 30 years199, while male voters already qualified at 
21200.  In  1928,  however,  the  voting  age  was equalised  for  both sexes  and the  age  of  21 
henceforth remained the relevant age requirement for both men and women201. In 1969 it was 
reduced to 18 and has not been changed since202. Nevertheless two proposals for change have 
dominated recent debates. First,  some demand that the minimum age for voting should be 
lowered to 16. This idea has become popular not only in England, but also in various other 
European countries within the last few years203. Second, in academic circles the introduction 
of a maximum age for voting has also been discussed. This new provision is not supposed to 
replace  the  existing  minimum age requirement,  but  supplement  it.  It  would  constitute  an 
unprecedented change, because age qualification would then not only refer to the age of the 
first introduction to the franchise, but instead maintain that there was only a limited time or 
age span during which a person could vote at all, i.e. enfranchisement would only be possible 
from  and  up  to  a  certain  age.  In  sum,  there  currently  is  and  always  has  been  an  age 
qualification  for  enfranchisement  in  England,  but  some suggest  that  its  particular  design 
should be adapted.
In the following I will outline several justifications for an age qualification for voting, most of 
which have been used to support a particular design. The first set of arguments centres around 
age-dependent  competence.  The  second  is  concerned  with  how  age  and  interests  are 
interrelated, either in regards to their orientation or in regards to their substantial content. A 
third view is built on age as a measure for how many people should be included in regards to 
numerical proportions. It can be related to the issue of turn-out and actual participation in the 
election or to demographical considerations. The fourth and last approach strives for a balance 
of rights and duties held by every member of society.
an  analysis  of  63  democracies  world-wide  has  shown  (see  Blais,  André/Massicotte,  Louis/Yoshinaka, 
Antoine: Deciding who has the right to vote. A comparative analysis of election laws., In: Electoral Studies,  
Vol.  20,  No.  1,  2001,  to  be  found  online  at  http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?
_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6V9P-41JTSD0-3-1&_cdi=5904&_user=464575&_pii=S0261379499000621&_ 
orig=browse&_coverDate=03%2F31%2F2001&_sk=999799998&view=c&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkzV&md  5= 
f8436c09bd10498f813d75b23083944f&ie=/sdarticle.pdf, last visited on 23 July 2010, 09:37).
199 See e.g. Evans, Eric: Parliamentary Reform 1770-1819., Longman, 2000, p. 135.
200 See e.g. Trachsler, Wilhelm: Das aktive Wahlrecht in England., Buchdruckerei K. J. Wyss Erben, 1927, p. 30.
201 See e.g. Butler, D.E.: The electoral system in Britain 1918-1951., Clarendon Press, 1953, p. 12.
202 See e.g. Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 72.
203 See e.g. Council of Europe (Parliamentary Assembly): Expansion of democracy by lowering the voting age 
to 16, 2009 (to be found online at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc09/EDOC11895.pdf, 
last visited on 18 June 2010, 00:23). 
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Age as a proxy for competence
The first argument is based on the notion that in order to actually cast their vote, a person 
needs a certain ability and competence. Age itself may not be a guarantee for that, but it might 
function as a proxy. This is because there is a typical course of development common to all 
human beings and we can therefore empirically determine at which age an average person is  
(or is not) in possession of the capacities relevant for voting. The age qualification is thus 
designed to indirectly ensure that all  voters can reasonably be expected to meet  a certain 
threshold of competence defined through certain key capacities or functions. Accepting this 
reasoning the main question is this: What kind of ability or competence are we referring to 
here? Is it physical or mental; is it the bodily ability to mark one's vote on a ballot paper, the 
intellectual  capacity  to  understand  what  one  is  supposed  to  do,  the  ability  to  form  an 
independent  judgement,  or the moral  competence to  reflect  on the consequences  of one's 
voting behaviour?
On the first assumption age is seen as a proxy for physical ability, so perhaps it would be  
designed to exclude very young infants and elderly people. One could argue, for example, that 
the common method of voting simply requires certain physical acts – be it only to pick up a 
pen and make a mark on the ballot paper – therefore only those capable of performing them 
should actually be eligible to vote. However, there are two problems with this reasoning. The 
first concerns effectiveness: If we aim to enfranchise people based on their physical capacity 
it is all but obvious that age would be the most effective or accurate proxy. Especially in 
regards  to  the  elderly  it  seems  that  the  individual  lifestyle  predicates  more  about  the 
comparability of two ninety-year-olds than their numerical age. Second, it is similarly dubious 
why we should accept physical ability as a relevant competence for voting at  all.  This is 
because voting methods are not natural facts but can be structured so that they do not need to 
exclude people based on physical fitness or ability.  In fact,  the variety of voting methods 
which  is  available  in  England  today  proves  that  it  is  possible  to  accommodate  people 
suffering from almost all common physical impairments – for example there is the option of 
voting by post or proxy for those unable to go to the polling station in person, the  availability  
of tactile voting templates for blind persons, the accessibility of polling stations with special 
regards to persons with disabilities, or the option of getting general assistance for casting a 
vote204. Thus, while voting methods indeed can constitute a barrier for voting, they do not 
204 See the Electoral Commissions website for further information on the different methods of voting and the  
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seem a profound justification for basing  rights on physical ability. Quite another argument 
would be, of course, to suggest that physical ability is a relevant qualification per se, for 
example because it reveals something about a person's worth for the community. However, 
this  argument would probably not be linked to the age qualification but rather be seen to 
establish a direct “physical fitness” qualification, which is why I will not discuss it in the 
present context.  I thus conclude that physical ability is  probably not the most convincing 
justification for age qualifications.
On a different approach, relevant “competence” is not understood as physical,  but mental 
ability205. Consequently it is not so much about whether a person can actually cast a vote but 
what intellectual process has to be in place for this physical action to  count as a vote. The 
underlying assumption is that casting a vote is tantamount to stating a political preference206. 
Yet, it only makes sense to respect it as a preference if it is meant as such – a mark on a sheet 
of paper counts as a vote, because we assume that the person meant to state a preference with 
it (e.g. the preference of being politically represented by person X in parliament). Most people 
would argue that we cannot actually ensure that the mark on the ballot paper is not just a 
random scribble, perhaps produced without any reflected consideration at all, but we can at 
least make sure that those people entitled to have their mark counted as votes indeed have the 
intellectual capacity to “mean“ their vote. In order for this to be possible they should be able 
to grasp the concept of politics in general and the concept of voting in particular, hence they 
need  to  be  able  to  “review  ideas  about  justice”207 and  to  form an  independent  political 
preference based on deliberation about the consequences of their voting behaviour208.  Age 
provides  a  proxy for  those  mental  capacities  and therefore  is  a  relevant  qualification  for 
enfranchisement209.  Provisions should be designed so that only age groups likely to be in 
possession of the required mental capacities are included in the franchise. Note that while this 
argument has most commonly be used to support minimum age requirements, centring around 
provisions made for  people with physical  disabilities:  http://www.aboutmyvote.co.uk/how_do_i_vote.aspx 
(last vistited on 18 June 2010, 12:38).
205  See e.g. Dahl, Robert: Democracy and its critics., Yale University Press, 1915, p. 105.
206  Note that from a standpoint of legitimacy it perhaps ought not only be a statement of preference, but an 
exercise of moral autonomy, etc. too. However, I am not yet at the point of assessing arguments from this  
viewpoint, which is why I aim to lay down possible justifications in neutral terms.
207  See Christiano, Tom: The Constitution of Equality. Democratic Authority and its Limits., Oxford University 
Press, 2008, p. 82.
208  See  e.g.  Schrag,  Francis:  Children  and  democracy:  theory  and  policy.,  In:  Politics,  Philosophy  and 
Economics, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2004, p. 365 for an outline of the mental capacities required for voting.
209  See e.g. Dahl, Robert: Democracy and its critics., Yale University Press, 1915, pp. 92, 97, 105 and 120.
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the notion of “maturity”210, it may also be used to justify a maximum age requirement. This is, 
for example, if one assumes that at a certain age there is a great probability for the average 
person to lose the competency in question or to become too senile to use it anymore211.
Age as a proxy for interests
The second set of arguments focuses on interests instead of competence. Once again it uses 
age as a proxy for a certain required trait. The general idea is that either the orientation or the 
substance of the voter's perceived self-interest is important and that it correlates with age. Age 
qualifications should be used to enfranchise only those who (on average) can be expected to 
have a certain kind of interest.
The first version of this argument is concerned with the orientation of interests. It argues that 
people  should  only be included in  the franchise if  they have reason to  have a  long-term 
interest  in  the  fate  of  the  political  community  in  question.  We  can  find  this  idea  most 
extensively elaborated in the regarding the “disenfranchisement of the elderly”. Supporters 
employ several  different  arguments  and while  some of  them relate  to  mental  fitness  and 
competence as discussed above212, others suggest that it is not the competence but the likely 
interests of age groups that matter in regards to franchise. The basic idea is this:
“The old, having no future, are dangerously free from the consequences of their own political  
acts, and it makes no sense to allow the vote to someone who is actuarially unlikely to survive,  
and pay the bills for the politician or party he may help elect. (...) The main fear is (...) that  
they may use it  [their  electoral  strength] in excessive manner to benefit  their unavoidably  
short-term self-interest.”213
There are several assumption at work here: First, only those persons should have a vote who 
210  See e.g. Clayton, Matthew / Chan, Tak Wing: Should the voting age be lowered to sixteen? Normative and 
empirical considerations., In: Political Studies, Vol. 54, 2006.
211  See  e.g.  Van  Parijs,  Philippe:  The  Disenfranchisement  of  the  Elderly,  and  Other  Attempts  to  secure  
Intergenerational Justice., In: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1999, p. 292.
212  See  e.g.  Van  Parijs,  Philippe:  The  Disenfranchisement  of  the  Elderly,  and  Other  Attempts  to  secure  
Intergenerational Justice., In: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1999, p. 292.
213 Van Parijs, Philippe: The Disenfranchisement of the Elderly, and Other Attempts to secure Intergenerational 
Justice., In: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1999, p. 293 (Addition in [brackets] made by me.) 
Also see Longman, Phillip: Born to Pay. The New Politics of Ageing in America., Houghton Mifflin, 1987, p. 
143 for a similar argument.
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are likely to have some permanent connection to the community and who thus share in its 
“fate”, i.e. who will experience not only the immediate effects of the policies implemented as 
a result of the election, but for whom it is reasonably probable that they will also be affected 
by the long-term consequences. As in the context of citizenship and residence, the idea of 
“permanence” once again functions as the basis of the argument. This relates to the second 
assumption which states that we are only interested in the long-term effects of the political 
outcome of elections, if we ourself are affected by them. Third, since people are less likely to 
be  affected by the  long-term effects  of  their  vote  the  older  they get  –  simply because  it 
becomes more and more probable that they will die before that – they are not likely to be 
interested in those effects. All people cast their vote out of self-interest, but that of old people 
is  “unavoidably short-term”, because there is no long-term perspective for them anymore. 
Basically, the orientation of people's interest is seen to fundamentally depend on their age, 
with younger people being long-term oriented and old ones focussing on the short-term. The 
argument  concludes  that  since  only  persons  with  a  “permanent”  interest  in  the  political 
community,  i.e.  for  whom the  long-term effects  are  in  their  own  self-interest,  are  to  be 
included in the franchise, and since old people are not likely to live up to this requirement, 
there should be a maximum age for voting. In the presented argument age is thus employed as 
a proxy for the orientation of a person's interest and while Van Parijs and others have mostly 
used it to argue for the exclusion of the elderly, it could perhaps also be used to justify a 
minimum age qualification too. All that would need to be demonstrated is that up until a 
certain  age,  human  interests  are  short-term,  rather  than  long-term  oriented  for  example 
because children do not yet have a concept of time or future the way adults do.
This then poses the question: Why should that even be a problem? Why is it that only those 
with a  long-term oriented self-interest should have a vote? The hidden answer is this: The 
quality of political decisions is at stake. If a person is not likely to suffer the long-term risks 
and burdens of their decision, he/she is more likely to make those decisions anyway – even 
more so when the short-term consequences are beneficial to him/her. In extreme cases this 
might put the future of the whole political community or even earth at stake (e.g. if policies 
have to weigh economic benefits versus ecological damage). This is to be prevented, and thus 
the franchise has to be designed so as to minimize the likelihood of that happening. Therefore 
an age requirement is justified and should include only those age groups that are likely to 
have a long-term oriented self-interest.
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The second version of an interest-based justification for age qualifications is not about the 
orientation, but rather the likely substance of a person's interest. The idea is that age groups 
form  “generations”  in  such  a  way  that  people  of  similar  age  are  likely  to  be  rather 
homogeneous in regards to their interests or opinion on certain political issues. Furthermore, 
there are some interests likely to prevail only within certain generations, but not others214. For 
older generations pensions are often cited as examples215, while education and environmental 
issues are for younger ones216. This gives rise to a defence of age qualifications, if we accept 
that some of those generation-dependent interests should be enfranchised while others should 
not. For example, some argue for a maximum age for voting, because they suggest that the 
older generations' attitude towards environmental issues may have detrimental effects on the 
future  of  the  whole  political  community.  Others  think  that  the  minimum age  should  be 
reduced in order to enfranchise ideas and interests that are so “fresh” and optimistic that they 
are likely to  be held only by very young generations217.
In any case, enfranchisement is to be based on the presumed “quality” of interests and their 
effects  on  the  community should  they prevail  in  general  elections.  If  age  is  a  proxy for 
generation-dependent political opinion, and if particular generations endorse harmful opinions 
while others hold reasonable ones, then an age qualification can thus be used to include (with 
some degree of probability) mostly those who hold the one sort of interest but not the other.  
Of course age qualification is a rather crude instrument, which is why it could only be applied 
to  a  very limited  range of  issues.  Yet  it  should be considered that  even though age may 
actually by a proxy for the likelihood of holding certain political views, the content is bound 
to change over time. For example, today's generation of the over-eighty-years-olds is likely to 
have a different take on environmental issues than the same age group 20 years from now. 
This is because it is not a direct result of age, but rather the result of belonging to a certain 
“cohort”,  i.e.  a  generation  not  only characterised  by common age  but  also  by sharing  a 
similar background era218. Thus, basing franchise on the content of interests probably has the 
214 See  e.g.  Schrag,  Francis:  Children  and  democracy:  theory  and  policy.,  In:  Politics,  Philosophy  and 
Economics, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2004, p. 374 and Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan 
Press, 1995, pp. 72-73.
215 See  e.g.  Van  Parijs,  Philippe:  The  Disenfranchisement  of  the  Elderly,  and  Other  Attempts  to  secure 
Intergenerational Justice., In: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1999, pp. 292-299.
216 See  e.g.  Schrag,  Francis:  Children  and  democracy:  theory  and  policy.,  In:  Politics,  Philosophy  and 
Economics, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2004, pp. 374-375.
217  See Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, pp. 72-73.
218 See Clayton,  Matthew /  Chan,  Tak Wing:  Should the voting age  be lowered to sixteen?  Normative and 
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disadvantage of having to implement new age requirements on a periodic basis.
Age as a measure for controlling the electorate's numerical proportions
I will now turn to the third kind of argument which can be offered in favour of age as a 
qualification for enfranchisement. The first two justifications were concerned with age as a 
proxy, but the third is based on numerical and/or proportional considerations. In fact, age is a 
demographic measure which can be used to control the electorate. There are two ways to 
construe this: On the one hand, an age qualification could have the purpose of defining the 
total size of the electorate or the likely election turnout. On the other, it can be used to control  
the electorate's composition.
To my knowledge there is no historic example for the first approach which suggests age as a 
measure for limiting the total number of electors. However, a very similar version of this 
argument is used by supporters of lowering the voting age in England. They argue that there is 
a legitimacy problem of the government if it is elected only by a certain percentage of the 
population.  Hence,  if  the  electoral  turnout  is  too  low,  even  a  majority  of  votes  are  not 
“enough”, because they will not count for a majority of the population. Lowering the voting 
age may increase the number of votes cast,  i.e.  the percentage of the population that has 
consented to the government, simply because there are more people eligible to vote The size 
of  the  electorate  should  therefore  be  designed  so  that  the  probable  electoral  turnout  will 
account for a certain percentage or majority of the population219. In sum, the general idea is 
this:  The size of the electorate  is  important and since the age qualification is  a workable 
instrument to control the size of the electorate it is justified.
The  second  line  of  argument  is  not  about  the  total  size  of  the  electorate,  but  about  its 
composition and it can be found in the discussions preceding the Reform Act of 1918. This 
Act first introduced women to the franchise, but only at a minimum age of 30 years220. When 
designing this provision, one of the core considerations was the number of women that should 
empirical considerations., In: Political Studies, Vol. 54, 2006, pp. 542-543 for the differentiation between 
“cohort” and “age” effect.
219 See e.g. Clayton, Matthew / Chan, Tak Wing: Should the voting age be lowered to sixteen? Normative and  
empirical considerations., In: Political Studies, Vol. 54, 2006, pp. 535-538. 
220  See e.g. Trachsler, Wilhelm: Das aktive Wahlrecht in England., Buchdruckerei K. J. Wyss Erben, 1927, p. 
30.
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be allowed to vote, or more precisely the percentage of the electorate which should henceforth 
be female221. Franchise should extend to women, but they were not to constitute a majority in 
the electorate. After the war the majority of the population was female, thus enfranchising 
women on the same basis as men would likely have established a female majority in the  
electorate222. This is why demographic statistics were consulted in order to find out what age 
qualification would  enfranchise only a  certain  number  of  women.  As Butler  summarizes: 
“The age of thirty was agreed as a result of compromise (...) designed to keep women in a  
minority of  the electorate.”223 The age qualification was used to ensure certain numerical 
proportions within the electorate. The goal was to ensure that a certain group of people, in this 
case characterized by their common sex, would not constitute an absolute majority within the 
electorate. Note that I have found a similar reasoning in the arguments for a maximum age 
disqualification. In this context the underlying idea is that only a certain percentage of the 
electorate should be allowed to be retired persons224, because otherwise the balance of rights 
and  duties  in  society  cannot  be  maintained.  An  alternative  proposal  suggests  that  the 
minimum age for voting could simply be reduced in order to ensure a “young” counterbalance 
to  the  old  age  electorate225.  Again,  the  idea  is  to  control  the  proportions  of  certain 
demographic groups within the electorate, i.e. to ensure a certain composition.
Age as the basis for distributing rights and duties in a community
The fourth justification for an age qualification for voting is based on the notion that rights are 
always to be balanced with duties, and that therefore only those persons should have a right to 
vote who also also share the duties of society. The underlying idea is that rights are benefits 
attributed  to  those  who  take  up  the  necessary  burdens  which  come  with  living  in  a 
community.  Adherents  argue  that  age  is  actually  one  of  the  most  common  criteria  for 
distributing  rights  and  duties,  or  benefits  and  burdens,  within  political  communities.  For 
example, there is a legal age that is relevant for concluding a valid contract, but also one for 
bearing criminal responsibility. They argue that the right to vote, too, constitutes a right that  
should be counterbalanced by certain societal responsibilities. For example, if small children 
221 See Trachsler, Wilhelm: Das aktive Wahlrecht in England., Buchdruckerei K. J. Wyss Erben, 1927, pp. 70-74 
and Butler Butler, D. E.: The electoral system in Britain 1918-1951., Clarendon Press, 1953, pp. 8-15.
222  See Butler, D. E.: The electoral system in Britain 1918-1951., Clarendon Press, 1953, p. 15.
223  See Butler, D. E.: The electoral system in Britain 1918-1951., Clarendon Press, 1953, p. 8.
224  See  e.g.  Van  Parijs,  Philippe:  The  Disenfranchisement  of  the  Elderly,  and  Other  Attempts  to  secure  
Intergenerational Justice., In: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1999, p. 293.
225 See Schrag, Francis: Children and democracy: theory and policy., In: Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 
Vol. 3, No. 3, 2004, p. 365.
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are not held fully responsible for their actions in a court of law, why should they have a say in 
how those laws are made? As Schrag puts it:  “there is something amiss in the idea that our  
children  might  be  considered  competent  to  make  decisions  affecting  millions  of  fellow  
citizens, but not competent to take charge of their own lives”226. The  argument is that if a 
person, legally,  has less responsibilities or duties than the average person included in the 
franchise – why should he/she share the (equal) right to vote? Schrag applies this to children 
especially, because they are under parental guardianship until they reach a certain age, thus 
not bearing full responsibility for their lives. On the same note, however, one might suggest 
that people at the age of retirement, freed from the burden of earning their subsidence and 
contributing to that of the community, are not to be enfranchised either. If rights and duties are 
generally attributed according to age, then the right to vote should also be age-dependent, 
because  it is  to  correlate  with  society's  duties,  such  as  paying taxes  or  entering  military 
service227.  Nevertheless,  there  is  a  risk  of  circularity  in  attributing  duties  according  to 
previously granted rights and vice versa228. In sum, the approach states that only those who are 
under an obligation to contribute to the good fate of the community should have a political 
say.
Conclusion
In  addition  to  citizenship  and  residence,  age  constitutes  the  third  core  qualification  for 
enfranchisement in England, because only persons over the age of 18 can be eligible to vote. 
Like citizenship, it is a necessary condition, because regardless of his/her other characteristics, 
no one can vote if he/she does not live up to the age requirement. However, only a minimum 
age is specified and there is no maximum age for voting even though there are some who 
would support such change. Furthermore, the age qualification is contested as too high, with 
critics favouring a minimum age of 16 instead of 18. As for the potential justifications we 
have seen that age qualifications can be defended based on a requirement of competency or 
likely interest, but also by referring to numerical considerations regarding the electorate, or a 
sense of equal distribution of benefits and burdens within society.
226 Schrag, Francis: Children and democracy: theory and policy., In: Politics, Philosophy and Economics, Vol. 3, 
No. 3, 2004, p. 373.
227 See Schrag, Francis: Children and democracy: theory and policy., In: Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 
Vol. 3, No. 3, 2004, p. 373.
228  See Dahl, Robert: Democracy and its critics., Yale University Press, 1915, p. 128.
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3.3.2.5 Conclusion
In  the  previous  sections  I  have  discussed  the  three  qualifications  for  enfranchisement 
currently prevailing in England: citizenship, residence and age. Although justifications varied, 
they also  showed profound similarities.  First,  we found the  idea  that  only those  persons 
should have a vote, who are actually linked to the political community in question. This link 
should be permanent, but also signify personal membership. It can be established by the fact  
that  a  person's  interests,  their  “fate”,  is  fundamentally  affected  by  that  of  the  political 
community,  for  example  because  one  is  subject  to  its  laws  or  because  one's  effective 
opportunities will depend on it in the future. Second, only those who are actually competent to 
vote should be eligible to do so. Third, considerations should not only go to the individual 
voter  but  also  to  the  population  or  electorate  as  a  whole.  Numerical  and  demographical 
proportions may be just as important as the practical necessity of a territorial basis for politics. 
On a similar notion, the fair distribution of burdens and benefits within a society is to be 
considered. 
3.3.3 Prevailing principles of disenfranchisement
3.3.3.1 Introduction
As we have seen, the three main principles of enfranchisement in England are citizenship, 
residence and age. All British citizens who are aged at least 18 years and who have not, on 
polling  day,  been  living  abroad  for  more  than  15  years  are  eligible  to  vote.  Irish  and 
Commonwealth citizens may also be entitled to vote, provided that they are at least 18 years  
old and currently (lawful) residents somewhere within the United Kingdom. Citizenship and a 
certain age are necessary conditions,  no alien citizen and no person under  the age of 18 
(regardless of their citizenship or resident status) is eligible to vote. These requirements are 
supplemented by a second set of principles that fulfil the opposite purpose, that is to identify 
conditions  that  disenfranchise  people  even  if  they  fulfil  the  necessary  qualifications  of 
citizenship/residence  and  age.  They  constitute  “legal  incapacities  to  vote”229 and  will  be 
discussed in the following:
229 Note that,  obviously,  not living up to any of the thus far summarized principles of enfranchisement also 
results in a de facto legal incapacity to vote, but there are three more explicit conditions that I will decribe in 
the following.
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“At a general election, the following cannot vote (...):
• Members of the House of Lords (...)
• Convicted persons detained in pursuance of their sentences (though remand prisoners,
unconvicted prisoners and civil prisoners in default of fine or breach of recognisances
can vote if they are on the electoral register) This includes offenders detained in
mental hospitals (...)
• Anyone found guilty within the previous five years of corrupt or illegal practices in
connection with an election
• Under common law, people with mental disabilities if, on polling day, they are
incapable of making a reasoned judgement”230
3.3.3.2 Members of the House of Lords
Design and working of the disqualification
One group of persons who is not eligible to vote in general elections in England, regardless of 
their nationality, residence status or age, is the members of the parliamentary House of Lords. 
They are either life peers, appointed by the Queen on the Prime Minister's recommendation, 
hereditary peers who have retained their  seat  through decent,  or  bishops and archbishops 
appointed by the Church of England. What they all have in common is that as Members of 
Parliaments they are personally included in the process of making laws.
Justification
The argument for this exclusion from the franchise seems simple: Being enfranchised for 
voting in general elections means that one gets a say in who will  represent the people in 
parliament and, although indirectly, who will form the government. Members of the House of 
Lords do not need this kind of say, because they don't need representation. Instead they can 
speak their mind in person since they have a say in parliament directly. Enfranchising them to 
vote would double their potential political influence, because it would add up to two votes – 
one to elect the representatives in the House of Commons, one within the parliament directly. 
230 Sear, Chris: Electoral franchise. Who can vote? (Publication by Parliament and Constitution Centre of the 
House  of  Commons  Library,  to  be  found  online  at  http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons  /lib/ 
research/briefings/snpc-02208.pdf, last visited on 16 June 2010, 18:52).
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This would indeed violate the principle of equality incorporated by democratic say and this is 
why only those are to be enfranchised for a vote in general elections, who need representation 
because they are not personally involved in the process of making laws or who are at least not 
sure to do so. What this last provision implies is that members of the House of Commons 
indeed are eligible to vote in general elections, because their seat is not a guaranteed one since 
they can lose it as a result of the election. The same also goes for the Prime Minister who 
recruits from the House of Commons. In contrast, members of the House of Lords are not 
dependent  on being (re-)elected by the  people,  because they hold their  seats  in  virtue  of 
(comparatively) permanent features – appointment for life or hereditary status – and therefore 
they are not eligible to vote in general elections. However, they can vote “at elections to local  
authorities, devolved legislatures and the European Parliament” 231 since they do not hold a 
permanent seat there. Note that taking those principle seriously would mean that it should 
extent to the King or Queen of England too, because the monarch still is the official sovereign 
in the United Kingdom and therefore holds a range of significant political competencies. Yet, 
the monarch is not legally excluded from the franchise. On the parliament's official website 
we instead find the following admission: 
“Can the Queen vote? - The Queen can vote, but in practice it is considered unconstitutional for the  
Monarch to vote in an election.“232
Historic background
History shows that equality in voting power is a relatively recent invention. Until 1948 it was 
legally  possible,  and actually not  uncommon,  for  persons  to  hold  more  than  one  vote  in 
general elections. There were several reasons for this.
First, until 1928 persons were eligible to vote in as many constituencies as they qualified to 
vote in. This was actually possible because there was a rather diverse system of qualifications, 
so that persons could become enfranchised on the basis of either of the competing principles. 
That is to say that being qualified based on more than one condition did not have any effect 
231 Sear, Chris: Electoral franchise. Who can vote? (Publication by Parliament and Constitution Centre of the 
House  of  Commons  Library,  to  be  found  online  at  http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons 
/lib/research/briefings/snpc-02208.pdf, last visited on 16 June 2010, 18:52)
232 See  the  Frequently  Asked  Questions  section:  http://www.parliament.uk/about/faqs/house-of-commons-
faqs/elections-faq-page/ (last visited on 19 June 2010, 23:23).
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on a person's  number of votes  as long as it  was all  within the same constituency.  If  one 
satisfied the qualifications posed by different constituencies,  however,  one was eligible to 
vote  wherever  one  qualified.  One  very  common  reason  for  plural  voting  was  business 
property, because persons who owned a business in a constituency different from where they 
where resident held a vote in both of them233. The justification for this was seen to lie in the 
territorial  representation  prevailing  in  the  House  of  Commons.  Since  its  members  were 
supposed to represent not simply “the people”, but the people of a certain constituency, it  
allowed for the argument that those who had a tight connection to more than one constituency, 
for example because they lived in one but earned their livelihood in the other, were justified to 
have a say in both of them. Perhaps this indicates some sort of paradigm shift: Today the main 
concern is whether a person can vote in England at all, with it being only a secondary concern 
where a person should cast their vote. In contrast, the former focus was on whether they had 
the right to vote within a certain constituency, and some people qualified in more than one. 
This  argument  was thus  based on a  very similar  justification as  the one discussed in  the 
context of citizenship and residence requirements – votes should be given to those who have a 
“close tie”234 to, or a “firm root”235 in, a certain community. The difference is just that not the 
nation  state  as  a  whole,  but  rather  the  particular  constituency,  counted  as  the  relevant 
community in question236. This notion was rejected in 1928, however, and henceforth a person 
had to choose a single constituency to vote in237, even if he/she actually qualified in more than 
one.
Nevertheless  one  form of  plural  voting  persisted,  because  it  was  not  based  on territorial 
enfranchisement238.  From 1603 on certain  universities  were  allowed to  appoint  their  own 
Members  of  Parliament  and  all  those  who  (in  addition  to  living  up  to  other  common 
qualifications such as age or nationality) held a degree or an honorary degree of particular 
universities  were allowed a vote239.  This  resulted in  additional  vote,  because people were 
233 See Reeve, Andrew / Ware, Alan: Electoral Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction., Routledge, 
1992, p. 63. Also see e.g. Trachsler, Wilhelm: Das aktive Wahlrecht in England., K. J. Wyss Erben, 1927, pp.  
45-55 for details on what would count as a business or business premise for the purpose of enfranchisement 
in 1918.
234  Electoral Commission: Who can vote?, 2006 (to be found online: http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/ 
__data/assets/electoral_commission_pdf_file/0017/13274/0906whocanvote_23253_6144__E__N__S__W__.
pdf, last visited on 15 June 2010, 13:55)
235  See Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 80.
236  See e.g. Trachsler, Wilhelm: Das aktive Wahlrecht in England., K. J. Wyss Erben, 1927, p. 38. 
237  See Keir, D. L. The constitutional history of modern Britain 1485-1937., R&R Clark, 1938, pp. 117-118.
238  See Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 70. 
239  See Reeve, Andrew / Ware, Alan: Electoral Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction., Routledge, 
1992, p. 47.
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enfranchised regardless of whether they were already registered to vote in the constituency 
where they were resident in. The university seats  in parliament thus lead to plural voting 
power for graduates and it was only in 1948 that this provision was abolished240.  The main 
argument  had  been  that  enhanced  voting  power  for  the  educated  would  “elevate  the  
intellectual quality of debate in the House of Commons”241. They usually did not elect a party 
member to represent them but someone from the university staff,  which was supposed to 
guarantee  that  they  were  “free  from  party  discipline”  and  spoke  “according  to  their  
conscience alone”242. Thus the argument did not go to justify the additional vote for certain 
people  so  much  as  justify  why universities  were  allowed  to  send additional  MPs,  but  it 
nevertheless made for a “preferential voting right” for the educated.
3.3.3.3 Criminals
Design, working and historic background of the disqualification
The  second  group  of  persons  who  are  disenfranchised,  even  if  they  live  up  to  the 
citizenship/residence  and age  qualification,  are  criminals.  On the  one  hand,  this  refers  to 
persons who are detained in pursuance of their sentence, that is prisoners or offenders who are 
detained in mental hospitals. On the other hand, “anyone found guilty within the previous five  
years of corrupt or illegal practices in connection with an election”243 is also disenfranchised.
The former group has always been excluded from the franchise, dating back at least as far as 
to the 14th century244,  when King Edward III  took up the notion of “civil  death”,  i.e.  the 
ancient  idea  that  fellons  were  “deemed civilly  dead  and  thus  lacking  all  civil  rights”245. 
However, while in the past imprisonment led to blanket disenfranchisement, simply because 
prisons could not be named as places of residence for the purpose of registration, today there 
240 See Reeve, Andrew / Ware, Alan: Electoral Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction., Routledge, 
1992, p. 31.
241 See Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 71.
242 Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 71
243 Sear, Chris: Electoral franchise. Who can vote? (Publication by Parliament and Constitution Centre of the 
House  of  Commons  Library,  to  be  found  online  at   http://www.parliament.uk/documents  /commons 
/lib/research/briefings/snpc-02208.pdf, last visited on 16 June 2010, 18:52).
244 See the official judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Hirst  vs. The United 
Kingdom  (Application  no.  74025/01)  which  can  be  found  online  at  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
view.aspaction=html&documentId=787485&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD
8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649, last visited on 22 June 2010, 23:30). Also see  Lippke, Richard: The 
disenfranchisement of fellons., Law and Philosophy, Vol. 20, 2001, p. 559 for more details about the origins 
of the notion “civil death”.
245  Lippke, Richard: The disenfranchisement of fellons., Law and Philosophy, Vol. 20, 2001, p. 559.
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are two exceptions to this rule. First, remand or unconvicted prisoners and, second, so-called 
“civil prisoners” who are detained for being in default of paying a fine or for contempt of 
court. The second is especially important, because disenfranchising those who are financially 
unable to pay fines would introduce a class distinction in franchise, with those possessing 
more money being able to buy themselves out of disenfranchisement and poor people unable 
to do so246. Thus the assumption seems to be that the criminal act for which one is detained is 
the reason for disenfranchisement, not the fact that one is in prison. 
The disenfranchisement of those who broke election rules goes back to the Corrupt and Illegal 
Practices Act of 1883. For example,  it  defined bribery and intimidation corrupt  pracitces, 
while actions such as the provision of party favours were defined as illegal practice. Both 
were punishable with fines and the loss of certain political rights such as the right to vote247.
Justification
The important thing to note about the disenfranchisement of criminals is this: The underlying 
justification is not, as with the Members of the House of Lords, the equality of the democratic 
say,  i.e.  that  they  already  have  a  say  somewhere  in  the  core  political  process  and  may 
therefore not be included in general elections too. Instead, the decision is for them not to have 
any say at all, they may not elect a Member of Parliament to represent them. Their exclusion 
is  hence  pervasive  and  there  are  two  lines  of  argument  to  defend  this.  One  treats  their 
disenfranchisement as part of their legal punishment, the other refers to a criminal's probable 
intention.
The first justification assumes that persons generally want to have a say in how their society is 
ruled, i.e. they have a genuine interest, if not in participating in general elections, then at least 
to have the option of doing so. Taking that option away may therefore function as an effective 
punishment, as officially stated by a Member of Parliament in 2000: “it should be part of a  
246 See See Thomson, Matthew: The problem of mental  deficiency:  Eugenics,  democracy and social  policy 
1870-1959.,  p.  52  (to  be  found  online  at:  http://books.google.at/booksid=9rIsDsV_WpkC&printsec 
=frontcover&dq=Thomson+Mathew+eugenics&source=bl&ots=bvY2xAZGjR&sig=poHTb4RAHGsbvMcR
6s0e5oNAnJo&hl=de&ei=gn8aTNqnOJCVOMGAsdYK&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ve
d=0CCkQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q&f=false, last visited on 17 June 2010, 22:04).
247 See e.g.  Blewett, Neal: The Peers, the Party and the People. The general elections of 1910., Macmillan Press,  
1972, p. 371.
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convicted prisoner’s punishment that he loses rights, and one of them is the right to vote”248. 
There are two reasons for this. First, it can be suggested that by “violating the law, criminal  
offenders either take more benefits than they are entitled to or seek to avoid the burdens of  
law-abidingness”249. By punishing them this imbalance can be set right again, because their 
violating  other's  rights  results  in  their  rights  being  taken  away.  Disenfranchisement  is 
justified, then, because it is one way of setting the balance of rights and duties right again. Yet 
it may seem justified mostly for punishing “offenders whose crimes involve direct attacks on  
democratic political institutions or voting process”250, because in those cases the criminal's 
disenfranchisement  will  most  likely correct  an imbalance.  The second reason for  viewing 
disenfranchisement  as  a  justified  punishment  for  criminals  is  to  suggest  that  it  will  have 
educative, or “improving”, effects on the affected persons themselves. Their having taken a 
basic  democratic  right  taken  away  may  encourage  them  to  “acknowledge  their  past  
wrongdoing, repent of it and undertake genuine efforts to reform themselves so that future  
wrongdoing is avoided”251, because they feel  “a sting of exclusion from the ranks of equal  
political participation”252.
An alternative justification goes not so much to individual effects of disenfranchisement, be 
they retributive or educative,  but rather to the moral characteristics of criminal offenders. 
Supporters assume that criminals, as a group, are to be disenfranchised because “if they are  
not, they are likely to vote in ways that do not serve the public interest in crime reduction.” 253. 
Their  voting behaviour  is  assumed to  be contrary to  the  common interest,  therefore  they 
should not be allowed to vote. Furthermore, a person's criminal record is seen as proof of their 
lack of intent to actually follow the collective rules of society, so why should they have a say 
in the making of those rules? As Lippke puts it: “Criminal offenders are unwilling to obey the  
laws that result from everyone's exercise of the franchise, and thus have their rights to vote  
justifiably  suspended.”254.  Hence the general  idea is  that they lose their  rights because of 
248  See the official judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Hirst vs. The United  
Kingdom (Application  no.  74025/01)  for  this  citation.  (online  at  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/  view. 
aspaction=html&documentId=787485&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB
86142BF01C1166DEA398649, last visited on 22 June 2010, 23:30).
249  Lippke, Richard: The disenfranchisement of fellons., Law and Philosophy, Vol. 20, 2001, p. 571
250  Lippke, Richard: The disenfranchisement of fellons., Law and Philosophy, Vol. 20, 2001, p. 571
251 Lippke, Richard: The disenfranchisement of fellons., Law and Philosophy, Vol. 20, 2001, p. 573 (Note that he 
references Jean Hampton' article “The Moral Education Theory of Punishment”, published in Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, Vol. 13, 1984, in this context.)
252  Lippke, Richard: The disenfranchisement of fellons., Law and Philosophy, Vol. 20, 2001, p. 574
253  Lippke, Richard: The disenfranchisement of fellons., Law and Philosophy, Vol. 20, 2001, p. 569
254  Lippke, Richard: The disenfranchisement of fellons., Law and Philosophy, Vol. 20, 2001, p. 563
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voluntary actions  that  go to  testify a  certain state  of  mind.  This  seems to  suggest  that  a 
person's moral character is relevant for their right to vote.
While the disenfranchisement of criminals can thus be justified,  some criticise that England 
still practices some sort of “blanket disenfranchisement”255. The core argument was detailed 
by the European Court of Human Rights in 2005256, where they claimed that the real source of 
disenfranchisement is not the nature or gravity of the offence, but rather the fact that a person 
is in prison. This is because not all criminal offenders are excluded, but only those who either 
broke election rules or those who are detained, either in prison or in a mental hospital. This is 
a problem, because whether a person is detained in pursuance of their sentence or whether 
detention is suspended does not only depend on the nature or gravity of their act, but also on 
background  conditions  such  as  age  or  family  situation.  The  objection  is  that 
disenfranchisement of criminals is justified only if the gravity and nature of their act warrant 
this decision, but it cannot be determined simply by whether a person is detained in prison or 
not.
3.3.3.4 Mentally ill persons
Design and working of the disqualification
The third  condition  under  which  a  person is  disenfranchised,  even if  he/she  satisfies  the 
necessary conditions of citizenship/residence and age, is mental disability.  More precisely, 
only persons who “on polling day (...) are incapable of making a reasoned judgement”257 are 
disenfranchised, but the provision does not apply to all persons with mental disorders. In fact, 
it mainly applies to “formal patients” of mental hospitals,  i.e. those who are “compulsorily  
detained under a section of the Mental Health Act 1983”258, or to persons who have been 
placed  under  legal  guardianship  under  the  same  provision.  Both,  detainment  and 
255  See e.g. Lippke, Richard: The disenfranchisement of fellons., Law and Philosophy, Vol. 20, 2001, p. 566.
256 See the official  judgment  of  the European  Court  of  Human Rights  in  the case of  Hirst  vs.  The United 
Kingdom  (Application  no.  74025/01)  for  this  argumentation.  (online  at  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/ 
tkp197/view.aspaction=html&documentId=787485&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F6
9A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649, last visited on 22 June 2010, 23:30).
257 See Sear, Chris: Electoral franchise. Who can vote? (Publication by Parliament and Constitution Centre of  
the House of Commons Library, to be found online at
    http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-02208.pdf, last visited on 16 June 
2010, 18:52).
258 See  http://www.mind.org.uk/help/rights_and_legislation/mental_health_act_1983_an_outline_guide (last 
visited on 19 June 2010, 23:24) Also see  Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan 
Press, 1995, p. 83.
77
guardianship, are measures that can only be taken when they are warranted due to“nature or 
degree” of  a  person's  mental  disorder,  which  has  to  be  confirmed  by  two  doctors259. 
Furthermore, the doctors must confirm that these measures are necessary due to a concern for 
the patient's own safety and that of others260. Note that “necessity” in this context implies that 
both  conditions  cannot  be  satisfied  unless  the  person  is  actually  detained.  In  contrast, 
“informal patients” are “in hospital on a voluntary basis”261 and are therefore not affected by 
this provision. We therefore get the impression that legislation is both very open and very 
strict at the same time. It is open in regards to what might count as a mental disorder, because 
since 2007 it simply refers to  “any disorder or disability of mind”, thereby excepting only 
learning  disabilities  that  are  not  associated  with  “abnormally  aggressive  or  seriously  
irresponsible conduct”262. At the same time, however, legislation is very rigid in defining who 
can certify a person to have a mental disorder, how or under what conditions he/she can do 
that, and under which circumstances this accounts for them losing their vote.  In any case the 
disenfranchisement of mentally disabled persons is as pervasive as that of prisoners, because 
they do not have a say in general elections at all, at least for as long as they are commited.
Historic background
Dating  back  at  least  to  early  18th century  franchise  legislation,  “certified  lunatics” have 
always been excluded from the franchise263. For example, persons who had been admitted to a 
“madhouse” following the Madhouses Act of 1774, were practically disenfranchised, simply 
because  these  institutions  did  not  qualify  as  places  of  residence  for  the  purpose  of 
enfranchisement.  Similarly,  the  “asylums”  of  the  19th century  were  authorised  to  detain 
“lunatics”,  “idiots” and, more generally,  all  persons of “unsound mind” and also had this 
effect. Even the most radical supporters of an extension of the franchise agreed that “idiots” 
and “imbeciles” should not  vote,  because they were  not fit  to bear  the responsibilities of 
citizenship264.  However,  while  the  18th century  indeed  had  introduced  a  “new  and  more 
259  See  http://www.mind.org.uk/help/rights_and_legislation/mental_health_act_1983_an_outline_guide (last 
visited on 19 June 2010, 23:24).
260  See  http://www.mind.org.uk/help/rights_and_legislation/mental_health_act_1983_an_outline_guide (last 
visited on 19 June 2010, 23:24).
261 See  http://www.mind.org.uk/help/rights_and_legislation/mental_health_act_1983_an_outline_guide (last 
visited on 19 June 2010, 23:24) Also see  Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan 
Press, 1995, p. 83.
262 See  Mental  Health  Act  2007  (to  be  found  online  at  http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2007/ukpga 
_20070012_en_1, last visited on 20 June 2010, 10:54).
263 See e.g. Tanner, Duncan: Political change and the Labour Party 1900-1918., Cambridge University Press, 
1990, p. 100.
264 See Thomson, Matthew: The problem of mental deficiency: Eugenics, democracy and social policy 1870-
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specialised system of (...) medical regulation”265, admission to asylums still often reflected 
transgression  of  the  boundaries  of  social  conventions  rather  than  actual  mental 
incompetence266. For example, persons displaying “dirty habits” such as the  “inclination to 
leave the workhouse without clothes” were considered “suitable candidates for treatment in  
an asylum”267. In fact, one did not even need to display “any remarkable symptoms”268 at all, 
in order to be admitted to an asylum “distress”, “mania” or “melancholia” were enough to be 
certified insane269 and there did not need to be a precise medical diagnosis for this270. What is 
more, some of the main causes of “insanity” in he 19th century were not even mental, because 
they also included general paralysis or bodily ill-health271. There also was a tight connection 
between “workhouses”, designed to provide a place to work and live for people who were 
unable to support themselves, and the “lunatic asylums”. Poor persons were often transferred 
from one place to the other without any  medical justification at all272. It was assumed that 
being admitted to any of those institutions showed that a person was no independent member 
of the community273, thus he/she qualified for support but not for free citizenship rights, which 
is why he/she lost the vote in either case.
All in all, the main difference in regards to today's legislation is that physical illness or bodily 
disabilities no longer constitute a disqualification in regards to franchise, and that only mental 
disorders  prevent  persons from forming an independent  reasoned judgement  are  excluded 
from the franchise. This does not, by far, exclude all mentally “abnormal” persons, but mainly 
those who are compulsorily detained in mental hospitals  following the medical advise of at 
1959.,  pp.  53-54  (to  be  found  online  at:  http://books.google.at/booksid=  9rIsDsV_WPkC  &printsec= 
frontcover&dq=Thomson+Mathew+eugenics&source=bl&ots=bvY2xAZGjR&sig=poHTb4RAHGsbvMcR6
s0e5oNAnJo&hl=de&ei=gn8aTNqnOJCVOMGAsdYK&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved
=0CCkQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q&f=false, last visited on 17 June 2010, 22:04).
265 Melling, Joseph / Forsythe, Bill: The politics of madness. The state, insanity and society in England 1845-
1914., Routledge, 2006, p. 3.
266 See Melling, Joseph / Forsythe, Bill: The politics of madness. The state, insanity and society in England  
1845-1914., Routledge, 2006, p. 5.
267 Melling, Joseph / Forsythe, Bill: The politics of madness. The state, insanity and society in England 1845-
1914., Routledge, 2006, pp. 33ff 
268 Melling, Joseph / Forsythe, Bill: The politics of madness. The state, insanity and society in England 1845-
1914., Routledge, 2006, p. 37
269 See Melling, Joseph / Forsythe, Bill: The politics of madness. The state, insanity and society in England  
1845-1914., Routledge, 2006, p. 178. 
270 See Melling, Joseph / Forsythe, Bill: The politics of madness. The state, insanity and society in England  
1845-1914., Routledge, 2006, p. 195.
271 Melling, Joseph / Forsythe, Bill: The politics of madness. The state, insanity and society in England 1845-
1914., Routledge, 2006, p. 178. 
272  See Melling, Joseph / Forsythe, Bill: The politics of madness. The state, insanity and society in England 
1845-1914., Routledge, 2006, p. 37
273 See Melling, Joseph / Forsythe, Bill: The politics of madness. The state, insanity and society in England  
1845-1914., Routledge, 2006, p. 23.
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least two doctors.
Justification
The general argument for excluding mentally disabled persons from the franchise relies on 
“competence” as the central notion. First, in order to exercise their franchise, voters have to 
be in possession of mental competence above a certain threshold274. Persons who, on polling 
day, are “incapable of making a reasoned judgement”275 actually cannot exercise their right to 
vote,  because  they  cannot  do  what  is  required  for  voting  –  freely  forming  a  reasoned 
judgement on politics. They lose their right to vote, because they cannot actually vote, they 
are not mentally able to. Second, the distinction between formal and informal patients shows 
that only those persons are to be disenfranchised who are, from a medical standpoint, not fit 
or capable of taking responsibility for their own lives in a way that does not harm them or 
others. Hence, the underlying argument is that they are not to get a say in collectively binding  
decisions, because they cannot even take responsibility for their own lives, let alone that of 
the community.  In both cases,  a certain mental competence is assumed to be required for 
voting, and certain groups of mentally disabled persons do not live up to this condition.
3.3.3.5 Conclusion
There are two groups of people excluded from the English franchise. First, there are those 
who do not live up to the conditions of enfranchisement, i.e. citizenship, residence and age. 
Second,  there  is  a  set  of  legal  incapacities which  also  result  in  an  individual  being 
disenfranchised. Members of the House of Lords are excluded from the franchise, because 
their inclusion would violate the principle of equality in regards to the democratic say. The 
underlying argument is that they already have a guaranteed say in politics, hence they do not 
require representation. On the other hand, criminals and mentally disabled persons are more 
pervasively disenfranchised, because they are not to have any say at all. This can be justified 
by either referring to a fair distribution of rights and duties within society or due to a person's  
274 See Thomson, Matthew: The problem of mental deficiency: Eugenics, democracy and social policy 1870-
1959., p. 51 (to be found online at: http://books.google.at/booksid=9rIsDsV_ WpkC&printsec =frontcover 
&dq=Thomson+Mathew+eugenics&source=bl&ots=bvY2xAZGjR&sig=poHTb4RAHGsbvMcR6s0e5oNAn
Jo&hl=de&ei=gn8aTNqnOJCVOMGAsdYK&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CCkQ6
AEwAw#v=onepage&q&f=false, last visited on 17 June 2010, 22:04).
275 See Sear, Chris: Electoral franchise. Who can vote? (Publication by Parliament and Constitution Centre of  
the  House  of  Commons  Library,  to  be  found online  at  http://www.parliament.uk/  documents/  commons 
/lib/research/ briefings/snpc-02208.pdf, last visited on 16 June 2010, 18:52).
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state  of  mind.  Prisoner's  are  disqualified  for  their  likely  intent,  while  mentally  disabled 
persons are assumed to be unable to actually cast a meaningful vote. 
3.3.4 Conclusion
In the present chapter I have provided a detailed account of the current franchise patterns in 
England as well as of their evolution. I explicated the qualifications a person has to live up to 
in order to enjoy suffrage for general (parliamentary) elections in England, and conversely 
which conditions disenfranchise them. On the one hand, citizenship, residence and age are 
used as franchise qualifications. On the other, membership in the House of Lords, criminal 
conviction  and mental  disability  constitute  “legal  incapacities  to  vote”  and  thus  result  in 
disenfranchisement.  All  of  those  conditions  have firm historic  roots,  although design and 
justification has varied and changed over time. Since my aim is to use the example of the 
English franchise to develop a systematic framework for assessing a demos' legitimacy, the 
potential justification of all (dis)qualifications has been of special importance throughout this 
chapter. In fact, I have found six different principles of dis-/enfranchisement. First, there is the 
idea that only those persons should have a vote, whose fate is personally and permanently 
linked to the political community in question. Second, competency has proven an important 
issue. Although its meaning varies from “maturity” to general “mental ability”, the common 
assumption is that reasoned judgement is a precondition for voting. Third, the likely interest 
and  intention  of  particular  groups  of  people  is  an  argument  for  franchise  qualifications. 
Fourth, the fair distribution of burdens and benefits within a society has also been used as an 
argument. Fifth, numerical and demographical proportions within the electorate may justify 
franchise  qualifications.  Last,  the  issue  of  territory  and  its  political  significance  can  be 
deemed to justify certain limitations
For the context of this paper, there will be two main questions regarding those justifications: 
First, do they render the franchise qualifications legitimate? Second, is the particular English 
design of those qualifications legitimate? This question is important because it could turn out 
that  the  particular  provisions  in  England  are  not  legitimate,  even  though  the  underlying 
principles  are.  Before  turning  to  this  assessment,  however,  I  will  give  an  overview  of 
franchise qualifications that no longer prevail in England so to give a more comprehensive 
insight into potential franchise patterns.
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3.4 Review of no longer prevailing  principles
3.4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I explicated those qualifications that shape England's franchise today. 
In the present chapter, I will now give an overview of those conditions that did prevail in 
England for some time, but were abolished and are thus no longer relevant for suffrage today.  
I will  elaborate on the design and working of those conditions, but also suggest potential 
justifications and the official reasons for their abolishment. The main purpose is to allow for a 
comprehensive  insight  into  franchise  patterns  that  will  help  me  to  develop  a  theoretical 
framework for assessing the legitimacy of a democratic people.
3.4.2 No longer prevailing principles of enfranchisement
3.4.2.1 The property qualification
The oldest general election qualification is property. It was officially abolished in 1918, but 
some of its aspects have persisted until 2000. “Property” in the context of enfranchisement in 
England basically referred to the fact that a person had to own certain things in order to be 
eligible to vote. The qualification thus drew from the nature and value of those possessions, 
the criteria for both of which changed over time. In the present section I will now give an 
overview of property as a principle of enfranchisement and the justifications that were seen to 
support it.
Property as territorial stake
The property qualification goes back to the very beginnings of parliament itself. Even though 
the parliament did not, by far,  have the political  and legal powers it has today, it  already 
played an important role and therefore I argue it is significant to take a look at the early 
franchise qualifications.  The first important legislation on franchise was enacted in 1430276. 
Note, however, that it only affected the county franchise, because until 1832 boroughs had the 
right to decide the basis for enfranchisement by themselves277. Because of this right, borough 
franchise varied significantly in extent and nature,  but it mostly adhered to the same principle 
276 See Reeve, Andrew / Ware, Alan: Electoral Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction., Routledge, 
1992, p. 45.
277 See Reeve, Andrew / Ware, Alan: Electoral Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction., Routledge, 
1992, p. 46 .
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as county franchise – property278. As for the counties: Before 1430, “all free householders in  
a county had a right to vote in an election for members of the Commons”279, but after that 
“the franchise was restricted by statute to freeholders whose property was worth at least 40  
shillings a year”280. This introduction of a minimum value of the qualifying property indeed 
constituted a further limitation of the franchise and preserved the principle that only “those 
who had a stake in the land should be entitled to vote”281. As Reeve and Ware have pointed 
out:  “in effect, all that changed after 1430 was what was to count as ´having a stake`”282. 
Thus, in medieval England, the property qualification was justified with the argument that 
people had to have a stake in order to get a vote. Having a stake, however, meant to have a  
(propertied) stake in a territory283 and this was due to several reasons. First, the Commons 
have always been seen to represent constituencies, i.e. territorially defined parts of the realm. 
Against this background it is not surprising that having a “stake” in this constituency should 
also be defined on a territorial, or landed, basis. Having a stake meant for persons to have a 
stake in “the territory they resided in”284. Second, a connection to the particular constituency 
was established only by propertied stake285, because the parliament was to represent the main 
socio-economic interests286 of the country. Again, land was seen as the key resource, because 
any kind of economy, any kind of business or commerce or agriculture, had to be conducted 
somewhere, “in a place”287.
278 See Reeve, Andrew / Ware, Alan: Electoral Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction., Routledge, 
1992, p. 46. 
279 Reeve, Andrew /  Ware, Alan: Electoral  Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction.,  Routledge, 
1992, p. 45
280 Reeve, Andrew /  Ware, Alan: Electoral  Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction.,  Routledge, 
1992, p. 45
281 Reeve, Andrew /  Ware, Alan: Electoral  Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction.,  Routledge, 
1992, p. 45 
282 Reeve, Andrew /  Ware, Alan: Electoral  Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction.,  Routledge, 
1992, p. 45 
283 See Reeve, Andrew / Ware, Alan: Electoral Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction., Routledge, 
1992, p. 51 and  Dearlove, John / Saunders, Peter: Introduction to British Politics. Analyzing a Capitalist 
Democracy. (2nd edition), Polity Press, 1989, p. 30.
284 See Reeve, Andrew / Ware, Alan: Electoral Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction., Routledge, 
1992, p. 51.
285 See Dearlove, John / Saunders, Peter: Introduction to British Politics. Analyzing a Capitalist Democracy.  
(2nd edition), Polity Press, 1989, p. 30. 
286 See Reeve, Andrew / Ware, Alan: Electoral Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction., Routledge, 
1992,  p.  46.  Also  see  Pole,  J.  R.:  Political  representation  in  England  and  the  origins  of  the  American 
Republic.,  Macmillan  Press,  1966,  p.  443  for  an  argument  how  parliament  was  supposed  to  represent  
“interests” rather than persons.
287 Reeve, Andrew /  Ware, Alan: Electoral  Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction.,  Routledge, 
1992, p. 46
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Property as respectability
The principle  of  property as  core  condition  for  enfranchisement  did  not  change  but  was 
instead  re-iterated by the Great Reform Acts of the 19th century. In 1832 new principles of 
what should “count as a stake” were introduced and for the first time, borough franchise was 
harmonized288. The main change was the new enfranchisement of the middle-classes289, so that 
in  sum about  18% of  all  adult  males  were  eligible  to  vote  after  1832290.  In  counties  the 
franchise was extended to those adult males who owned freehold property worth at least £2 or 
copyhold land worth £10 yearly value, but also to those who had rented land worth £50 per 
year291. In the boroughs all those who had been entitled to vote before 1832 remained eligible,  
but they were no longer able to automatically pass this right on to their heirs unless they too  
qualified according to the new requirements.  Apart from that,  franchise was limited to all 
those adult males who owned or occupied property worth £10 a year, provided that they had 
satisfied this condition for one year prior to the election, had paid the relevant taxes and not 
received poor relief within this period292. As we can see, property remained the underlying 
qualification, even though it was not only established through ownership of land anymore, but 
also through the legitimate occupation of land as long it had a certain financial or economic 
value. The later reforms of 1867 and 1884 “progressively reduced the economic barriers to  
voting for men”293, but they also reflected a shift in principles. Instead of land ownership, 
general wealth became sufficient294. This is because in the 19th century the main criterion was 
not so much territorial stake anymore, but respectability, as Evans has pointed out:
288 See Reeve, Andrew / Ware, Alan: Electoral Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction., Routledge, 
1992, p. 51
289 Reeve, Andrew / Ware, Alan: Electoral  Systems. A comparative and theoretical  introduction., Routledge, 
1992, p. 51
290 See  e.g.  Reeve,  Andrew  /  Ware,  Alan:  Electoral  Systems.  A comparative  and  theoretical  introduction., 
Routledge,  1992,  p.  51or  Evans,  Eric:  Parliamentary  reform  1770-1918.,  Longman,  2000,  p.  129.  See 
Trachsler, Wilhelm: Das akive Wahlrecht in England., K.J. Wyss Erben, 1927 for numerical details on the 
continuing inclusion. Note however, that he is not concerned with the proportion of male adults that were  
allowed to vote, but rather the percentage of the whole English population who was enfranchised.
291 See Evans, Eric: Parliamentary reform 1770-1918., Longman, 2000, p. 128.
292 See Evans, Eric: Parliamentary reform 1770-1918., Longman, 2000, p. 129. - Note that the receipt of poor 
relief ceased to be a disqualification from voting in 1918 (see Butler, D. E.: The electoral system in Britain 
1918-1951., Clarendon Press, 1953, p. 8).
293 Reeve, Andrew / Ware, Alan: Electoral  Systems. A comparative and theoretical  introduction., Routledge, 
1992, p. 56.
294 Note that this may be seen to reflect the general change of societal and economic structures, in particular the  
emergence  of  the  “industrial  mass  society”.  (See  Kluxen,  Kurt:  Die  Umformung des  parlamentarischen 
Regierungssystems  in  Großbritannien  beim  Übergang  zur  Massendemokratie.,  In:  Kluxen,  Kurt  (Ed.): 
Parlamentarismus., Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1967, p. 116) Also see Keir, D. L.: The constitutional history of 
modern Britain 1485-1937.,  R&R Clark, 1938, p.  416 on the role of  the “industrial  masses” in the 19 th 
century.
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“Respectability  was  a  key  term  in  Victorian  England.  It  denoted  a  degree  of  economic  
independence, such as could be enjoyed by those who had a secure job bringing in decent  
wages. (...) it indicated a willingness to play by the existing social rules. (...) The respectable  
were expected to be organised, thrifty and prudent. They kept up with their rent. (...) They  
would cast away surplus cash in saving banks (...)”295 
This suggests that the underlying idea was that only the socially “worthy” people should be 
enfranchised296. However, it was unclear how to legislate this principle, so the only feasible 
way was to rely on a person's financial status297 which was perceived as an indication of their 
prudence and social virtue. The wealthy thus contrasted with the “residuum”, i.e. the casually 
unemployed298,  “vagrants” and  “wastrels”299 who were to be excluded from the franchise. 
Like criminals or insane people, the poor were deemed unworthy of inclusion, in part because 
they had nothing to show for their responsibility300. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact 
that until 1918, the receipt of poor relief constituted a disqualification from the franchise301. 
Property as household qualification 
While property was first introduced as a measure of “territorial stake” and then evolved to 
signify “respectability”, a third change began to show in 1867302. This is because the 1867 
reform implemented the basis for household suffrage which was later confirmed in the 1884 
Act  which  finally  equalised  conditions  for  enfranchisement  in  counties  and  boroughs303. 
Where territory or certain interests had been the relevant basis for enfranchisement before, 
“households” now were the central social unit. Whereas the nature and monetary value of 
property became less important the social unit holding it became significant. Though England 
295 Evans, Eric: Parliamentary reform 1770-1918., Longman, 2000, p. 41 – Also see Blackburn, Robert: The 
Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 66
296 See e.g. See e.g. Keir, D. L.: The constitutional history of modern Britain 1485-1937., R&R Clark, 1938, p. 
415 for an argument how democratisation was to be designed so that the poor and uneducated would be 
“outbalanced”. Also see Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 66.
297  See Evans, Eric: Parliamentary reform 1770-1918., Longman, 2000, p. 42
298  See Evans, Eric: Parliamentary reform 1770-1918., Longman, 2000, p. 41.
299 See Thomson, Mathew: The problem of mental deficiency: Eugenics, democracy and social policy in Britain.  
1870-1959., p. 51 (to be found online at: http://books.google.at/ booksid= 9rIsDsV _WpkC&  printsec =front 
cover&dq=Thomson+Mathew+eugenics&source=bl&ots=bvY2xAZGjR&sig=poHTb4RAHGsbvMcR6s0e5
oNAnJo&hl=de&ei=gn8aTNqnOJCVOMGAsdYK&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0C
CkQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q&f=false, last visited on 17 June 2010, 22:04).
300 See Melling, Joseph / Forsythe, Bill: The politics of madness. The state, insanity and society in England  
1845-1914., Routledge, 2006 for the similarities and connections in the treatment of the insane and the poor.
301 Butler, D. E.: The electoral system in Britain 1918-1951., Clarendon Press, 1953, p. 8
302 See Evans, Eric: Parliamentary reform 1770-1918., Longman, 2000, p. 132.
303 Evans, Eric: Parliamentary reform 1770-1918., Longman, 2000, p. 134
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had  not  arrived  at  today's  principle  of  “one  person,  one  vote”  yet304,  it  did  come  to  be 
acknowledged that the head of household, who was effectively the one to be enfranchised, 
spoke not only for himself, in virtue of his economic or social achievement, but was expected 
to  virtually represent  all  other  members  of  his  household too.  This  applied  to  wives  and 
children, but also adult bachelors living with their parents as well as domestic servants sharing 
their employer's household305.
Property replaced by residence
Household suffrage and the idea of virtual representation was effectively replaced in 1918 (or 
1928  for  women)  when  franchise  was  no  longer  limited  to  the  head  of  household,  but  
extended to persons on an individual basis306.  However,  this  was the point when property 
qualifications were abolished altogether and were instead replaced by residence as the core 
condition  of  enfranchisement307.  As  I  have  pointed  out  in  earlier  sections  of  this  paper, 
residence still  is  one  of  the  main  principles  of  enfranchisement  today,  even  if  it  is 
complemented by citizenship. Once again, the basic justification is that of “having a stake”, 
but this stake need not be based on property anymore. For example, this is signified by the 
fact that homeless people, i.e. persons who are resident without having property, are explicitly 
enfranchised since 2000308.
According to Keir, one of the main reasons for the extinction of the property qualification is 
that it was “too arbitrary to survive”309. This is because it
“(...) did not even qualify any uniform social class, since in small towns it enfranchised a  
smaller proportion than in large towns where rents ruled higher. As national wealth increased,  
the  £ 10 franchise declining in real (...) value, qualified a growing number of persons, and  
304 See Reeve, Andrew / Ware, Alan: Electoral Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction., Routledge, 
1992, p. 63.
305 See Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 68 and Blewett, Neal: 
The Peers, the Parties and the People. The General Elections of 1919., Macmillan Press, 1972, p. 359.
306 See Reeve, Andrew / Ware, Alan: Electoral Systems. A comparative and theoretical introduction., Routledge, 
1992, p. 49.
307 See Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 69.
308 See James, Toby: Electoral Modernisation or Elite Statecraft. Electoral Administration in the UK 1997-2007.,  
not  yet  published but forthcoming in “British Politics” (Journal),  provided to me in advance by Andrew 
Reeve (PDF). Also see https/homeless.org.uk/voting-in-general-election (last visited on 23 May 2010, 17:00) 
for an overview of conditions for voting of homeless persons.
309 Keir, D. L.: The constitutional history of modern Britain 1485-1937., R&R Clark, 1938, p. 415 
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made  the  contrast  between  those  who  could  and  those  who  could  not  vote  even  more  
indefensible.”310
Apart from arbitrariness, the main change lay in the issue of what should count as a stake for 
the purpose of enfranchisement. For example, Locke argued that people founded the political 
community by pooling their  property,  thus political  status per se came through propertied 
stake311.  However,  his  writings  are  open  to  interpretation  in  regards  to  the  definition  of 
property. While it is true that he sometimes refers to possessions, he also defines property as 
“life, liberty and estates”. On this second reading, any living person would own property, 
thus being eligible for franchise312. 
3.4.2.2 The marriage qualification
A second principle of enfranchisement that is no longer prevailing in England's electoral law 
today is marriage. From 1918 to 1928 women could qualify for franchise in general elections, 
not directly by satisfying the residence and age requirements that qualified men, but by being 
married  to  a  man  who  actually  was  enfranchised313.  Thus  marriage  effectively  was  an 
enfranchising principle314. This contrasts with the concept of household suffrage, because in 
this case the male head of household was enfranchised but supposedly exercised his vote in 
representation of all members of the household, including his wife. Today, women qualify to 
vote on an equal basis as men, with the marital or family status being irrelevant for the issue 
of franchise.
What could justify enfranchising a person based on her spouse's franchise status? Perhaps the 
general idea is that of the special affiliation of married couples. They usually share property 
310 Keir, D. L.: The constitutional history of modern Britain 1485-1937., R&R Clark, 1938, p. 415 
311 See Locke, John: Two treatises of government., Cambridge University Press, 2005 (student edition edited  
with an  introduction and notes by Peter Laslett). Also see Pole, J. R.: Political representation in England and 
the  origins  of  the  American  Republic.,  Macmillan  Press,  1966,  pp.  4-22  and  pp.  526-528  for  further 
explication.
312 See Laslett, Peter: Introduction., In: Locke, John: Two treatises of government., Cambridge University Press,  
2005  (student  edition  edited  with  an   introduction  and  notes  by  Peter  Laslett)  or  Arblaster,  Anthony:  
Democracy., Open University Press, 1987, pp.33-34. Also see  Pole, J. R.: Political representation in England 
and the origins of the American Republic., Macmillan Press, 1966, pp. 465-468.
313 See Evans, Eric: Parliamentary reform 1770-1918., Longman, 2000, p. 135.
314 Note that Tanner suggests that in the late 19th century, marriage constituted a franchise principle for men too, 
albeit indirectly, because the de facto design of the various qualification significantly favoured married men  
over  bachelors  (see  Tanner,  Duncan:  Political  change  and  the  Labour  Party  1900-1918.,  Cambridge 
University Press, 1990, pp. 120-128 for details).
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and their a place of residence, which could be seen to warrant that what qualifies the one 
should also qualify the other. On this view, if one person is enfranchised, this right should also 
be transferred to his/her spouse, because of the extraordinary connection they share.
3.4.3 No longer prevailing principles of disenfranchisement
3.4.3.1 The sex disqualification
The main franchise disqualification persisting throughout history and until well into the 20 th 
century was sex315. In fact, women were rigidly denied franchise until 1918316, and it was only 
in  1928 that  they qualified  on  the  same conditions  as  men317.  Note,  however,  that  “it  is  
probable that a few women did vote before 1832”318, because there was no uniform franchise 
in boroughs and it is likely that women were sometimes allowed to hold property in their own 
name,  thus  being able  to  qualify on  a  property basis319.  Yet  this  seems  to  have  been an 
exception  rather  than  the  norm  and  in  1832  an  “all-male  electorate”320 was  created. 
Henceforth, being a woman automatically disqualified a person from holding a vote in general 
elections in England. There were four common justifications for this, three of which were 
based on cultural prejudice and only the last being inherently political.
Female franchise and cultural prejudice
In  order  to  justify  female  exclusion  from the  franchise  conservatives  used  three  lines  of 
argument. First, they suggested that there were sex-dependent  “god-given spaces”. Women 
were to be confined to the private sphere while men should be in charge of the public arena321. 
Furthermore,  some  argued  that  women  were  “generally  indifferent  to  vote”  and  that 
enfranchising them would thus be unnecessary or even unwise. Of course this might seem 
strange considering that it was an official line of argument even at a time when the women 
suffrage campaigns of the 19th century were already publicly known322. It was not so much 
315 Note that I will treat sex as a principle of disenfranchisement rather than of enfranchisement, because while  
male sex was necessary for enfranchisement,  it  did not by itself  constitute a qualification for voting.  In 
contrast, being female did constitute an absolute disqualification from the franchise for a very long time.
316 See e.g. Evans, Eric: Parliamentary reform 1770-1918., Longman, 2000, p. 87. 
317 See e.g. Butler, D.E.: The electoral system in Britain 1918-1951., Clarendon Press, 1953, p. 12.
318 Reeve, Andrew / Ware, Alan: Electoral  Systems. A comparative and theoretical  introduction., Routledge, 
1992, p. 52
319 See Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 67.
320 Reeve, Andrew / Ware, Alan: Electoral  Systems. A comparative and theoretical  introduction., Routledge, 
1992, p. 52
321 See Evans, Eric: Parliamentary reform 1770-1918., Longman, 2000, p. 77.
322  See Evans, Eric: Parliamentary reform 1770-1918., Longman, 2000, p. 77. Also see Mill, John Stuart: The  
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that women, as a gender, were de facto indifferent to franchise, rather they were supposed to 
be, especially considering the assumption of gender-specific traits and duties. Third, “women 
were  not  ´proper`  examples  of  their  sex unless  they  had  fulfilled  their  manifest  duty  to  
marry”323 and if they were indeed married they did not actually need a vote, because their 
family was already represented through their husbands, the head of household324. To back up 
this  argument,  some  opponents  of  the  female  franchise  cited  “house-owning  brothel  
madams” as  the  only  ones  who  would  actually  benefit  from  the  inclusion  of  women. 
“Respectable  wives”,  on  the  other  hand,  would  not  benefit,  because  they  already  were 
virtually  represented  through their  husband325 and  did  not  need any further  inclusion.  Of 
course  this  is  not  entirely  true,  because  even  if  we  accept  the  premise  that  virtual 
representation through household suffrage tantamounts to being enfranchised this would still 
disqualify  “respectable” widows326.  In  fact,  this  was  the  very  argument  used  by  many 
supporters of the female franchise. They suggested that while it was certainly true that women 
should not be entitled to vote merely based on their sex, sex should at least cease to be an a 
priori disqualification. Instead individuals should be enfranchised based on qualifications that 
do not require a certain sex327.
What all three of these justifications have in common is that they reflect cultural prejudice, 
because a biological trait was asserted to be decisive for whether a person  should have the 
vote.  Empirics  and  normativity  were  thus  confused328.  One  could  question  whether  the 
situation  is  different  if  women's  disqualification  was  not  based  on  sex,  but  on  lack  of 
“interest”, as the second argument indicates. In this context, some of today's theorists would 
claim that “interest in politics” is in fact relevant for enfranchisement329, but it would be quite 
another thing to establish that sex is the most reliable indicator for this.
subjection of women., In: Mill, John Stuart: On Liberty and other essays., Oxford University Press, 2008 
[essay originally published in 1869] or Wollstonecraft, Mary: A vindication of the rights of woman., Oxford 
University Press, 1993 [first published in 1792].
323 Evans, Eric: Parliamentary reform 1770-1918., Longman, 2000, p. 78
324 Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 68
325 See Evans, Eric: Parliamentary reform 1770-1918., Longman, 2000, p. 78.
326 See Evans, Eric: Parliamentary reform 1770-1918., Longman, 2000, p. 78.
327 See Evans, Eric: Parliamentary reform 1770-1918., Longman, 2000, p. 80.
328 Note that  “race” would be a similar  example for  an alleged “natural” or  biological  criterion,  but which 
actually reflects cultural prejudice. (See e.g. Spinner, Jeff: The boundaries of citizenship. Race, ethnicity and 
nationality in the Liberal State., John Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp.14-16.)
329 See e.g. Weissberg, Robert: Democratic political competence. Clearing the underbrush and a controversial 
proposal., In: Political Behavior, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2001 for discussion.
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Female franchise as danger to political stability
In contrast to the more culturally motivated arguments, the second approach of justification is 
political  in  nature.  On  the  one  hand,  arguments  against  female  suffrage  centred  around 
political  stability.  In  the  context  of  the  1918  reform  some  claimed  that  it  would  be 
irresponsible to introduce such a massive number of new voters which, due to their sex, were 
bound to show an entirely different voting behaviour330. This could have a negative impact on 
political stability and was therefore deemed unwarrantable. On the other hand, some argued 
that female franchise was unnecessary, because their voting behaviour would not change the 
quality  of  politics  in  England331.  The  underlying  assumption  was  that  only those  persons 
should be enfranchised whose votes are likely to have a positive impact on the nation's fate. 
Note that this argument thus reflects a similar principle as the notion of “respectability” or the 
plural voting for university graduates.
Female franchise and the abolishment of sex discrimination
When women were finally enfranchised in 1918, the main justification was their  “massive  
contribution  to  the  war  effort”332.  Having  shared  the  burdens  of  society  and  having 
contributed to the best of their abilities, thereby supporting the government during the World 
War333, public support for women's inclusion had grown stronger334. Nonetheless it  “could 
only be sold to parliament if the great majority of female voters were married, mature and  
could be linked in some way to the household qualification, either directly or through their  
husband”335. This is one of the reasons why they were subjected to different qualifications 
than men, for example regarding age. Effectively only women over thirty who satisfied one of 
the following conditions  wer  eligible  to  vote:  Either  they already were local  government 
electors occupying property of  £5 yearly value, or they occupied a dwelling house on the 
same basis as men,, or they were married to a man entitled to be registered336.
330 See Butler, D. E.: The electoral system in Britain 1918-1951., Clarendon Press, 1953, p. 12.
331 See Trachsler, Wilhelm: Das aktive Wahlrecht in England., Buchdruckerei K.J. Wyss Erben, 1927, p. 67.
332 Evans, Eric: Parliamentary reform 1770-1918., Longman, 2000, p. 87. Also see Emden, Cecil: The people 
and the constitution. Being a history of the development of the people's influence in British government.,  
Clarendon Press, 1956, pp. 3-4  (Also see Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan 
Press, 1995, p. 68.)
333 See Trachsler, Wilhelm: Das aktive Wahlrecht in England., Buchdruckerei K.J. Wyss Erben, 1927, p. 68.
334 See Evans, Eric: Parliamentary reform 1770-1918., Longman, 2000, p. 87.
335 Evans, Eric: Parliamentary reform 1770-1918., Longman, 2000, p. 87.
336 See Evans, Eric: Parliamentary reform 1770-1918., Longman, 2000, p. 135.
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In 1928, this discrimination between sexes could no longer be maintained337, not least because 
female voting behaviour had turned out to not to have any destabilising effects on politics, 
and women have henceforth been enfranchised on the same basis as men, sex no longer being 
a principle of disenfranchisement.
3.4.3.2 The conscientious objection disqualification
The same Reform Act that first enfranchised women in 1918 also introduced a new principle 
of disenfranchisement: conscientious objection338. As summarized by Morris:
“It  was to apply  to all  persons who were exempted from military  services  on account of  
conscientious objections or those who were sentenced by court-martial for refusal to obey  
military law, on account of conscientious objection. Conscientious objectors, however, were  
not  to  be  disqualified if  before  the  expiration of  one  year after  the  war  they  obtained  a  
certificate from the Central Tribunal that they had satisfactorily performed services during the  
war in some way connected with the war or had performed work of national importance.”339
This disenfranchisement was not pervasive, because it was limited to five years after the end 
of  the  war340.  As  for  justification,  it  seems  that  it  was  the  reversal  of  the  argument  for 
enfranchising women which was based on the idea that their contribution to the war entitled 
them to be enfranchised. Only conscientious objectors who could not prove having at least 
engaged in  some “work of national importance” were disenfranchised due to their lack of 
contribution341. On the one hand, this once again reflects the rights/duties or benefits/burdens 
approach we have already encountered several times in the context of franchise. On the other, 
we get  the  impression  that  war  is  of  special  significance  when it  comes  to  the  issue  of 
337 See e.g. Trachsler, Wilhelm: Das aktive Wahlrecht in England., Buchdruckerei K.J. Wyss Erben, 1927, p. 70.
338 See e.g. Butler, D. E.: The electoral system in Britain 1918-1951., Clarendon Press, 1953, p. 5.
339 Morris, Homer Lawrence: Parliamentary franchise reform in England from 1885 to 1918., BiblipLife, pp.  
184-185  (to  be  found  online  at  http://books.google.at/books?id=IjH1wDWldMkC&pg=  PA182&lpg= 
PA182&dq=conscientious+objector+franchise&source=bl&ots=JVZ6xWKgQx&sig=AtIqHdyypCgZH3JSs
GI_0QMlS64&hl=de&ei=E2QhTIeuDoyoOIv9mWw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0
CCUQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q&f=true, last visited on 22 June 2010, 03:43) 
340  See e.g. Butler, D. E.: The electoral system in Britain 1918-1951., Clarendon Press, 1953, p. 5.
341 See Trachsler, Wilhelm: Das aktive Wahlrecht in England., K. J. Wyss Erben, 1927, p. 9. Also see  Emden, 
Cecil: The people and the constitution. Being a history of the development of the people's influence in British 
government., Clarendon Press, 1956, pp. 3-4 for the more general argument that all widening of the franchise  
was at that time justified by the “necessity for allowing those who had taken a part in the war”  to have a 
vote.
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contribution. Perhaps this is because the nature of war per se requires commitment, or because 
it is an official “act” of the collectively elected government and lack of support may therefore 
result in the suspension of a person's democratic rights342.
3.4.4 Conclusion 
In the present chapter I have given an overview of those franchise (dis)qualifications that no 
longer  prevail  in  English  electoral  law  today.  Property  and  marriage  qualifications  were 
abolished, as were sex and conscientious objection disqualifications. I have tried to show that 
while some of those requirements were based on similar justifications as those still prevailing 
today,  there are  some arguments that  are no longer  deemed valid.  For example,  having a 
“stake” in the political community is still important, but it no longer needs to be supported by 
property.  Similarly,  economic  wealth  is  no  longer  presumed  to  reflect  on  a  person's 
“respectability”,  at  least  not  in  a  way  that  matters  for  enfranchisement.  Furthermore, 
biological traits such as sex are no longer seen to disqualify a person from voting, as long as 
they  do  not  affect  their  ability  to  come  to  reasoned  judgement.  Last,  a  person's  family, 
household  or  marital  status  no  longer  affects  his/her  franchise  status  and  a  person's 
engagement in the war is not a requirement for voting anymore.
342 See Lippke, Richard: The disenfranchisement of fellons., Law and Philosophy, Vol. 20, 2001 for a similar  
argument in the context of the disenfranchisement of criminals.
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IV. ANALYSIS
1. Introduction
In  the  present  chapter  I  will  pull  together  the  strings  that  have  been  introduced  in  the 
foregoing  parts  of  this  paper.  In  particular  this  means  that  I  will  analyse  what  kind  of 
conditions make for a legitimate democratic people. On the one hand, I will integrate the three 
values of freedom, equality and reasonable acceptability into one coherent framework. On the 
other,  I  aim  to  systematize  the  principles  of  (dis)enfranchisement  so  that  they  can  be 
distinguished according to their underlying justification and perspective. The so-developed 
framework will be applied to the example of the English franchise, because I want to examine 
whether their demos is legitimate or what would need to be changed in order for it to be. For 
this  purpose  I  will  consider  both  the  legal  qualifications  and  their  underlying  theoretical 
principles. The analysis will have exemplary status since the analytical framework proposed 
in this paper can also be used to examine any other franchise pattern.
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2.  Developing  a  systematic  framework  for  assessing  the 
legitimacy of a democratic people
2.1 Systematizing principles of legitimacy
The first criterion that qualifications for enfranchisement have to live up to in order to count 
as legitimate is freedom. As I have pointed out in an earlier section of this paper, Philip Pettit 
elaborates this to mean that all human beings are born free and must not be systematically 
interfered  with  unless  this  interference  lives  up  to  the  following  two  conditions:  First, 
systematic interference must not be arbitrary. Second, it is only justified when it tracks the 
relevant  interests  of  all  involved  persons.  Should  the  interference  not  live  up  to  those 
conditions,  a  state  of   (arbitrary)  “domination”  is  created  and  this  is  inconsistent  with 
individual freedom.343 For the constitution of the demos the important  implication is  this: 
Anyone whose life a democratic government interferes with should be enfranchised, because 
this is how their interests can be tracked and how they can protect themselves against arbitrary 
domination.  In  contrast,  it  seems illegitimate  for  someone to  have  a  say if  he/she  is  not 
actually interfered with by the democratic government.
The second standard  of  legitimacy is  based  on the  value  of  equality.  For  example,  Tom 
Christiano argues that since all persons have equal moral status, their interests have to be 
advanced equally and in a way that allows them to actually see that they are being treated as 
equals344.  We  can  specify  this  to  mean  that  while  moral  equality  requires  morally  equal 
treatment, politically equal treatment has to be justified from this particular perspective too. 
Obviously, if democratic legitimacy requires that equals are treated as such, it must require 
that  unequals are  not.  What  accounts for  “equality” in  the politically relevant  sense does 
therefore not only depend on moral status, but also on the political one. Unlike moral status, 
the political does not seem to follow from mere humanity, however, but from other relevant 
traits, such as the extent to which a person is affected by the collectively made decisions, their 
political interest, their competence, etc. - in fact, the proper explication of what accounts for 
equal political status is what we will need to define due to the further course of this chapter. In 
any case, the value of equality requires that equal treatment should follow from equality  in 
343 See Pettit, Philip: Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government., Claredon Press, 1997 for details  
on  his argument.
344 See Christiano, Tom: The Constitution of Equality. Democratic Authority and its Limits., Oxford University 
Press, 2009 for details on his argument.
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regards to relevant traits or status, not from arbitrary favouring.
The third standard of legitimacy is based on the notion of reasonable acceptability. On this 
view, qualifications for enfranchisement must be designed so that they can be justified based 
on reasons that all those who are reasonable, in the sense that they are willing to propose and 
abide by fair terms of cooperation, would accept345. According to John Rawls, “acceptable” in 
this  context  does  not  mean  “likely  to  be  accepted  (empirically)”,  but  rather  “meriting 
acceptance” - it is what people would accept were they reasonable, thus it is what they ought 
to accept if they aim to propose and abide by fair terms of cooperation346. In particular this 
means that qualifications must be designed so that even those who are disenfranchised would 
be able to reasonably accept them, as long as they are fair-minded. John Rawls has developed 
the “Original Position” as a (hypothetical) tool for determining whether particular conditions 
actually satisfy the condition of reasonable acceptability. He argues that if persons were under 
a “veil of ignorance”, that is if they didn't know what their own position in society was, they 
would be likely to make truly just decisions, because they wouldn't be able to favour their 
own position (simply because they would not know what this position was) and thus would 
have an interest in making impartial decisions that would not arbitrarily discriminate against 
anyone347. 
I thus suggest that there are three principles that franchise qualifications have to live up to in 
order to count as legitimate – freedom, equality and reasonable acceptability. I furthermore 
claim  that  all  three  principles  are  of  equal  normative  power.  A franchise  qualification 
therefore is legitimate only if it does not contradict any one of those principles, if it is in fact 
compatible with all of them, and if it can be shown to realize at least one of their underlying 
values. That is to say,  a franchise qualification does not have to foster both freedom and 
equality, but it will suffice if it actually fosters one, without contradicting or counteracting the 
other(s). For example, a red-hair-qualification for voting may be compatible with the value of 
equality if we assume that everyone has an equal chance of dyeing their hair red, but it is  
certainly  questionable  whether  if  could  be  reconciled  with  the  values  of  freedom  and 
345 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, pp.136ff.
346 See Weale,  Albert:  Contractarianism, deliberation and general  agreement.,  In:  Dowding,  Keith /  Goodin, 
Robert / Pateman, Carle (Eds.): Justice and Democracy. Essays for Brian Barry. Cambridge University Press,  
2004, pp. 91-92.
347 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, pp. 24-28 for details on the veil of 
ignorance and its purpose in Rawls' theory.
95
reasonable acceptability, because it seems a rather arbitrary qualification – there simply are no 
“good” reasons for why people should be required to have red hair and why being blonde 
should disqualify a person from voting.
2.2 Systematizing principles of (dis)enfranchisement
When clarifying my conception of democracy I argued that its key distinct feature is that it is 
rule of the people,  but not only of  some people,  but  all.   Yet the example of the English 
franchise has made it obvious that “all” does not actually refer to all people in the sense that 
all human persons (or even all living) are enfranchised. Rather, it seems to refer to “all who 
belong to the people”, i.e. who are members of the relevant collective in question. At the same 
time, however, there usually is even further discrimination, because not all members of “the 
people” actually get a vote and there thus is franchise discrimination  within the people too. 
How  can  we  integrate  those  findings  into  a  systematic  framework  for  conceptualizing 
principles of (dis)enfranchisement?
First, I conclude that franchise qualifications can be differentiated according to the analytical 
perspective they adopt. There are two relevant levels, one treating the democratic people from 
an  outside,  the  other  from  an  inside  perspective.  From  an  outside  perspective  the  core 
question is what constitutes a political community to begin with. Or, put differently, why is it 
that there should be “a people” instead of just people? What is it that makes persons form a 
collective for matters of politics at all? In contrast, the second level is about discriminations 
within this  people.  Even if  a  certain  set  of  persons  forms a  people,  not  all  members  are 
necessarily enfranchised. How can this be reconciled with the idea that democracy means that 
all,  and  not  just  some,  of  the  people  are  rulers?  Both  perspectives  deal  with  potential 
exclusion, but they take different views on what kind of exclusion matters for legitimacy.
Second,  I  conclude  that  those  two  perspectives  also  differ  in  regards  to  the  sorts  of 
justification they endorse. For example, citizenship and/or residence requirements are the key 
examples of first level qualifications, and the two main justifications for those qualifications 
are the “all affected principle” and territoriality. Those arguments are actually meant to show 
that exclusion can be compatible with legitimacy; that it  can be legitimate to constitute  a 
people that does not comprise of all humans. There is an even more subtle distinction within 
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the second analytical level, because franchise qualifications  within a people can be justified 
either with reference to the community or with reference to the individual. For example, the 
disenfranchisement of criminals can be justified with reference to the balance of rights and 
duties  within  the  political  community,  but  it  can  also  be  justified  with  reference  to  the 
criminal's character.
In sum, I thus conclude that when assessing the legitimacy of franchise qualifications we first 
have  to  determine  whether  they are  meant  to  justify outside  or  inside  exclusion  (i.e.  the 
“level” of exclusion we are dealing with), and, second, what their underlying justification is 
(i.e.  their  “reference  point”).  We thus  get  a  systematic  framework for  how to  assess  the 
legitimacy of a democratic people. Note that this conceptualisation is actually rather different 
from those proposed by Czermak or Katz. For example, Czermak proposes that there are four 
principles of (dis)enfranchisement:  being affected, capacity, territorial boundaries, temporal 
boundaries348. On the other hand, Katz suggests that there are only three sorts of principles: 
“those based on community membership and having a personal stake in the election, those  
based on competence, and those based on autonomy”349. In my view both approaches fail to 
properly distinguish between the level and the reference point of justification, which is why 
they seem too  crude  for  the  present  purpose.  This  is  because  it  is  indeed  significant  to 
determine  both,  the  inside  and  outside  borders  of  a  community,  but  also  analyse  the 
legitimacy of the reference point that is used to justify those borders. In the following I will 
therefore apply the principles of legitimacy to all levels of the demos, but also analyse the 
individual arguments in order to find out whether and on which basis a democratic people can 
legitimately be constituted.
348 See Czermak, Emmerich: Demokratie und Wahlrecht. Europa-Verlag, 1948, pp. 105-108.
349 Katz, Richard: Democracy and Elections., Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 216 
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3.  Assessing  the  legitimacy  of  principles  of 
(dis)enfranchisement
3.1  Legitimacy  and  the  constitution  of  a people:  Citizenship/residence 
qualifications examined 
The first justification necessary when aiming to constitute a legitimate democratic people is 
the  justification  for  why  there  is  to  be  any  exclusion  at  all.  For  example,  if  the  equal  
democratic say is justified by referring to the equal moral worth of all human beings, then it is 
not at all obvious how any exclusion could be legitimate; i.e. why there is to be “a people” 
instead of just “people”. As we have seen, it is usually citizenship status in combination with 
some sort of residence requirement that is used as a (dis)enfranchising criterion of this sort. 
Yet, both qualifications are morally contingent in the sense that it is not due to any moral 
merit, justification or trait that a person holds a certain nationality, and none of those concepts  
apply to the particular borders of any particular state either350. From a viewpoint of legitimacy 
it  may therefore seem arbitrary that  a  person should be (dis)enfranchised based on those 
features.  Can  the  constitution  of  a democratic  people  based  on  those  qualifications 
nevertheless be legitimate? In the following I will examine this question by analysing the 
potential justifications discovered in the context of the English franchise. The general idea is 
that political communities represent “communities of fate”. Therefore a democratic people 
should be constituted only by those who are actually members of this sort, i.e. who share a 
personal, permanent and lawful link to the community, who have a significant stake in it, and 
who therefore participate in the burdens as well as the benefits of this society. In order to 
determine whether citizenship and residence are legitimate principles of (dis)enfranchising a 
person, we thus have to analyse, first, whether the concept of a community of fate lives up to 
the standards of legitimacy, whether nation states are an appropriate tool for distinguishing 
between them, and, third, whether citizenship and residence qualifications are thus legitimate 
as franchise criteria.
3.1.1 The legitimacy of distinct political communities
First, can the existence of separate communities of fate be legitimate? Based on the argument 
of Pettit  I  argue that it  can be,  because a  government  should only be elected by those it  
350 See e.g, Canovan Margaret: Nationhood and political theory., Edward Elgar Publishing, 1996, p. 34. (Note 
that she is referencing the work of Thomas Pogge there.)
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interferes with. Thus the constitution of a democratic people is legitimate if it includes all 
those who it interferes with, while at the same time excluding those it does not. This fosters 
freedom, because one has the chance to participate in decisions that interfere with one's life 
and to actually contest them if necessary. At the same time it prevents others from interfering 
with me unless they themselves are affected by my choices. Goodin has criticised this all 
affected  principle  for  being  impracticable  –  after  all,  who  is  affected  by  a  decision  (or 
interfered with by a particular government) seems to depend on what that decision turn out to 
be351.  Furthermore,  the  notion  of  “being  affected”  or  „being  interfered  with“  is  open  to 
interpretation:  Does  it  apply  to  anyone  whose  interests  are  affected  by the  government's 
decisions in any way, or is it only those who are bound by their laws, or even restricted to 
those who are bound permanently? If we accept the notion of a community of fate, then the 
latter answer would seem most appropriate. For example, Christiano argues that it does not 
only matter whether one is affected at all, but rather to which degree one is interfered with. 
According to  him “being affected” is  not  enough to legitimately be enfranchised.  Instead 
suffrage should only extend to those who actually share a “common world”: 
„A common world is a set of circumstances among a group of persons in which the fundamental  
interests of each person are implicated in how that world is structured in a multitude of ways. It is  
a world in which the fulfillment of all or nearly all of the fundamental interests of each person are  
connected  with the fulfillment  of  all  or  nearly  all  of  the  fundamental  interests  of  every other  
person.“352
Thus, what matters is not only that a person has any stake in the government's decisions at all, 
but  that  persons  have  roughly  equal  stakes  and  that  those  stakes  are  above  a  certain 
threshold353.  Why should  a  person have  an  equal  say in  political  decisions  regardless  of 
whether they are only temporarily and peripherally affected by them, or instead fundamentally 
bound?  As he puts it: „It must be the case that the individuals have roughly equal stakes in  
the things that connect them in order to justify giving each an equal say in these relationships.  
351 See Goodin,  Robert:  Enfranchising all  affected interests,  and its  alternatives.,  In:  Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2007, p. 52.
352 Christiano, Tom: The constitution of equality. Democratic authority and its limits., Oxford University Press, 
2008, p. 57
353 Note that a similar argumentation lies behind Rainer Bauböck's concept of “stakeholder citizenship”. For 
details see his article “Expansive citizenship. Voting beyond territory and membership.”, In: Political Science 
and Politics, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2005 (to be found online at http://www.jstor.org/stable/30044350, last visited on 
22 July, 16:54).
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And though people are affected by what happens in societies beyond their borders, the normal  
case is such that the impacts on interests are not equal.“354 Hence, by the standard of equality, 
a demos is legitimately constituted if it  enfranchises all and only those who have roughly 
equal  stakes  in  the  government's  decisions,  i.e.  who  actually  have  a  fundamental  and 
permanent  connection  to  the  political  community  in  question.  The  existence  of  distinct 
political communities is thus legitimate if there are indeed separate “common worlds”, that is, 
if not all people are connected to everyone else to the same extent, but if there are some 
communities that actually share a tighter connection.
The last question therefore is: Is it acceptable, from a viewpoint of reasonable acceptability, to 
enfranchise only those who are significantly affected? I actually do not see any persuasive 
counter-argument. If someone is willing to propose and abide by fair terms of cooperation, 
why should they not agree that participation depends on sharing the „common world“ that is  
shaped by those decisions, and sharing it  permanently? Seeing that political  decisions are 
collectively binding it does seem reasonable that I should only be allowed to vote if I am 
actually  part  of  the  collective  that  is  bound  by  them.  Otherwise  I  would  participate  in  
interfering with other people's lives without allowing them to avoid domination. This would 
be illegitimate, because as Rawls has pointed out, reciprocity is a key value of reasonable 
acceptability355. That is to say that it is reasonable for me to not want others interfering with 
me, but at the same time others have an equal claim to that. Hence reciprocity requires that we 
may only interfere with others if we ourselves are affected. As a consequence, discriminating 
between  peoples  on  the  basis  that  they do not  share  a  common world  seems  reasonably 
acceptable.
In sum I thus draw the conclusion that the constitution of a people, i.e. a political collective 
that does not comprise of all people, can in fact be legitimate. This is because peoples can be 
seen as communities of fate, meaning that while members share a “common world” with each 
other, outsiders do not have an equal part in it. It is legitimate that only members should have  
a right to an equal say in political decisions, then, because they are the ones fundamentally 
and permanently bound by them, i.e. because they are the ones that the elected government 
interferes with.
354 Christiano, Tom: The constitution of equality. Democratic authority and its limits., Oxford University Press, 
2008, p. 59
355 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, e.g. p. xliv for details.
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3.1.2 The legitimacy of state boundaries as franchise limitation
In the previous section I have argued that the existence of distinct political communities can 
be legitimate if the communities are constituted as communities of fate, so that only members 
can reasonably be assumed to actually share a “common world”.  Does this mean that the 
boundaries of nation states, as they exist today, are legitimate? Or, put differently, are those 
boundaries reasonably congruent with those of distinct “communities of fate”?
It  seems that  the  only forceful  objection  against  this  view lies  in  the  fact  that  that  state 
boundaries are contingent in the sense that they are the product of historical development and 
need not be morally justified. Considering this, why should I have more in common with one 
person rather than another, simply because one belongs to my side of the border while the 
other does not? The simple answer is: Because there are boundaries and they do run where 
they do. That is to say that while one does not have to prescribe to some obscure sort of 
determinism assuming that boundaries are running where they “should” or “have to” run, one 
cannot  escape  the  fact  that  there  actually  are  boundaries.  We  do  not  have  to  proof  that 
territoriality is a “necessary” feature of politics (although perhaps one could356), and we do not 
have to proof that the particular territory of a particular state is morally “necessary”, but it 
suffices to show that territoriality actually is a pervasive feature of politics357. The mere fact 
that there is a state system and that there are national boundaries makes it more likely for me 
to share a common world with some people rather than others, because we are not in a pre-
political state of nature358, but  nation states do exist and governments are typically national, 
thus the laws that interfere with us are national and so are the governments that we are to elect 
for making them. This is why I suggest that, today, nation states are the most likely candidates 
for “communities of fate”.
3.1.3 The legitimacy of citizenship/residence requirements for voting
If it is legitimate for distinct political communities to exist and if nation states are today's 
356 Note that one could imagine such an argument to either build on “feasibility” in the sense that administration,  
law-enforcement, etc. all are practicable only within a territorially limited realm, or by making some sort of  
Lockean argument that “common world” is not only a metaphorical but also a literal description of politics,  
e.g. referring to common land and resources of a political community.
357 See e.g. Canovan, Margaret: Nationhood and political theory., Edward Elgar Publishing, 1996, p.17.
358 Note that this is relevant because the hypothetical assumption of a state of nature is common in the political 
theory of e.g. Thomas Hobbes (“Leviathan”) or John Locke (“Treatises of Government”).
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manifestation of this,  does this  mean that a combination of citizenship and residence is  a 
legitimate criterion to distinguish between peoples, between communities of fate,  and that 
they are thus justified as franchise qualifications? Is it legitimate to in- and exclude persons 
based on their nationality or place of residence?
In short: If nation states actually were the sort of “closed” systems that Rawls envisaged them 
to be359, or if only native citizens permanently lived within a particular state, it would mean 
exactly that360, because citizenship would equal membership in the community of fate and 
aliens would clearly be outside that community. As it is, however, there are not only members 
and non-members, but there also is the third category of non-formal de facto members, and 
this is why the citizenship requirement may be illegitimate at times. In the following I will 
elaborate on this argument.
As we have  seen,  resident  co-citizens  are,  on average,  most  likely to  have an equal  and 
fundamental  stake  in  certain  political  decisions  such  as  the  election  of  the  national 
government,  because they are bound by the same laws. Aliens,  i.e.  those who are neither 
native-born  nor  naturalized  citizens361,  on  the  other  hand,  may well  be  affected  by some 
decisions to some degree, perhaps even fundamentally, but probably not as extensively. For 
example,  Afghanistan's  citizens  are  fundamentally  affected  by  the  United  Kingdom 
government's decision to go to war with them, but they are not likely to be affected by British 
car traffic regulations. Hence, they may have a stake in that government's decisions, but only 
in regards to a very limited range of issues, especially if compared to British nationals who 
actually  live  in  England  and  who  therefore  have  to  abide  by  innumerable  British  legal 
regulations every day. Thus, the discrimination according to nationality and the exclusion of 
“aliens” from the franchise seem legitimate, because citizenship indeed signifies membership 
in a distinct community of fate.  However,  there is serious doubt that this argumentation can 
account for the disenfranchisement of long-term alien residents too. This is because they may 
be de facto members in the “community of fate” even if they do not hold formal membership. 
In many states their exclusion is based on the assumption that “aliens, even resident aliens,  
359 See Rawls, John: Political Liberalism., Columbia University Press, 2005, e.g. p. 12 for details.
360 See e.g. Czermak, Emmerich: Demokratie und Wahlrecht., Europa-Verlag, 1948, pp. 111-113.
361 See Raskin, Jamin: Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The historical, constitutional and theoretical meanings of 
alien suffrage., In:  University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 141, 1993, p. 1397 (to be found online at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3312345.pdf, last visited on 22 July 2010, 15:46) for this definition.
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have a lesser stake than citizens in national, state, and local issues”362. Yet this claim does not 
seem persuasive considering that they “drive on the same highways as citizens, pay the same  
taxes,  breathe  the  same  air,  require  the  same  police  and  fire  protection,  and  send  their  
children  to  the  same  schools”363. As  Easton  has  pointed  out:“In  an  era  of  large-scale  
migration, democracies today host populations of aliens that reside within their borders for  
years – if not decades or lifetimes – that pay taxes, face compulsory obligations like the draft,  
and often share more political  interests  with their  local  neighbors  than they  do with the  
citizens  in  their  home  countries.”364 If  what  matters  is  the  degree  to  which  a  person's 
fundamental interests are affected by the government's political decisions, and on the range of 
issues  that  this  is  true  for,  then  it  hence  would seem that  long-term resident  aliens  have 
roughly equal stakes as citizens. In fact, there is no reason to doubt the permanence of their 
stakes any more than that of native citizens: “They may, to be sure, move from one community  
to another, and some will return to their country of origin. But citizens also move, and I know  
of  no  reason  to  believe  that  resident  aliens  have  a  higher  rate  of  mobility  than  other  
persons.”365 It thus seems that the exclusion of long-term alien residents could pose a severe 
problem for the legitimacy of a people constituted based on citizenship qualifications. This is 
because  it  seems  to  violate  equality  and  allow  for  domination  of  one  group  of  persons 
(citizens)  over  another  (non-citizens).  While  aliens  are  not  usually interfered with by the 
citizens of another country and therefore may legitimately be excluded from the franchise, 
this does not seem to be not true for resident aliens, because they are in fact governed by the 
same “political institutions and are subject to all laws which apply to citizens (and many  
which  they  do  not);  they  must  pay  all  taxes  that  citizens  pay  (...)  and  have,  in  various  
categories, been subject to the military draft”366.
362 Rosberg, Gerald: Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, In: Michigan Law Review, Vol. 
75, No. 5/6, 1977, p. 1111 (to be found online at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1288026, last visited on 22 July 
2010, 14:50 )
363 Rosberg, Gerald: Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, In: Michigan Law Review, Vol. 
75, No. 5/6, 1977, p. 1112 (to be found online at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1288026, last visited on 22 July 
2010, 14:50 )
364 Earnest, David: Noncitizen voting rights. A survey of an emerging democratic norm., paper prepared for 
delivery  at  the  2003  annual  convention  of  the  American  Political  Science  Association,  Philadelphia,  
Pennsylvania,  August  28-31,  2003.,  p.1,  to  be  found  online  at 
http://www.odu.edu/~dearnest/pdfs/Earnest_APSA_2003.pdf (last visited on 21 July 2010, 11:07). Also see 
Raskin, Jamin: Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The historical, constitutional, and theoretical Meanings of Alien 
Suffrage.,  University  of  Pennsylvania  Law  Review,  Vol.  141,  1993,  p.  1394  (to  be  found  online  at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3312345.pdf, last visited on 22 July 2010, 15:46).
365 Rosberg, Gerald: Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, In: Michigan Law Review, Vol. 
75, No. 5/6, 1977, pp. 1112-1113 (to be found online at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1288026, last visited on  
22 July 2010, 14:50 )
366 Raskin, Jamin: Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The historical, constitutional and theoretical meanings of alien 
suffrage.,  In:   University of  Pennsylvania  Law Review,  Vol.  141,  1993,  p.  1442 (to  be found online at  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3312345.pdf, last visited on 22 July 2010, 15:46)
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The only reasonable attempt  to  counter  this  conclusion  would  be  to “deny that  there  is  
anything  tyrannical  about  citizens  ruling  noncitizens  when  the  noncitizens  have  the  
opportunity to become citizens and members”367. Raskin refers to the option of naturalization 
here, i.e. the option of becoming a citizen of a state other than one's native country. Aliens 
usually get this chance after having been a lawful resident in the country of their choice for an 
extended  period  of  time,  or  by being  married  to  a  national  of  this  country.  The  present 
argument is based on the assumption that aliens are not generally members of the political 
community368, but they can become members by, firstly, freely choosing to do and, secondly, 
by demonstrating an adequate degree of commitment and sincerity through the act of applying 
for  citizenship.  Can  this  redeem  citizenship  as  a  legitimate  franchise  qualification?  The 
underlying idea seems to be this: If a person really is a member of this particular community 
of fate, if he/she really has a stake there, then he/she should demonstrate this by becoming a 
formal member too. If he/she refuses to do so, this is tantamount to consenting to ongoing 
disenfranchisement. Citizenship is a legitimate franchise qualification, then, because it does 
not violate a person's freedom: It may be true that nationality is a contingent feature to begin 
with, because nobody chose the one he/she was born with. However, we later do have the 
chance to become citizens of another state, and once this option is open for us, nationality is  
not contingent anymore, but it is a matter of choice (at least to some degree). Indeed some 
might  even go so  far  as  to  argue  that  an  alien's  foregoing or  postponing to  seek  formal 
membership  casts  doubt  on the durability of  their  loyalty or  commitment  to  the political 
community in question369. It may signify a lack of “willingness on the part of resident aliens  
to identify themselves with the country and its people and to give up once and for all their  
attachment  to  the countries  in  which they were born.  The unnaturalized alien is  perhaps  
holding  something  back,  refusing  to  join  in.”370 However,  this  assumption  loses 
persuasiveness if we consider that there are various reasonable justifications for choosing to 
367 Raskin, Jamin: Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The historical, constitutional and theoretical meanings of alien 
suffrage.,  In:   University of  Pennsylvania Law Review,  Vol.  141,  1993,  p.  1448 (to  be  found online  at  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3312345.pdf, last visited on 22 July 2010, 15:46)
368 See Raskin, Jamin: Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The historical, constitutional and theoretical meanings of 
alien suffrage., In:  University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 141, 1993, p. 1432 (to be found online at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3312345.pdf, last visited on 22 July 2010, 15:46).
369 See Raskin, Jamin: Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The historical, constitutional and theoretical meanings of 
alien suffrage., In:  University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 141, 1993, p. 1451 (to be found online at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3312345.pdf, last visited on 22 July 2010, 15:46).
370 Rosberg, Gerald: Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, In: Michigan Law Review, Vol. 
75, No. 5/6, 1977, p. 1129 (to be found online at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1288026, last visited on 22 July 
2010, 14:50 )
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keep one's native citizenship, because not all of them represent a lack of relevant commitment 
to the new community:
“Sometimes  unfavorable  economic  consequences  under  the  former  country's  law,  such  as  
forfeiture of accrued pension rights or ineligibility to inherit from relatives, may be dominant.  
Political exiles may  wish to preserve the option of return in case of an unlikely change in the  
character  of  the  regime.  Some  business  immigrants  use  the  United  States  as  a  base  for  
international  activities,  while  maintaining  close  ties  with  their  home-lands.  Some  immigrants  
expect ultimately to retire to the land of their childhood. Others may have no intention to make  
practical use of their prior citizenship, but view it as a part of their psychological identity that they  
are reluctant to renounce.“371
Taking the values of freedom and equality seriously,  what  matters  is  the equal  degree of 
interference. In general, nationality seems to be an appropriate proxy thereof, but it is neither 
a sufficient nor a strictly necessary requirement that a political community is comprised only 
of co-citizens, because what matters for inclusion is the equal stake.  Thus the question is 
whether not being a citizen, or choosing not to become one, should make any difference as to 
whether a person is entitled to participate in electing their government, provided that he/she is 
nevertheless living there and sharing in the “common world” with all its burdens and benefits. 
As far as I can see, it does not. 
Note, however, that I do not thereby deny that durational residence requirements for aliens are 
a  legitimate  means to  ensure  the  commitment  of  aliens.  In  this  view,  I  deviate  from the 
position of Raskin, who suggests that there should be hardly any (or no) qualifying period of 
residence for aliens at all. He justifies this by claiming that even “five years is a very long  
time to be voteless, lacking the crucial form of social recognition, in a community in which  
you live, work, socialize, pay taxes, use public services, and send your children to school.“372 
According  to  him,  durational  qualifications  can  only  be  based  on  the  assumption  that 
“knowledgeable exercise of  the franchise"373 cannot  be guaranteed otherwise,  i.e.  because 
371 Raskin, Jamin: Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The historical, constitutional and theoretical meanings of alien 
suffrage.,  In:   University of  Pennsylvania  Law Review,  Vol.  141,  1993,  p.  1451 (to  be found online at  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3312345.pdf, last visited on 22 July 2010, 15:46)
372 Raskin, Jamin: Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The historical, constitutional and theoretical meanings of alien 
suffrage.,  In:   University of  Pennsylvania  Law Review,  Vol.  141,  1993,  p.  1448 (to  be found online at  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3312345.pdf, last visited on 22 July 2010, 15:46)
373 Raskin, Jamin: Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The historical, constitutional and theoretical meanings of alien 
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aliens are not likely to have sufficient knowledge of local customs, values and political issues 
at the point of their arrival. He rejects this as “seriously under- and over-inclusive”374 and 
argues that duration of residence is too crude to function as a proxy of familiarity with local or 
national  politics.  A similar  objection  is  raised  by  Rosberg  who  argues  that  a  durational 
residence requirement “excludes  some newcomers  who are as knowledgeable about  local  
affairs as long-time residents, and it includes some long-time residents who are as ignorant of  
local  affairs  as  newcomers.”375 He  claims  that  most  resident  aliens  will  actually  have 
familiarised themselves with the necessary customs and obtained the relevant informations 
quite fast376. Furthermore, he deems it discriminatory that native-born citizens should be free 
from the burden of proof while aliens are not377, although he concedes that as “a general  
proposition, long-time residents of a community are always likely to be more knowledgeable  
about local affairs than newcomers”378. In fact, I do not disagree with this assessment. The 
likely level of information in a person with the genuine interest in making a new country 
his/her home is probably sufficiently equal with that of any native-born citizen. However, 
both Rosberg and Raskin make their arguments with the background of U.S. immigration in 
mind, and Raskin himself concedes that the case of the so-called “guest-workers” in Europe 
might be different in character379. While any kind of resident may have a fundamental stake in 
the political community he/she lives in, it is not obvious that all newly arrived ones actually 
have a “roughly equal” stake with long-term residents. This is because only once aliens have 
stakes as  “parents, homeowners, tax-payers, draftees, and consumers”380,  and not just the 
suffrage.,  In:   University of  Pennsylvania Law Review,  Vol.  141,  1993,  p.  1450 (to  be  found online  at  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3312345.pdf, last visited on 22 July 2010, 15:46)
374 Raskin, Jamin: Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The historical, constitutional and theoretical meanings of alien 
suffrage.,  In:   University of  Pennsylvania Law Review,  Vol.  141,  1993,  p.  1450 (to  be  found online  at  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3312345.pdf, last visited on 22 July 2010, 15:46)
375 Rosberg, Gerald: Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, In: Michigan Law Review, Vol. 
75, No. 5/6, 1977, p. 1118 (to be found online at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1288026, last visited on 22 July 
2010, 14:50 )
376 See Rosberg, Gerald: Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, In: Michigan Law Review, 
Vol. 75, No. 5/6, 1977, p. 1119 (to be found online at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1288026, last visited on 22 
July 2010, 14:50).
377 See Rosberg, Gerald: Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, In: Michigan Law Review, 
Vol. 75, No. 5/6, 1977, p. 1121 (to be found online at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1288026, last visited on 22  
July 2010, 14:50).
378 Rosberg, Gerald: Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, In: Michigan Law Review, Vol. 
75, No. 5/6, 1977, p. 1121 (to be found online at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1288026, last visited on 22 July 
2010, 14:50)
379 See Raskin, Jamin: Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The historical, constitutional and theoretical meanings of 
alien suffrage., In:  University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 141, 1993, p. 1447 (to be found online at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3312345.pdf, last visited on 22 July 2010, 15:46).
380 Rosberg, Gerald: Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, In: Michigan Law Review, Vol. 
75, No. 5/6, 1977, p. 1114 (to be found online at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1288026, last visited on 22 July 
2010, 14:50) – Note that this is of course a metaphorical list of “stakes” that does not claim to be exhaustive 
at all.
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stake as aliens, their stakes may count as (roughly) equal. In order to develop this kind of 
stake, I argue it is reasonably acceptable that they should have lived in their new community 
for a while before they retain an equal status. This is not because they are of an unequal worth 
(as persons), or because one has to doubt their intention or competence, but it is due to the 
fact that their vote is participation in collectively binding decisions, i.e. decisions that bind all 
members  of  the  community  and  not  just  themselves,  and  this  justifies  that  they  should 
demonstrate  a  genuine commitment  to  sharing the consequences  of  those decisions.  As a 
matter of fact this need not be discriminatory if we take it to mean that citizens should not be 
fully exempted from the residence requirement either. For example, in England citizen's right 
to vote is suspended if they live abroad for an extended period of time.
We can therefore summarize our findings as follows: The thicker the congruence between 
citizenship and de facto membership in the community of fate, the more legitimate it is as a 
franchise qualification381, because this is the more it lives up to the values of freedom, equality 
and  reasonable  acceptability.  However,  there  are  good reasons  to  believe  that  permanent 
residence within the national state is the most adequate evidence of this de facto membership, 
and this has two important implications. First, citizenship is probably not sufficient to justify a 
person's inclusion to the franchise. It should instead be combined with some sort of residence 
requirement. Second, citizenship is not a sufficient disqualification either. De facto members 
of the community of fate should have the chance to become a formal member, a citizen, to 
thus retain the right to vote, or be enfranchised regardless of their nationality provided that 
they have demonstrated genuine commitment, for example through permanent residence. 
3.2 Legitimacy and discrimination within a people: Internal qualifications 
examined
In  the  foregoing  chapter  I  have  analysed  whether  and  under  what  conditions  it  can  be 
legitimate to constitute  a people so that some people are in- and others excluded from it. I 
concluded that it is indeed legitimate for distinct political communities to exist, for example 
based on a combination of citizenship and residence requirements. However, as we have seen 
from the example of the English franchise, being a member of the political community is 
usually  not  sufficient  to  be  enfranchised,  because  each  citizen  has  to  live  up  to  certain 
additional  qualifications,  such  as  minimum  age,  law-abidance  and  mental  ability 
381 See Czermak, Emmerich: Demokratie und Wahlrecht., Europa-Verlag, 1948, pp. 111-113.
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requirements. Hence the main question is whether such kind of discrimination within a people 
can also be legitimate. There are two ways to approach this problem, one taking a community 
perspective, the other taking an individualised view. That is to say that “internal” franchise 
qualifications can be justified either with reference to the community or with reference to the 
individual.  I  will  examine both sorts  of argumentation in  order to determine whether  and 
under what conditions it might be legitimate to exclude people from the franchise although 
they share a common world.
Note  that  I  will  make  my  argument  based  on  the  assumption  that  all  of  the  discussed 
qualifications  are  applied  within the  political  community,  i.e.  the  question  is  not  about 
membership but about an even further restriction of voting rights. This is crucial, because it  
means that it is about the exclusion of people who actually share the same “common world”, 
who are affected and indeed bound by the collective decisions and thus interfered with by the 
national  laws.  Their  disenfranchisement  would thus  be pervasive  in  a  way that  exclusion 
based on stake is  not.  This is because the latter  only excludes a person from a particular 
political community,  but – assuming that everyone has a fundamental stake – everyone is 
bound to be enfranchised somewhere (else)382. Put differently, everyone has some nationality 
and place of residence, hence what counts as disqualification in one state is qualification in 
another.  Disenfranchisement  of  members,  i.e.  discrimination  within  a  people,  is  different, 
however, because it  implies that a person is not enfranchised anywhere, not enfranchised at 
all. Can this kind of exclusion be legitimate?
3.2.1 Justifications with reference to the community
Adopting  a  community-oriented  perspective,  there  are  two  possible  ways  to  justify  the 
disenfranchisement of members of the community of fate. One is concerned with the fair 
balance of  rights  and duties  within the  community,  the  other  with  the  likely or  potential 
consequences  that  the  enfranchisement  of  certain  groups  or  persons  would  have  for  the 
community. In the following I will assess the legitimacy of both argumentations, using the 
382 Note that I am of course aware that our world does not actually consist of only democracies. Thus a person's  
exclusion from one democracy may well mean inclusion, but not necessarily enfranchisement, in another 
state. However, it would exceed the scope of this paper to consider the different structure and political nature 
of political communities, which is why I am working on the presumption that although there are distinct  
political communities they are actually all of roughly the same inner political structure. Real world politics 
are different, of course, and it would indeed be an interesting question whether this should have an impact on 
the potential inclusion of aliens from non-democratic countries in democracies.
108
examples discovered in the context of the English franchise.
3.2.1.1 The balance of rights and duties within the community
As we have seen in the example of  the English franchise, the idea that there should be a 
balance of rights and duties among the members of society functions as valuable reference 
point for justifying franchise qualifications. There are three variations of this argument, two of 
which are concerned with fair allocation while the other has its focus on equal obligation.
First,  there  is  the  idea  that  being  a  member  of  the  political  community  comes  with  a 
responsibility to contribute, i.e. a duty to share the burdens that come with living in a society. 
On this view, only those who contribute to the welfare of society should have a say in how it 
is governed383. In order to make this concept workable as a franchise criterion, one has to 
specify what exactly is to count as a contribution. In the history of the English franchise I  
have found two possible examples, one economic (property qualification), the other related to 
war (exclusion of conscientious objectors, inclusion of women after World War II). In both 
cases, the general argumentation is the same: Only if a person satisfies condition X, that is, if 
he/she pays certain taxes or shows the willingness to participate in the war efforts of the state, 
he/she is eligible to vote. On the other hand, persons who do not satisfy this condition are 
persons who are either unable or unwilling to relevantly contribute to the good fate of the 
community, and are thus not entitled to have a vote. They may have a stake in the community, 
hence they are legitimate members, but the right to vote is a privilege that does not come with 
mere membership but with living up to the duties associated with it384. There are two classes 
of  citizens/residents  –  “doers”  who contribute  and  are  therefore  entitled  to  participate  in 
making the collectively binding decisions, and “compliers”, who belong to the community but 
do not decide the fate of it, neither through contribution nor decisions. Some might argue this 
argumentation  is  the  specification  of  the  famous  principle  “no  taxation  without  
representation”385, while others may see it as its inversion, because what it actually implies is, 
383 Note again that I discuss this principle as an addition to the “common world” principle, meaning that it is  
meant to justify (dis)enfranchisement within an already constituted people. However, one could perhaps also 
discuss it as an alternative approach, so that it would not apply to a people but would be meant to constitute  
it.
384 Note that the correlation of rights and duties, understood as privileges and obligations, is a notion that can be 
found e.g.  in  the analytical  of  Wesley Hohfeld (see  Wenar,  Leif:  Rights.,  In:  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of 
Philosophy, first published in 2005 (to be found online at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/, last visited 
on 26 July 2010, 21:31).
385 Note that this dictum goes back to the 1689 Bill of Rights, where it referred to the decision that taxes could  
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“no representation  without  taxation”  (or,  analogically,  any other  contribution).  Indeed the 
argumentation seems to refer to one of the core values of legitimacy: equality. It claims that  
just  as  only equality  in  stake  can  get  you  membership  in  the  political  community,  only 
equality in contribution can get you an equal democratic say. This actually seems intuitively 
plausible, because it expresses a common notion of fairness, i.e. no one should get more than 
their fair share. It calls for the question why those who are free from burdens should share the 
same rights as those who are not. For example, if children, elderly and insane people do not 
contribute  to  the  GDP,  why  should  they  have  a  say  in  how  it  is  spent?  Similarly  if 
conscientious objectors refuse to defend their country, why should they have a say in how it is 
run? 
In order for this argument to legitimise the disenfranchisement of non-contributing members, 
it has to claim that contribution trumps stake, because only then it would justify excluding 
people who have a significant stake. However, this claim does not seem convincing to me, 
because while it assumes that the right to vote is a privilege, a commodity allocated according 
to merit, it offers no real justification for  why this should be the case. It fails to show why 
there is  a need for  any further  discrimination within the the people at  all,  why having a 
fundamental stake is  not sufficient to be enfranchised. In fact, it appears to me that if we 
understand stake to give rise to a claim right, and I suggest that there is conclusive reason to  
do, then there is no room for conceptualising one and the same right as “privilege” too. Apart 
from that, contribution is indeed a rather vague concept which it is hard to form reasonable 
consensus  on,  thus  it  is  doubtful  whether  it  could  function  as  a  reasonably  acceptable 
franchise criterion at all. I therefore reject the argument that voting rights can legitimately be 
allocated according to merit, because it conflicts with the value of equality.
The second duty-based approach to franchise is not so much about the original balance of 
rights and duties, but about its restoration once it has been violated. Thus, while in the first  
approach, citizens/residents are given the vote only once they have actually contributed what 
was required of them (or at least shown willingness to do so), on the second, the right to vote  
is granted as part of the original bundle of rights, and only revoked if a person has either  
violated his/her duties or claimed more rights than he/she is entitled to. This argument escapes 
no longer  be imposed on the people  without  the consent  of  the Parliament.  See e.g.  Spinner,  Jeff:  The 
boundaries of citizenship. Race, ethnicity and nationality in the liberal state., John Hopkins University Press, 
1994, p. 123 for brief consideration of this idea.
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the  first  objection,  because  enfranchisement  is  the  original  state  of  all  members  of  the 
community of fate (for example qua their equal stake) and  disenfranchisement only comes 
into play when the societal balance of rights and duties is upset. It is a measure that can be 
taken to restore the collective balance of rights, but it is not itself an integral part of that 
balance, which is why it can only be justified ex post. The disenfranchisement of convicted 
criminals could actually be an example for this sort of justification386.
Yet there is a serious problem with this view. It lies in the question of how to define the 
appropriate quid pro quo regarding the right to vote. For example, if “law abidingness” is the 
relevant duty,  and its violation is  to lead to disenfranchisement,  even the transgression of 
speed restrictions would seem to constitute a ground for disenfranchisement. This does not 
seem justified, however, because the argument is plausible only “if we assume that it refers to  
those whose lawbreaking is fairly serious”387. On the other hand, if there is to be a threshold 
for how severe the violation has to be before it suspends the right stemming from a person's  
stake, then there is a high risk of arbitrariness. For example, while election related offences 
may quite evidently be linked to the right to vote, it is less obvious how disenfranchisement is 
the  appropriate  measure  following  tax  fraud.  In  fact  there  is  bound  to  be  reasonable 
disagreement388 on what the core duties of citizenship are and what violations in fact justify 
disenfranchisement.  This  is  why  the  second  argumentation,  too,  seems  insufficient  to 
generally  justify  discrimination  within  a  people,  because  as  a  foundation  for  franchise 
qualifications it cannot live up to the standard of reasonable acceptability.
In sum, what both the first and second argumentation have in common is that they perceive 
rights  and duties  as  commodities  to  be  distributed  among  the  members  of  a  community. 
Franchise is conceptualised as either a privilege stemming from duty-fulfillment or as a claim 
that can be suspended based on duty-violation. Both approaches presuppose some conception 
of how rights and duties ought to be distributed, envisaging this as an ideal state of balance 
with (dis)enfranchisement simply being one element among others. That is actually different 
386 See Lippke, Richard: The disenfranchisement of fellons., Law and Philosophy, Vol. 20, 2001, p. 570 (Note  
that  he  references  Jean  Hampton'  article  “The  Moral  Education  Theory  of  Punishment”,  published  on 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 13, 1984, in this context.)
387 Lippke, Richard: The disenfranchisement of fellons., Law and Philosophy, Vol. 20, 2001, p. 563 (Note that he 
references Jean Hampton' article “The Moral Education Theory of Punishment”, published on Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, Vol. 13, 1984, in this context.)
388 Note that this notion goes back to John Rawls (for details see his “Political Liberalism”, Columbia University 
Press, 2005, e.g. pp. 36-37).
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from the third approach which does not focus on the issue of distribution at all, but centres 
around obligation. The general idea is that every right has a corresponding duty and vice 
versa.  Thus,  for  every  right  a  person  is  granted  he/she  also  inherits  a  duty,  and  every 
obligation  goes  along  with  some particular  claim389.  If  a  person,  for  whatever  reason,  is 
exempted from a certain duty or obligation, he/she is therefore also exempted from the right 
that goes along with it390. For example, if children or mentally incompetent persons are, to 
some extent, exempted from criminal prosecution, then they also are to be exempted from 
making the laws that are enforced thereby. Similarly, if the elderly do not live to experience 
the (long-term) consequences of their choices they are not equally affected as those who do 
and therefore are not equally obliged. What this argument suggests is that people who are not, 
or not to the same extent as others, interfered with by the government, should not have an 
equal right to elect that government's officials. This is because they do not have an equal stake 
at all, and because they are thus not equally affected by the consequences of the collective 
decisions. 
The main problem with this view is that it relies on the assumption of some particular system 
of quid pro quos, i.e. particular rights correlating particular duties. However, the democratic 
vote is usually about the election of general representatives rather than about the decision on 
specific  issues.  If  the latter  were the case it  could perhaps be legitimate,  for example,  to 
exclude children from decisions about criminal law, work place regulations, etc. as long as 
they are exempted from the obligations stemming therefrom. Since this is not the case, the 
argument actually loses most of its persuasive force391, because it seems doubtful whether any 
member of the people would not be entitled to vote on this view. This is because the general 
assumption  is  that  all members  are  significantly  affected,  otherwise  they  would  not  be 
members  at  all.  Excluding children  on the basis  of  their  limited  liability seems arbitrary, 
considering that they are indeed fundamentally bound by all sorts of other laws, e.g. those 
regarding education. Similarly, the elderly may not live to personally experience the long-
term  effects  of  the  collective  decisions,  but  I  do  not  see  how  this  justifies  their  
389 See  e.g.  Blais,  André/Massicotte,  Louis/Yoshinaka,  Antoine:  Deciding  who  has  the  right  to  vote.  A 
comparative analysis of election laws., In: Electoral Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2001, p. 43 to be found online at  
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6V9P-41JTSD0-3-1&_cdi=5904&  _user= 
464575&_pii=S0261379499000621&_orig=browse&_coverDate=03%2F31%2F2001&_sk=999799998&vie
w=c&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkzV&md5=f8436c09bd10498f8  13d75b23083944f&ie=/sdarticle.pdf,  last  visited 
on 23 July 2010, 09:37).
390 See e.g. Dahl, Robert: Democracy, liberty and equality., Norwegian University Press, 1986, p. 150.
391 Note that one could of course question the legitimacy of representative government altogether, but this is not  
the subject of this paper.
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disenfranchisement for as long as they do live they will share roughly the same consequences 
as other members do. The question is: If this – albeit timely limited – stake is all they have,  
should they be discriminated against because of that? At the very best, it seems a slippery 
slope to suggest that the equality of stake should be measured in time. Indeed permanence 
matters, as I have myself argued in the context of membership in the community of fate. Yet I 
am not convinced that life expectancy is an appropriate measure for it. This is because what 
matters most for the significance of a person's stake is how fundamentally a person's life is 
affected, i.e. how fundamentally they are affected as long as they live. Hence, even if the 
elderly's stake is not equal, because they might not live to share the (long.-term) obligations 
that come with their decisions, it is not self-evident that this should actually trump the fact 
that they are nevertheless fundamentally affected until  they die.  Apart  from that, it  seems 
almost impossible to determine the relevant threshold of “permanence” according to human 
life expectancy. For example, the average English life expectancy at birth currently lies at 
77,7 for males and 81,9 for females392. At what age should citizens be disenfranchised then? 
There is bound to be reasonable disagreement as to whether ten or twenty more years of life 
are required to account for the on-going permanence of one's stake, and there thus is a high 
risk of violating people's freedom.
I conclude that despite the intuitive plausibility of the idea that rights should be allocated with 
corresponding  duties  in  mind,  this  approach  can  not  render  discriminations  in  franchise 
legitimate  within  a  (legitimately  constituted)  people,  because  it  cannot  justify  voting 
qualifications without violating either equality, reasonable acceptability or freedom.
3.2.1.2 Avoiding negative consequences for the community
In the first version of a community-oriented argument for internal discrimination in voting 
rights the focus was on the preservation of a fair balance of rights and duties within a political 
community. The second version, however, is concerned with the fate of that community. As 
we have seen, a political community can be conceptualised as a community of fate, i.e. the 
members are conjoined by sharing a common fate or future. Voting is perceived as one of the 
most fundamental ways in which persons can shape or even determine this common future. 
Thus, if someone's voting could be shown to lead to a “bad fate”, i.e. collectively negative 
392 See http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=168 (last visited on 30 July 2010, 21:48) referring to the 
mid-year population estimates provided by the  Office for National Statistics.
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consequences,  this  might  be seen to  justify their  exclusion from the franchise,  because it 
would be against the  “substantial interest”393 of the community. In fact, I have found three 
instances of this reasoning in the context of the English franchise – one concerns the possible 
exclusion  of  the  elderly,  another  the  reservation  to  include  women,  and  a  third  the 
disenfranchisement of criminals. 
The  most  straight-forward  argumentation  relies  on  the  fact  that  certain  groups  of  people 
actually do, or are likely to, have political interests that conflict with the “good fate” of the 
community. On the one hand, this may be due to their vicious interests or their unwillingness 
to be reasonable, on the other, it may be because of particular convictions that, were they 
implemented collectively, would have a negative impact on the fate of the community. In both 
cases the disenfranchisement is justified with concern for the quality of political decisions. 
For example, the exclusion of prisoners is commonly justified on the assumption that their 
criminal record documents their vicious intentions towards the community. Why would they 
violate collectively binding laws if not with either the explicit intention of hurting others or in 
order to profit at the expense of fairness and stability? Thus their voting behaviour is likely to 
reflect  a  state  of  mind  that  is  unreasonable  and conflicts  with  the  requirements  of  (fair)  
cooperation. In order to prevent this state of mind to be translated in collectively binding 
decisions, those persons should be denied the vote, at least for the duration of their penance.  
Some theorists actually support the disenfranchisement of the elderly based on a very similar 
view, i.e. they suggest it is for the good of the community. They claim that even though age 
does not relate to malignance directly,  it  does relate to certain patterns of voting that are 
harmful for the community. For example, the elderly are generally likely to have short-term 
oriented interests and are hence at risk of not weighing burdens and benefits carefully enough, 
because their self-interest is not as affected. At the same time, they tend to have antiquated 
views on issues such as environment and education – issues that may be crucial to the fate and 
ongoing existence  of  the  community.  Again,  the  idea  is  that  “the  community”  has  to  be 
protected from decisions that are of doubtful or even malicious quality, hence the elderly have 
to be excluded because of how they are likely to vote.
In order to embrace those arguments one must be prepared to accept that how one intends to 
393 See Barlow, Richard: Citizenship and conscience. A study in the theory and practice of religious toleration in 
England during the 18th century., University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962, p. 235 for the idea that members of 
the community may only be deprived of participation if this is in the “substantial” interest of the community. 
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vote is relevant for whether one should be allowed to vote at all. If either a person's intent is 
opposing the common good, or if the particular conviction one is holding might have negative 
effects on the community, one should be disenfranchised. However, there is one key objection 
against this argumentation and I don't see how it could convincingly be rejected: reasonable 
disagreement394.  This term goes back to Rawls and refers to the fact that even reasonable 
people are likely not to find consensus on every issue of collective concern, perhaps even on 
what constitutes “reasonable” use of the vote. Do the potentially destructive effects of nuclear 
power plants disqualify anyone who is prepared to take that risk? Does the unwillingness to 
accept  limitations  on  permissible  CO2 emission  –  even  though  this  might  lead  to  global 
warming, natural disasters and foreseeable hardship in the future – constitute grounds for 
disenfranchisement, because it reflects disregard for the long-term fate of the community? It 
seems there is no uniquely reasonable answer to this. First, there is disagreement on facts and 
likelihood of certain events and consequences, even from a scientific viewpoint395. Second, it 
is not immediately obvious what the “good” fate of a community is supposed to be. Persons 
are bound to have different preferences, for example when it comes to weighing security and 
profit, and interfering with that certainly seems to violate people's freedom. However, what 
about those views that actually are unreasonable, for example because they conflict with the 
equal human rights of others? If a certain group of people were likely to vote for a racist party 
– shouldn't they be disenfranchised to protect the equal rights of black people? I do not deny 
that there may indeed be cases like this, but franchise qualifications seem to be too crude an 
instrument to deal with that. Instead, constitutionally guaranteed minimum rights are a much 
more effective tool to protect minorities396. All in all, any sort of blanket disenfranchisement 
appears  to  be  at  risk  of  disenfranchising  (some)  people  illegitimately397,  because  all 
qualifications  such  as  age  or  even  criminality  would  need  to  work  on  probabilities,  not 
certainty, when it comes to voting behaviour.
The second sort of fate-based argument is not concerned with the consequences of political 
394 See e.g. Rawls, John: Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 2005, pp. 36-37 for details on this 
notion.
395 See e.g. Christiano's “facts of judgement”, in his “The Constitution of Equality. Democratic Authority and its 
Limits.”, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 39.
396 See e.g. Christiano, Tom: The constitution of equality. Democratic authority and its limits., Oxford University 
Press, 2008, ch. 7.
397 See e.g. Lippke, Richard: The disenfranchisement of fellons., Law and Philosophy, Vol. 20, 2001, p. 566 or 
he official judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Hirst vs. The United Kingdom 
(Application no. 74025/01) for this argumentation. (online at 
    http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.aspaction=html&documentId=787485&portal=hbkm&source=external
bydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649, last visited on 22 June 2010, 23:30).
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decisions so much as with the effects that the mere enfranchisement of certain groups of 
people might have. For example, some politicians were afraid that giving women the vote 
would lead to political instability398, either because of a protesting male population or because 
of the unforeseeable voting behaviour of women. The underlying assumption is that political 
stability is actually more valuable than freedom or equality. It is seen as a higher order good, 
because without political stability there can be no political community at all, thus all citizens 
would  be  made  worse  off.  Excluding certain  groups  of  the  people,  even if  freedom and 
equality would require their inclusion, may thus simply be the lesser evil. That makes these 
groups' disenfranchisement reasonably acceptable and therefore legitimate.
The problem is that this view conflicts with the idea that franchise qualifications must not 
violate any of the core values of legitimacy. In fact, if we are concerned with legitimacy at all, 
then  an  illegitimate  distribution  of  the  franchise  is  no  less  of  an  evil  than  an  unstable 
community. This is because it constitutes arbitrary discrimination, violating both equality and 
freedom. I therefore conclude that this argument is invalid, because it cannot justify internal 
franchise discriminations form a viewpoint of legitimacy.
3.2.1.3 Conclusion
In the previous sections I have analysed the legitimacy of internal franchise discriminations 
based on community-centred justifications. I examined two approaches, one dealing with the 
fair  distribution  of  burdens  and benefits,  the  other  concerned  with  consequences  of  non-
discrimination. In both cases, I came to the conclusion that concern for the community is 
insufficient to disqualify members of the people from the right to vote, be it on the basis of 
age,  intent  or  war  effort.  If  we  accept  that  fundamental  stake  gives  rise  to  the  right  to 
participate  in  collective  decisions,  then  this  right  cannot  be  suspended  for  the  sake  of  a 
community made up by exactly those members. Equality requires that everyone can preserve 
his/her  freedom as  long  as  it  he/she  enacts  it  only  within  the  boundaries  of  reasonable 
acceptability.  This  is  an  individual  right  and  it  seems  unconvincing  that  it  should  be 
suspended in favour of any sort of “collective good”.
398 See e.g. Butler, D. E.: The electoral system in Britain 1918-1951., Clarendon Press, 1953, p. 12.
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3.2.2 Justifications with reference to the individual
In the previous chapter I have argued that franchise discrimination within a people can not 
legitimately  be  justified  with  reference  to  the  community.  Thus,  if  there  are  to  be 
qualifications apart from stakeholdership they must be based on justifications that refer to the 
individual member instead. In the following I will sketch three versions of this argument. One 
focuses on competence, another on character and the last one on affiliation. Note that the 
particular  franchise  qualifications  I  mean  to  examine  are  mostly  the  same  as  the  ones 
discussed above (for example age and criminality), yet their justification is assumed to be 
different, because the individual and not the community is their reference point.
3.2.2.1 Competence
As we have seen in the example of the English franchise,  competence is one of the core 
justifications to exclude persons based on age or mental insanity/inability. The general idea is 
that only individuals who show “competence” above a certain threshold should be allowed to 
vote. However, it is not always clear what kind of competence is significant and where the 
alleged threshold should lie. For example, on the most basic understanding, “competence” 
could refer to the mental or intellectual ability to understand the act of voting or the nature of 
politics that it is embedded in399. On the other hand, it would be more demanding to argue that 
a person must not only have the ability to form a political opinion, but that this opinion should 
be  independent,  that  is,  it  must  not  be  manipulated  but  should  stand  for  autonomous 
judgement.  Thus,  a voter  must  have the ability to  deliberate  and reflect  about  competing 
political  concepts and to form his/her own opinion thereon.  For example,  many view the 
exclusion of children as legitimate, because they assume that  “they adopt moral ideas from 
their parents not out of a sense of conviction but out of a desire to please and a sense of trust  
in  their  parents”400.  On an even more demanding note,  what  could be required is  “moral 
competence”, i.e. the ability to  elaborate, reflect on and revise ideas about justice401. This 
399 See e.g. Czermak, Emmerich: Demokratie und Wahlrecht., Europa-Verlag, 1948, p. 106.
400 Christiano,  Tom:  Knowledge  and  power  in  the  justification  of  democracy.,  In:  Australasian  Journal  of 
Philosophy, Vol. 79, 2001, p. 207. Also see Blais, André/Massicotte, Louis/Yoshinaka, Antoine: Deciding 
who has the right to vote. A comparative analysis of election laws., In: Electoral Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, 
2001, p. 43 (to be found online at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6V9P-
41JTSD0-3-1&_cdi=5904&_user=464575&_pii=S0261379499000621&_orig=browse&_coverDate=03% 2F 
31%2F2001&_sk=999799998&view=c&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkzV&md5=f8436c09bd10498f813d75b23083 
944f&ie=/sdarticle.pdf, last visited on 23 July 2010, 09:37).
401 See Christiano, Tom: Knowledge and power in the justification of democracy., In: Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 79, 2001, pp. 207-214.
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refers to the fact that political decisions are somewhat special, because they are about how the 
basic structure of society is be designed. Therefore only those persons should have a say who 
are capable of understanding politics as a form of cooperation and comprehend the need to 
weigh political options in the light of considerations about justice. Last, competence could 
also be meant to require knowledge and information, and hence a certain level of education. 
As Estlund puts  it:  “(...)  a  decent  education,  including,  say,  some knowledge of  politics,  
history,  economics,  close  experience  with  others  from diverse  backgrounds,  etc.,  must  be  
admitted to improve the ability to rule wisely, other things equal (...)”402.  For example, one 
might  argue  that  in  order  to  cast  a  reflected  vote  one  has  to  be  informed  about  party 
principles, election mechanisms, etc. Since it would exceed the scope of this paper to analyse 
those interpretations separately, I will be working under the assumption that the “competence” 
qualification  presupposes  a  bundle  of  all  four  sorts  of  competences,  requiring  a  certain 
threshold of each of them. The two main questions are: Can it be legitimate to disenfranchise 
persons because of a lack of competence? Second, are age and mental health qualifications a 
legitimate way of doing so? 
For competence requirements to be legitimate criteria for (dis)enfranchisement they must not 
violate freedom, equality or reasonable acceptability.  In regards to freedom, the first likely 
observation is that any “internal” exclusion from the franchise, i.e. exclusion of members of 
the community of fate, is at risk of violating the freedom of persons, because they would then 
be bound by decisions that they have no say in – they are interfered with, but cannot contest  
that  interference.  Thus  there  seems to  be  a  case  against  any internal  disenfranchisement, 
because assuming that young, old, mentally ill or mentally disabled persons all have interests, 
and that those interests are affected by law, they have a stake just as fundamental as anyone 
else,  and  it  is  hence  not  obvious  whether  their  competence  should  make  any significant 
difference regarding their right to vote. However, it is exactly because collective decisions 
bind all members of the people that there may nevertheless be a case for disenfranchising the 
“incompetent”.  This  is  because  their  choices  would  affect  the  collective  rules  that  bind 
everyone. If those choices are reasonably likely to lack deliberate consideration and moral 
judgement, then there is a chance that this might be reflected in the laws that are thus made. I 
suggest that it is reasonably acceptable that this situation should be avoided, i.e. all things 
402 Estlund, David: Why not epistocracy?, In: Desire, Identity and Existence. Essays in honor of T. M. Penner.,  
Academic  Printing  and  Publishing,  2003,  p.  53   (to  be  found  online  at 
http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/onlinepapers/estlund/WhyNotEpistocracy.pdf, last visited on 
3 August 2010, 22:49)
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considered, it seems reasonable that, if we are to be bound by collective decisions rather than 
our own, then we should at least be able to expect others to vote according to competent 
judgement. Since this is perhaps impossible to guarantee, the least that should be ensured is 
that  the  people  who  are  involved  in  collective  decisions  are  able to  make  this  kind  of 
judgement, that they have the ability, the competence, to do so. From a viewpoint of freedom 
and  reasonable  acceptability,  disenfranchisement  of  the  “incompetent”  can  therefore  be 
legitimate and drawing the attention to the value of equality actually confirms this view. I 
have argued that it is “equality in the relevant category X” which entitles persons to an equal 
democratic  say.  Competence  can  be  seen  to  qualify  as  “relevant  category”,  because  by 
enforcing collective decisions on all members of the community, we ask them to submit to a 
will that may actually diverge from their personal preferences. It is not evident how we could 
ask them to do this, unless there is some provision to ensure that all persons involved in 
making those decisions are capable of doing so, i.e. that they indeed have the competence to. 
We would not  ask a  person to submit  to medical  recommendations unless the doctor  has 
undergone adequate training, which shows that in the field of medicine not everyone's say 
counts equally. Political decisions such as the election of a national government are at least as 
fundamental, so why should we be forbidden to ask for any kind of qualification? Hence, 
asking for roughly equal levels of competence from voters seems justified from a viewpoint 
of equality.
The most common objection against this line of argument is that once we accept competence 
as a franchise qualification, this is bound to conflict with the equality of the democratic say. 
This is because there is an enormous variation in the intellectual capacity of persons and if  
roughly equal competence matters, then what this variation would seem to suggest is that says 
should be distributed accordingly, with more competent people getting more votes. Note that 
this was actually one argument used to justify plural voting of university graduates in England 
well into the 20th century. However, I do not believe that this is a necessary conclusion. As 
Peter has argued in one of her lectures: “It is coherent to argue that voting rights can justly be  
withheld from teenagers if it is shown that their political competence fails to meet a relevant  
threshold,  while  at  the  same time resist  the view that,  above the  threshold,  variations  in  
political competence should not produce variations in voting entitlement.”403 This is to say 
403 See Peter, Fabienne: Franchise., handout provided in her seminar “Democratic legitimacy and justification” 
held at Warwick University together with Matthew Clayton in February 2009. (Note that the handout is no  
longer available online, but that I will be glad to provide a hardcopy version on request.)
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that equality need not be strict, but it can be understood to require the “roughly equal level” 
only up to a minimum threshold. For example, the competence qualification could mean that 
everyone has to be equally competent in so far that they are at least equally able to do X (e.g. 
form an independent political opinion that is based on reflected considerations), but it need 
not mean that everybody actually has to be equally competent. Thus it is compatible with the 
idea of a relevant threshold and need not violate the equality of  the democratic say404.  I 
therefore  draw the  conclusion  that  while  the  disenfranchisement  of  the  incompetent  may 
actually constitute domination, it does not constitute  arbitrary domination, because from a 
viewpoint  of  reasonableness,  competence  is  indeed  a  significant  enough  criterion  to  be 
required for voting and it is therefore compatible with the freedom and equality of persons. As 
Dahl puts it: “Democracy – rule by the people – can be justified only on the assumption that  
ordinary people are, in general qualified to govern themselves.”405
If  competence  can  be a  legitimate  franchise  criterion  the  remaining question  is  how this 
qualification could be implemented. The example of the English franchise has provided us 
with two suggestions: age and mental health or sanity. Before examining the legitimacy of 
those two criteria it is important to notice that they are actually very different. First, being of a 
certain age is not a permanent feature of a person, while a certain state of mental health may 
be. Furthermore, age in general is something that all persons have in common, because while 
people are obviously not all  of the same age, it  is certainly true that everyone shares the 
feature of having some age. There is no exception from either the process of ageing itself, nor 
are  there any differences  regarding to  the tempo or course of  it406.   Thus,  as a matter  of 
principle “age” is a feature that all persons share regardless of their sex, profession, race or 
education. Mental health, on the other hand, is different in that there is no clear or universally 
accepted standard for it. For example, the history of the English franchise has shown that what 
is considered a mental disorder today is actually very different from how it was defined a few 
centuries ago. Keeping this in mind, the second important difference between age and mental 
health is that, when used as a franchise qualification, one functions as a proxy while the other 
does not. It is this difference which actually seems to suggest that mental health qualifications 
require a much preciser definition of the required competence levels. In order to classify an 
404 Note  that  I  made  a  similar  argument  regarding  membership:  I  argued  that  for  community membership 
roughly equal stakes matter, but only up to a certain threshold defined by fundamentality and permanence.  
Even if  there was a way to measure and classify stakes  above that,  it  need not  matter  for  the issue of 
membership.
405 Dahl, Robert: Democracy and its critics., Yale University Press, 1915, p. 97
406 Note that the only difference between persons seems to be that not all reach the same age.
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individual as having a mental disorder or disability, there needs to be a clear standard for what 
levels of what competence are considered “normal” and how deviations can be measured. 
Whether a particular person satisfies this  profile is then decided on a case by case basis, 
following  rather  rigid  rules  and  regulations.  As  a  consequence,  disenfranchisement  of 
mentally handicapped or ill persons can be permanent if their condition is. This contrasts with 
age, because as a proxy it does not need to test particular competence(s) so much as provide a 
guideline, a benchmark, for general “maturity” or “accountability”. What an age qualification 
says is not “person x has the competence level of z”, but “on average persons can reasonably 
be expected to show competence level z at age y”. I suggest that those differences between 
age and mental health qualifications render one more “(reasonably) acceptable” than the other. 
As Blais has pointed out:
“Depriving mentally deficient people of the right to vote is seemingly a self-obvious solution. How  
can people be expected to make a reasonable choice when their very personal sanity is in serious  
doubt? (...) Yet,it can be pointed out that criteria for mental illness have varied across time and  
space, and that while serious illness may warrant disqualification, lighter and occasional mental  
problems should not. It is nearly impossible to draw a line that is not arbitrary (...).”407
The  problem is  not  that  serious  mental  disabilities  or  disorders  would  be  an  illegitimate 
ground for disenfranchisement per se, but that there is a serious risk of those conditions being 
defined according to (arbitrary) prejudice. This is not only about the decision which mental 
conditions justify disenfranchisement, but also about whether a certain person has it or not. 
Age  seems  less  objectionable,  because  it  does  not  discriminate  against  persons  due  to 
individual judgement and it does not lead to permanent disenfranchisement. Indeed the fact 
that there has been so little variation in the age qualification over time or across different 
countries408 seems to show that it is generally accepted as a reasonable criterion. Perhaps there 
407 Blais,  André/Massicotte,  Louis/Yoshinaka,  Antoine:  Deciding  who  has  the  right  to  vote.  A comparative 
analysis  of  election  laws.,  In:  Electoral  Studies,  Vol.  20,  No.  1,  2001,  p.  51  to  be  found  online  at  
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6V9P-41JTSD0-3-1&_cdi=5904&_user =4 
64575&_pii=S0261379499000621&_orig=browse&_coverDate=03%2F31%2F2001&_sk=999799998&vie
w  =c&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkzV&md5=f8436c09bd10498f813d75b23083944f&ie=/sdarticle.pdf,  last  visited 
on 23 July 2010, 09:37).
408 Blais,  André/Massicotte,  Louis/Yoshinaka,  Antoine:  Deciding  who  has  the  right  to  vote.  A comparative 
analysis  of  election  laws.,  In:  Electoral  Studies,  Vol.  20,  No.  1,  2001,  to  be  found  online  at  
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6V9P-41JTSD0-3-1&_cdi=5904&_user =4 
64575&_pii=S0261379499000621&_orig=browse&_coverDate=03%2F31%2F2001&_sk=999799998&vie
w=c&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkzV&md5=f8436c09bd10498f813d75b23083944f&ie=/sdarticle.pdf,  last  visited 
on 23 July 2010, 09:37) for international comparison.
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is some sort of prejudice to be found there too, because like recent discussions409 about the 
appropriate minimum age for voting show, there is  serious disagreement about the age at 
which  the  threshold  of  relevant  competence  is  reached  (or  about  where  the  minimum 
threshold should lie) However, while the specific threshold of course matters in practice, for 
the present purpose it suffices to acknowledge that in general, age is a legitimate proxy for 
maturity. This is why it does not constitute arbitrary domination to exclude some teenagers 
who might already be competent enough simply because their average peer is not (yet). Note 
that it for the same reasons that maximum age qualifications for voting should actually seem 
dubious.  This  is  because  senility  does  not  seem to  be  a  function  of  age  at  all,  i.e.  it  is 
dependent on individual lifestyle and circumstance much more than on the mere process of 
ageing.  Not  all  persons  actually  become  senile,  thus  it  cannot  be  assumed  that  persons 
generally become senile  or  “unaccountable”  in  time.  As a  consequence,  competence  may 
legitimise  age  qualifications,  but  only  in  regards  to  a  minimum,  not  a  maximum,  age 
requirement. This is because the “not yet” aspect of competence is better researched and more 
commonly acceptable, than the “not anymore” one.
All in all I thus conclude that age can constitute a legitimate franchise criterion because it may 
function as a proxy for competence, at least when it comes to defining a minimum age for 
voting according to a certain threshold of general maturity. Mental disability, on the other 
hand, while not per se illegitimate, at least seems more problematic, because it is at higher 
risk of discriminating against particular individuals based on arbitrary prejudice. On a similar 
note, maximum age requirements seem dubious when justified on the basis of competence 
requirements.
3.2.2.2 Character
There  are  two  ways  in  which  “character”  can  be  construed  as  relevant  for  the  issue  of 
franchise: On the one hand, it could be argued that only “good” people, i.e. people of the right 
sort of character, are to be enfranchised, thus implying that discrimination within a people is 
legitimate  if  it  manages  to  differentiate  between people  based  on the  worthiness  of  their 
character. On the other hand, it can be argued that a person's enfranchisement should depend 
409 See e.g. Council of Europe (Parliamentary Assembly): Expansion of democracy by lowering the voting age 
to 16, 2009 (to be found online at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc09/EDOC11895.pdf, 
last visited on 18 June 2010, 00:23). 
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on the consequences it has on people's character(s). For example, will it improve them or 
corrupt them? In the following I will examine both sorts of arguments in order to determine 
whether they can justify character as an internal franchise qualification.
First, let us consider the option of (dis-)enfranchising people based on their character or its 
inherent value. For example, this sort of argumentation was used in 19 th century England in 
order to justify property as a franchise qualification. It was assumed that a person's wealth 
was an indication for the sort of character they had. Being wealthy implied a person was 
“respectable” in the sense that they were willing “to play by the existing social rules” 410, 
while  being  poor  made  them  “vagrants” and  “wastrels”411,  that  is  persons  who  put 
themselves somewhat outside society. There are two evident objections against this kind of 
view:  First,  it  seems  that  the  definition  of  what  makes  a  person's  character  “good”  is 
contingent on social and historic circumstances, and thus arbitrary. Second, “goodness”, even 
if there was an impartial definition of it, would indeed seems hard to measure and we it might 
be hard to find an appropriate proxy. Leaving those two obstacles aside – if there was such a 
thing as an indefeasibly good character and if there was a way to determine whether certain 
people had it or not, would it be a legitimate franchise qualification? On the one hand one 
could go back to the community-centred justifications claiming that good persons have good 
intentions, while bad persons have interests that go against that of the community, hence, for 
the sake of the collective fate it is legitimate to disenfranchise them. A different way would be 
to focus on the inherent value of goodness itself – is it necessary for being enfranchised and 
having a say in collectively binding decisions? Do we need to earn an equal vote by being 
equally good? Does it violate anyone's freedom if we let bad people vote or is it simply that 
they are less entitled to freedom? Is it reasonably acceptable to assume that goodness is a 
matter of choice and lifestyle, and that it is therefore legitimate to discriminate against people 
on this basis?
If we assume that equal stake is what entitles a person to a say, then I think that all those 
410 Evans, Eric: Parliamentary reform 1770-1918., Longman, 2000, p. 41 – Also see Blackburn, Robert: The 
Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 66
411 See Thomson, Mathew: The problem of mental deficiency: Eugenics, democracy and social policy in Britain.  
1870-1959., p. 51 (to be found online at:
   http://books.google.at/booksid=9rIsDsV_WPkC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Thomson+Mathew+eugenics&sour
ce=bl&ots=bvY2xAZGjR&sig=poHTb4RAHGsbvMcR6s0e5oNAnJo&hl=de&ei=gn8aTNqnOJCVOMGAs
dYK&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CCkQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q&f=false,  last 
visited on 17 June 2010, 22:04).
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questions will fail to justify disenfranchisement based on “badness”. This is because I do not 
see how the kind of character a person has affects their stake at all. Compared to competence 
character is different  in that it does not relativize a person's ability to either comprehend or 
express their stake. While it is reasonably acceptable that a person's say should actually be a  
say in order to count as one, it does not seem reasonably acceptable that only certain person's 
says should count. This would conflict with the claim for equality that has been established 
due  to  the  stake  qualification,  and  I  therefore  suggest  that  equality  does  not  provide 
justification  for  this  sort  of  franchise  discrimination.  From a  perspective  of  freedom,  the 
essential  question  is  whether  the  disenfranchisement  of  the  bad  constitutes  arbitrary 
domination or  not.  Supporters  of  a  character  qualification could  suggest  that  it  does  not, 
because the nature of a person's character depends on their will and choices, hence it is not an 
arbitrary criterion,  because people are themselves responsible for their  character and they 
have the power to adapt so that they conform. However, if everyone had an equal opportunity 
to dye their hair red, a red-hair-qualification would nevertheless be arbitrary and thus not 
reasonably acceptable, because having or not having red hair is not relevant to the political 
process  of  voting  at  all.  The  same  argumentation  would  probably  defeat  religion  as  a 
legitimate franchise criterion – even if everyone had the same chance to confess to a certain 
faith,  why should  it  matter?  This  argument  goes  to  show that  the  character  qualification 
relates to a person's inner self, their identity, to who they are. If freedom does not include the  
freedom to choose our own character – and it would not, if we were to be disenfranchised for 
it  –  then  it  could  not  reasonably  be  called  that  at  all.  As  a  consequence  freedom  is 
incompatible with franchise criteria that dictate who a person has to be as a person for them 
to be allowed to vote. Assuming that they have an equal stake it should therefore not make 
any difference who they are,  even if  they are bad or bad by choice,  because it would go 
against any reasonably acceptable definition of freedom. I conclude that a person can not 
legitimately be disenfranchised because of who they are or how their character is, because this 
does not have any inherent relevance for the political process of voting.
However, a related argument suggests that the disenfranchisement of the bad is not justified 
merely because they are bad, but because of the effect enfranchisement would have on them 
or others. For example, some theorists claim that enfranchising criminals even though they 
have shown disregard for the collective rules would send a message that those actions were 
not  relevant.  It  might  corrupt  their  character,  because  if  they  are  not  punished  for 
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transgressions there is no motivation for them to improve and play by the existing rules. On 
the other hand, enfranchising only law-abiding people suggests that “fair play” is valuable, 
hence the right to vote functions as an incentive to be good412 or, at least, as a “deterrent” 
from being bad413. It seems that this view is vulnerable to the same objection I have offered 
above: If I have a fundamental stake why should it matter who having or not having the vote 
makes me want to be? What does it have to do with politics at all? There is no reason why 
“character” should trump stake in this matter, why freedom requires goodness, or why it is  
reasonably acceptable that the good should rule over the bad. Besides, it also is not obvious 
why transgressions should have to be punished via disenfranchisement, i.e. why another set of 
punishments would not have the same effect, or why this particular measure would even have 
such a profound impact on a person's perception of their identity. As Lipke has pointed out, 
the argument might “presuppose more interest in voting than is often displayed”414.
In sum I therefore reject goodness of character as a legitimate franchise qualification, because 
it cannot be justified with reference to either equality, freedom or reasonable respectability.
3.2.2.3 Affiliation
The third individual-centred justification for excluding members of the political community 
from the right to vote is affiliation. I found two instances of such qualification in the example 
of the English franchise: household suffrage and the exclusion of children.  In both cases, 
certain individuals are disenfranchised from holding a vote, not because they do not share an 
equal stake or because they are unable to make a politically relevant decision, but because 
they are already “virtually represented” by another member of the political community. For 
412 See Lippke, Richard: The disenfranchisement of fellons., Law and Philosophy, Vol. 20, 2001, pp. 573-574. 
(Note that he references Jean Hampton' article “The Moral Education Theory of Punishment”, published on 
Philosophy and Public  Affairs,  Vol.  13,  1984,  in  this  context.)  Note  that  J.S.  Mill  also made extensive  
arguments for how enfranchisement may transform a person's character for the better (e.g. see his essay “The 
subjection of women”, or  summaries of his argument in  Spinner, Jeff: The boundaries of citizenship. Race, 
ethnicity and nationality in the liberal  state.,  John Hopkins University Press,  1994, p.  95 and  Pennock, 
Roland: Democratic Political Theory., Princeton University Press, 1979, p. 443). Similar ideas have been 
used by Tom Christiano, but he has focused on the issue of self-esteem (see e.g. his  Christiano, Tom: The 
Constitution of Equality. Democratic Authority and its Limits., Oxford University Press, 2009).
413 See Lippke, Richard: The disenfranchisement of fellons., Law and Philosophy, Vol. 20, 2001, p. 568 (Note  
that  he  references  Jean  Hampton'  article  “The  Moral  Education  Theory  of  Punishment”,  published  on 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 13, 1984, in this context.).
414 Lippke, Richard: The disenfranchisement of fellons., Law and Philosophy, Vol. 20, 2001, p. 574 (Note that he 
references Jean Hampton' article “The Moral Education Theory of Punishment”, published on Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, Vol. 13, 1984, in this context.)
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example, in the case of household suffrage only one member of the household, usually the 
man, was entitled to vote, but his say was seen to incorporate the preferences of all other 
members of the household too415. Similarly, children can be excluded on the assumption that 
their parents will vote with their best interest in mind. The idea underlying this discrimination 
appears to be that it is not so much the individual person that needs to be represented, but their 
stake416. Thus, if people's stakes are roughly the same, then this should count as only one stake 
and they therefore do not require separate representation. On this view it is legitimate that one 
person should vote as a representative for all those who share his/her stake, the equation being 
“one stake,  one  vote”.  If  persons  share  an  intense  kind  of  affiliation  their  stakes  can  be 
assumed to be virtually the same. For example, if two (or more) share a whole life, or at least 
their place of life, they are likely to have an equal (or even the same) stake and thus household 
suffrage as it was practised in 19th century England417 is justified. Similarly, children do not 
need their own say, because their parents can generally be expected to look out for them and 
will thus vote with their interests in mind. As Rosberg puts it:  “And even though children 
have no formal voice in  the making of  government  decisions  that  may affect  them, their  
parents do have such a voice and presumably will undertake much of the responsibility for  
representing  the  interests  of  their  children.”418 The  whole  argument  seems  to  imply  that 
political  communities  are  composed by “interests”  and that  it  is  thus certain stake-holder 
groups, rather than the individual human persons, that need to be represented in government.  
However,  even  if  we  accept  the  –  undeniably  dubious  –  assumption  that  who  shares  a 
household actually shares the same stake (or  interests), there still is one important objection: 
It is true that I argued that having roughly equal stakes in the political fate of a community is 
what entitles a person to have a say in it. Yet what matters is not the stake itself, but the person 
having it. This is because people are fundamentally affected by political decisions and their  
stakes matter only under the assumption that the people holding them do. Therefore it seems 
imperative that it should be persons rather than stakes, or interests, that are represented419. 
415 See e.g. Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 68 and Blewett, 
Neal: The Peers, the Parties and the People. The General Elections of 1919., Macmillan Press, 1972, p. 359.
416 Note that this argument of “virtual” representation was also used in other contexts, such as the exclusion of  
the colonies or the poor. See e.g.   Pole, J. R.: Political representation in England and the origins of the 
American Republic., Macmillan Press, 1966, p. 23 and pp. 339-456.
417 See Blackburn, Robert: The Electoral System in Britain., Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 68 and Blewett, Neal: 
The Peers, the Parties and the People. The General Elections of 1919., Macmillan Press, 1972, p. 359.
418 Rosberg, Gerald: Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, In: Michigan Law Review, Vol. 
75, No. 5/6, 1977, p. 1115 (to be found online at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1288026, last visited on 22 July 
2010, 14:50 )
419 See e.g. Pole, J. R.: Political representation in England and the origins of the American Republic., Macmillan 
Press, 1966, p. 443 for observations on how the evolution of the English franchise is a transformation of  
representation (from “stakes” to “persons”).
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That  is  to  say  that  even  if  the  subject of  people's  stake  is  the  same,  individuals  are 
nevertheless bound to have their own unique sets of preferences, views and opinions on how 
their  interests  are to be understood. Even if  this  were not the case,  and persons could be 
shown to share the  same interests  as  others,  it  would not  be legitimate to  disenfranchise 
people because of that. Indeed it seems inconsistent to assume that equality in stakes is what 
gives rise to the equal say of people, but at the same time grounds their disenfranchisement.  
The value of equality in fact requires that individual persons are treated equally with respect 
to  relevant  features,  thus  discrimination  based  on  that  same  equality  seems  illegitimate. 
Moreover, the value of freedom also presupposes human persons as the relevant unit. People 
need to have a say in order to be able to contest  arbitrary domination,  and this condition 
continues to hold even if the prevailing domination corresponds to my interests exactly. This 
is because the option for contestation is necessary in order to protect a person's freedom, 
regardless of whether this contestation is necessary at the time420. I therefore conclude that the 
assumption of “virtual representation” is not a legitimate criterion for disenfranchisement. On 
the one hand, it can be doubted, empirically, whether there are people who share the same 
stake at all. On the other, this approach would seem to illegitimately reverse the relevance of 
stakes  and people.  Stakes  matter  because  the  people  having  them do,  not  the  other  way 
around; this is what the values of freedom and equality imply by presupposing the individual 
as their core unit.
Note that this conclusion has several implications: It implies that the disenfranchisement of 
those  who  are  already  actually  represented is  nevertheless  legitimate.  For  example,  the 
exclusion of the members of the English House of Lords is legitimate, because it is not a case 
of virtual but actual representation and thus occurs on a very different level, without having 
anything to do with affiliation. Similarly, the exclusion of the King or Queen would also seem 
to  be  required  by  legitimacy.  The  same  argument  also  implies  that  just  like  I  cannot 
legitimately be disenfranchised because I am affiliated to someone, I cannot be enfranchised 
because of it. For example the latter was the case in the early 20 th century England, when 
some married women were enfranchised while (other things being equal) unmarried women 
weren't.  If  affiliation  is  not  sufficient  ground  for  excluding  someone,  however,  it  is  not 
sufficient to ground their inclusion either.
420 Note that  this objection seems more urgent the more aggregative a democracy is designed, because in that 
case, the counting of votes would seem to disadvantage homogeneous groups more the bigger they are.
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3.2.2.4 Conclusion 
In the present chapter I have analysed whether referring to the individual may justify internal 
franchise  discrimination.  Assuming  that  the  people  is  made  up  by persons  who  share  a 
roughly equal  stake  in  the  fate  of  their  community,  the  question  is  whether  there  is  any 
condition  that  could  justify  certain  member's  disenfranchisement.  I  have  analysed  three 
potential approaches – competence, character and affiliation status – and concluded that there 
can indeed be legitimate franchise discrimination within a people. While the goodness of a 
person's  character  and  their  affiliation  to  another  person  should  not  matter  for  suffrage, 
because  it  would  go  against  freedom,  equality  and  reasonable  acceptability,  competence 
actually is a legitimate requirement. This is because whether a person is competent to form an 
independent and considered political opinion is relevant for whether they are  actually able to 
express their stake. As a consequence, I deem minimum age requirements as well as mental 
health  qualifications  legitimate,  while  at  the  same  time  rejecting  property,  marriage  and 
household conditions. Maximum age requirements have also been rejected on the account that 
average degeneration seems a rather unconvincing premise. 
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V. CONCLUSION
In the present chapter I have developed a systematic framework for assessing the legitimacy 
of a democratic people and applied it to the example of the English franchise. For this purpose 
I proceeded in three steps. First, I integrated the three values of legitimacy (freedom, equality 
and  reasonable  acceptability)  into  one  coherent  whole  and systematized  the  principles  of 
(dis)enfranchisement so that they were distinguished according to their analytical perspective 
and reference point. Second, I used this as a basis to analyse whether it can be legitimate to 
constitute a democratic people in a way that some people are in- and others excluded from it. I 
concluded that it actually can be, if the discrimination depends on whether people share a 
“common world” or not.  Furthermore,  internal  discrimination of stakeholders  can also be 
legitimate,  but  exclusions  have  to  be  justified  with  reference  to  the  individual,  not  the 
community. Moreover, they may only be based on competence, not on character or affiliation. 
Regarding the English franchise I thus conclude, thirdly, that most of the implemented voting 
qualifications are legitimate, but that there still are some significant problems. For example, 
citizenship/residence  requirements  are  legitimate  but  their  justification  does  not  seem to 
warrant the exclusion of long-term resident aliens. The exclusion of children and mentally ill 
persons also is legitimate, while that of prisoners is not. Similarly, the legitimate exclusion of 
members of the House of Lords suggests that the Queen should also be disenfranchised. In 
sum my assessment shows that the English franchise has become more legitimate over time, 
because many unjustified franchise patterns – such as property or sex qualifications - have 
already been abolished.
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VII. APPENDIX
A. Abstract  (German)  
In  der  vorliegenden  Arbeit  untersuche  ich  die  Frage,  wie  das  demokratische  Wahlrecht 
legitim,  d.h.  auf  Basis  der  Werte  Freiheit,  Gerechtigkeit  und  „Akzeptierbarkeit“,  verteilt 
werden kann. Anhand des Beispiels der englischen Wahlrechtsentwicklung zeige ich auf, auf 
welchen Voraussetzungen und Einschränkungen das Wahlrecht basieren kann. Indem ich die 
zugrundeliegenden Prinzipien dieser Qualifikationen untersuche und systematisiere, entwickle 
ich  ein  Gerüst,  dass  eine  umfassende  theoretische  Analyse  ermöglicht  und  dadurch 
Schlussfolgerungen  zulässt,  die  nicht  nur  für  England  sondern  für  das  demokratische 
Wahlrecht allgemein von Bedeutung sind: Staatsbürgerschaft in Kombination mit bestimmten 
Aufenthalts-  oder  Wohnsitzqualifikationen  können  legitim  sein.  Das  gilt  auch  für  die 
Festlegung eines Mindestalters und die Voraussetzung relativer geistiger Gesundheit.  Nicht 
legitim  ist  jedoch  der  Entzug  des  Wahlrechts  auf  Basis  von  Verbrechen, 
Wehrdienstverweigerung, Armut oder Geschlecht.
B. Summary  (German)  
In der vorliegenden Arbeit untersuche ich die Frage, wie das demokratische Wahlrecht legitim 
verteilt  werden kann.  Dies ist  nicht nur aus unmittelbar  real-politischen Gründen relevant 
(z.B. im Kontext von Migrationspolitik), sondern hat auch für moderne Demokratietheorie 
Bedeutung, wie der erste Teil meiner Arbeit zeigt: Der demokratische politische Prozess wird 
gemeinhin als besonders „gerecht“ oder „legitim“ angesehen, weil angenommen wird, dass er 
die  Werte  Freiheit,  Gerechtigkeit  und  Akzeptierbarkeit  („reasonable  acceptability“)  auf 
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einzigartige Weise realisiert, und zwar durch das allgemeine, freie und gleiche Wahlrecht. Was 
dabei allerdings oft übersehen wird ist die Tatsache, dass die Verteilung des Wahlrechts in 
Demokratien weder  eindeutig  noch in  jedem Fall  legitim ist.  Lange Zeit  waren in  vielen 
Staaten  zum Beispiel  ausschließlich weiße,  volljährige,  männliche Staatsbürger  mit  einem 
gewissen ökonomischen Status und Bildungsniveau wahlberechtigt.  Das würden heute die 
wenigsten  als  „legitim“  oder  gar  „gerecht“  bezeichnen,  denn  es  verletzt  alle  der  oben 
genannten Werte. Dennoch ist es eine Fehlannahme, davon auszugehen, dass der  politische 
Prozess, der die Demokratie zur solchen macht, dadurch „undemokratisch“ wird, denn die Art 
wie politische Institutionen gestaltet sind, wie Wahlen abgehalten oder Regierungen gebildet 
werden, ist unabhängig davon,  wer die Wähler sind. Daraus folgt, dass für die Legitimität 
einer Demokratie nicht nur der politische Prozess, durch den sie normalerweise charakterisiert 
wird,  sondern  dass  auch  die  Voraussetzungen dieses  Prozesses  essentiell  sind.  Zu  diesen 
Voraussetzungen gehört vor allem die Verteilung des Wahlrechts, oder anders ausgedrückt der 
Aspekt der In- und Exklusion. Meine Arbeit widmet sich daher der Frage, wie das Wahlrecht 
so  verteilt  werden  kann,  dass  die  zugrundeliegenden  Prinzipien  mit  den  Werten  Freiheit, 
Gleichheit und „Akzeptierbarkeit“ übereinstimmen.
Um diese  Frage  zu  beantworten,  gehe  ich  in  drei  Schritten  vor.  Zuerst  definiere  ich  die 
grundlegenden Konzepte dieser Arbeit, d.h. Demokratie und Legitimität, um so den Inhalt der 
Analyse klar abzugrenzen und die Ansatzpunkte für die folgende Argumentation darzulegen. 
Im zweiten Teil widme ich mich einem Fallbeispiel, nämlich dem englischen Wahlrecht. Ich 
analysiere nicht nur, historisch, wie das aktuelle Wahlrecht in England strukturiert ist und wie 
es  sich  entwickelt  hat,  sondern  auch,  theoretisch,  auf  Basis  welcher  Prinzipien  diese 
Regelungen begründet werden können. Diese Untersuchung ermöglicht mir einen Überblick 
über aktuelle und potentielle  Einschränkungen des Wahlrechts,  die  ich im dritten Teil  der 
vorliegenden Arbeit  systematisieren  und theoretisch  aufarbeiten  werde.  Auf  dieses  Gerüst 
lassen  sich  sodann  die  zuvor  festgelegten  Prinzipien  der  Legitimität  anwenden,  sodass 
festgestellt werden kann, ob die konkrete Wahlrechtsverteilung in England legitim gestaltet 
ist. Darüber hinaus ermöglicht es mir außerdem auch einen allgemeinen Schluss darüber, wie 
das Wahlrecht nicht nur in England sondern ganz allgemein verteilt werden muss, damit die 
daraufaufbauende Demokratie dem Anspruch von Legitimität gerecht werden kann, denn die 
theoretischen Ergebnisse meiner Arbeit sind in ihrer Anwendbarkeit nicht auf das Fallbeispiel 
England begrenzt.
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Insgesamt hat meine Arbeit also ein zweifaches Ziel. Es geht einerseits um die historische 
Aufarbeitung eines konkreten politischen Prozesses, der Wahlrechtsentwicklung in England, 
anderseits geht es aber auch um die Abstraktion und Systematisierung der zugrundeliegenden 
Prinzipien, um so eine normative Analyse zu ermöglichen. Ich hoffe, damit einen originellen 
Beitrag zur aktuellen demokratietheoretischen Debatte zu leisten, da es meiner umfassenden 
Recherche  zufolge  bisher  keinen  vergleichbaren  Versuch  einer  Fallstudien-basierten 
Systematisierung gibt.
Aspekte,  die im Kontext demokratischer  Legitimität  ebenfalls  relevant  sind aber in dieser 
Arbeit aufgrund des begrenzten Rahmens nicht bearbeitet werden können, sind zum Beispiel 
nicht-legalisierte, d.h. indirekte, Beschränkungen des Wahlrechts. Indem meine Arbeit sich 
auf  die  Gestaltung  des  Wahlrechts konzentriert,  werden  nämlich  all  jene  Umstände 
ausgeblendet,  die  unabhängig  davon  das  Wahlrecht  oder  dessen  Ausübung  ebenfalls 
einschränken können. Beispielsweise wäre denkbar, dass das Wahlrecht zwar legitim verteilt 
ist, d.h. dass all jene dieses Wahlrecht besitzen, denen es zusteht und niemand, dem es nicht 
zusteht, dass jedoch die de-facto Ausübung des Wahlrechts indirekt an Bedingungen geknüpft 
ist,  die  nur  bestimmte  Bevölkerungsgruppen  erfüllen  können,  zum  Beispiel  weil  für  die 
Erreichung  des  Wahlortes  ein  gewisser  Grad  an  Mobilität  und  zeitlicher  und/oder 
ökonomischer Flexibilität vorausgesetzt wird. Dies würde die Frage der Legitimität natürlich 
maßgeblich beeinflussen, ist jedoch ein Problem, das in der vorliegenden Arbeit nicht näher 
analysiert werden kann. Der zweite wesentliche Aspekt, der im vorliegenden Kontext nicht 
diskutiert wird, ist die Frage ob der demokratische politische  Prozess tatsächlich legitim ist 
bzw. ob er dies notwendigerweise und in jedem Fall ist. Es ist nicht mein Ziel, die Frage zu 
beantworten, wie legitim Demokratie „wirklich“ ist, ob sie „immer“ legitim ist, wer in einer 
Demokratie „wirklich“ wählen kann oder ob das Wahlrecht „immer“ umgesetzt wird, sondern 
es geht um die Frage, wie das Wahlrecht verteilt werden muss, sodass der politische Prozess 
einer  Demokratie  die  Möglichkeit hat,  legitim  zu  sein.  Das  Wahlrecht  wird  also  als 
Voraussetzung  dieses  Prozesses  verstanden  und  auf  diesen  Aspekt  der  demokratischen 
Legitimität beschränkt sich die vorliegende Analyse.
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